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Docuflex e-signature MCP server

net.docuflex/esigndocuflex.netstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

E-signature envelopes on Docuflex: create, send, track, verify; US e-sign law lookup.

13 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 3 do something that can't be undone, 2 change things and 7 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 3 irreversible, 2 write, 7 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 2
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things and 3 do something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Docuflex e-signature MCP server can do

The Docuflex e-signature MCP server is published by docuflex.net, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 13 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: void_envelope), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (create_envelope, send_envelope and request_access) and create or change data (2 tools: docuflex_overview and verify_envelope). 7 tools only read.

2 tools read private data (esign_law_lookup and get_envelope); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_signing_url); 2 tools can send data out of your system (create_envelope and send_envelope). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

13 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • void_envelopeVoid a sent envelope with a reason.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "void_envelope" says "void": a word for removing or ending something.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Void a sent envelope with a reason.
Can't be undone 3Claude Code: ask
  • create_envelopeCreate a Docuflex envelope.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_envelope" says "create": a word for a change.
    • The input addresses people (input.recipients): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.recipients): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a Docuflex envelope. documents: inline base64 PDFs or staged uploadIds. recipients: name, email, routingOrder (1 = first), optional type (signer default, cc, certified_delivery, in_person_signer...). tabs: type (signature, initial, date_signed, text, checkbox...), page (1-based), x/y/width/height as fractions of the page from the top-left, documentIndex and recipientIndex into this request's arrays. status 'sent' sends now; omit for a draft.
  • request_accessSend a message to the Docuflex team (commercial terms, higher limits, questions).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "request_access" says "request": a word for a change.
    • The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Send a message to the Docuflex team (commercial terms, higher limits, questions). Only when the user explicitly asks and provides their own email. Limited to 5 per hour per IP.
  • send_envelopeTransition a draft to sent.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "send_envelope" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "send_envelope" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Transition a draft to sent.
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • docuflex_overviewProduct summary, how to get an API key, base URLs, auth, limits and links.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Product summary, how to get an API key, base URLs, auth, limits and links.
  • verify_envelopeNo key needed.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    No key needed. Returns status, sealed-document hashes, certificate hash and audit-chain verification for an envelope id. Never returns document content.
Only reads 7Show 7 read-only tools
  • docuflex_api_referenceList the operations (method, path, summary) for one resource group from the OpenAPI spec: envelopes, signing, verify, templates, bulk-send, connect, uploads, api-keys, oauth, accou…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the operations (method, path, summary) for one resource group from the OpenAPI spec: envelopes, signing, verify, templates, bulk-send, connect, uploads, api-keys, oauth, accounts, library, admin.
  • esign_law_lookupHigh-level ESIGN / UETA / ESRA summary for a US state, the document types the federal act excludes, and what Docuflex records.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "esign_law_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "document": it reads documents.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    High-level ESIGN / UETA / ESRA summary for a US state, the document types the federal act excludes, and what Docuflex records. Not legal advice.
  • get_audit_trailHash-chained audit events for an envelope, oldest first.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_audit_trail" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Hash-chained audit events for an envelope, oldest first.
  • get_envelopeEnvelope status, recipients, documents.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_envelope" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "document": it reads documents.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Envelope status, recipients, documents.
  • get_signing_urlShort-lived signing URL for a current-tier recipient (embedded signing).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_signing_url" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "get_signing_url" says "get" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Short-lived signing URL for a current-tier recipient (embedded signing). Provide the recipient's email or clientUserId as used on the envelope and a returnUrl.
  • list_envelopesMost recent envelopes for the account.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_envelopes" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Most recent envelopes for the account.
  • whoamiWorks with an OAuth2 bearer token (user principal).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "whoami" says "whoami": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Works with an OAuth2 bearer token (user principal). Plain API keys are account-scoped and get 403 here; then use the account id from Account settings in the Docuflex app and pass it as account_id or x-docuflex-account.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

4 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 untrusted-input tool breaks every one.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__esign__get_signing_url"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 12, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
6
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (1 destructive, 3 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://docuflex.net/mcp: tools/list returned 13 tools to an anonymous client, including void_envelope (destructive), create_envelope (irreversible), send_envelope (irreversible), request_access (irreversible), docuflex_overview (write) and 1 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http esign https://docuflex.net/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http esign https://docuflex.net/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__esign__docuflex_api_reference",
      "mcp__esign__esign_law_lookup",
      "mcp__esign__whoami",
      "mcp__esign__get_envelope",
      "mcp__esign__list_envelopes",
      "mcp__esign__get_signing_url",
      "mcp__esign__get_audit_trail"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__esign__docuflex_overview",
      "mcp__esign__create_envelope",
      "mcp__esign__send_envelope",
      "mcp__esign__verify_envelope",
      "mcp__esign__request_access"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__esign__void_envelope"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as esign. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__esign__esign_law_lookup private-data
  • mcp__esign__create_envelope outbound
  • mcp__esign__send_envelope outbound
  • mcp__esign__get_envelope private-data
  • mcp__esign__get_signing_url untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/net.docuflex/esign/verify?hash=c5c509cbdf13cc28f5f69ddb8dc5e3a99620ebf555ee715638f7aee323f4071a" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash c5c509cbdf13, from Nov 11, 2026, 20:19 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/net.docuflex/esign/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for net.docuflex/esign
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/net.docuflex/esign.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/net.docuflex/esign)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 11, 2026, 20:19 UTC.

Docuflex e-signature MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Docuflex e-signature MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 13 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Docuflex e-signature MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: void_envelope.

Can the Docuflex e-signature MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 3 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: create_envelope, send_envelope and request_access.

What tools does the Docuflex e-signature MCP server have?

13 tools: 1 destructive, 3 irreversible, 2 write, 7 read. void_envelope, create_envelope, send_envelope, request_access, docuflex_overview, verify_envelope, docuflex_api_reference, esign_law_lookup and 5 more.

Does the Docuflex e-signature MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Docuflex e-signature MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): create_envelope and send_envelope.

Has the Docuflex e-signature MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.