vibescan MCP server
net.bigfloppy.vibescan/vibescanvibescan.bigfloppy.netstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Free security scan for AI-written GitHub repos: leaked keys, .env, eval, SQLi, CORS.
1 tool: 1 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding, 1 high
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the vibescan MCP server can do
The vibescan MCP server is published by vibescan.bigfloppy.net, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: scan_repo), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 1 finding, 1 of them high severity (sensitive-path). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
1 tool
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
scan_repoScan a public GitHub repo (owner/repo or URL) for leaked secrets, .env files, eval, SQLi, CORS and other risky patterns common in AI-written code.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Findings
- High
The description refers to ".env".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...(owner/repo or URL) for leaked secrets, .env files, eval, SQLi, CORS and other risky..."
Description, as the server wrote it Scan a public GitHub repo (owner/repo or URL) for leaked secrets, .env files, eval, SQLi, CORS and other risky patterns common in AI-written code.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://vibescan.bigfloppy.net/mcp: tools/list returned 1 tool to an anonymous client, including scan_repo (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Highscan_repo
The description refers to ".env".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...(owner/repo or URL) for leaked secrets, .env files, eval, SQLi, CORS and other risky..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http vibescan https://vibescan.bigfloppy.net/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http vibescan https://vibescan.bigfloppy.net/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__vibescan__scan_repo"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as vibescan. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/net.bigfloppy.vibescan/vibescan/verify?hash=54ec23a6158b7ae5bf8bfc002d2521db3ff0f2b9302a97f79da62a2d0694ebf6" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 54ec23a6158b, from Nov 10, 2026, 11:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/net.bigfloppy.vibescan/vibescan/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/net.bigfloppy.vibescan/vibescan)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 29, 2026, 03:18 UTC.
vibescan MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the vibescan MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding (1 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the vibescan MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the vibescan MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the vibescan MCP server have?
- 1 tool: 1 write. scan_repo.
Does the vibescan MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the vibescan MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the vibescan MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.