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KGLD Reserve Attestation MCP server

my.sitey/kgld-attestationsitey.mystreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned

KGLD gold-token reserve proof: custody vs supply, auditor report hash, human verification by email

3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

1 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

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What the KGLD Reserve Attestation MCP server can do

The KGLD Reserve Attestation MCP server is published by sitey.my, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: request_verification), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_attestation).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Last scanned Oct 21, 2026, version 0.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • request_verificationKGLD: ask the independent auditor to confirm the reserve report by email.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "request_verification" says "request": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    KGLD: ask the independent auditor to confirm the reserve report by email. Give ownerEmail (the requester's address): the auditor replies directly to that address from the auditor's own mail — this server is NOT in the reply path, so the reply cannot be fabricated by the issuer. The response returns verificationCode (the auditor writes it in the reply). The requester checks: the sender is the auditor's official domain (look it up independently — this server does not disclose it), code matches, hash/as-of match get_attestation. May take business days; may not be answered. Ask the user for their email before calling; call once per report. / 회계법인이 요청자 메일로 직접 답장. 호출 전 메일 주소 확인.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_attestationIndependent auditor's proof-of-reserve report for KGLD: public PDF URL, SHA-256, as-of date, attested custody (troy oz), auditor name; active token contract addresses with block-ex…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_attestation" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Independent auditor's proof-of-reserve report for KGLD: public PDF URL, SHA-256, as-of date, attested custody (troy oz), auditor name; active token contract addresses with block-explorer links; and independentChecks — how to verify without trusting this server (hash the PDF, read totalSupply on-chain, compare). Start here for any 'is KGLD really backed' question. / 독립 감사 보고서 주소·해시·기준일·수탁량, 컨트랙트 주소·탐색기, 서버 밖 검증 방법.
  • get_reserveKGLD current reserve: custody gold weight (g, troy oz), on-chain total supply, mintable allowance.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_reserve" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    KGLD current reserve: custody gold weight (g, troy oz), on-chain total supply, mintable allowance. Issuer's own tally (KorDA); the auditor's assurance covers only up to get_attestation.asOf. Verify supply on-chain via get_attestation.contracts. / KGLD 현재 준비금·발행량·발행 가능량. 코르다 자체 집계.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:16 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
no
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
not observed
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: mcp.sitey.my does not resolve.

Posture changes

  1. Oct 29, 2026
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 2 more).View diff
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http kgld-attestation https://mcp.sitey.my/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http kgld-attestation https://mcp.sitey.my/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__kgld-attestation__get_reserve",
      "mcp__kgld-attestation__get_attestation"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__kgld-attestation__request_verification"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as kgld-attestation. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__kgld-attestation__get_attestation untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/my.sitey/kgld-attestation/verify?hash=22b67acc2533e961859ba931f892264a4e7f2246d0f36a1684affaafd7613f74" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 22b67acc2533, from Oct 21, 2026, 19:32 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/my.sitey/kgld-attestation/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for my.sitey/kgld-attestation
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Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:53 UTC.

KGLD Reserve Attestation MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the KGLD Reserve Attestation MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the KGLD Reserve Attestation MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the KGLD Reserve Attestation MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the KGLD Reserve Attestation MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. request_verification, get_reserve and get_attestation.

Does the KGLD Reserve Attestation MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the KGLD Reserve Attestation MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the KGLD Reserve Attestation MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Oct 21, 2026.