isitdns MCP server
net.isitdns/isitdnsisitdns.netstreamable-httpv2026-11-21Scanned
Is it DNS? Audit a site or domain that isn't working: one call says if it resolves and why. No key.
6 tools: 5 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 6
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
5 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the isitdns MCP server can do
The isitdns MCP server is published by isitdns.net, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: check_domain, dig, trace, dnssec_chain and 1 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
6 tools bring in text other people can write (check_domain, dig, trace and 3 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 4 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 2026-11-21.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
check_domainCheck a domain that is not working: whether the name resolves in public DNS, then the eleven-check audit of its zone, each row ok, warn, fail or skipped with why.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Check a domain that is not working: whether the name resolves in public DNS, then the eleven-check audit of its zone, each row ok, warn, fail or skipped with why. DNS only, not HTTP or TLS. Measured from the isitdns edge and its probes, never the caller's network. from moves the recursion, TTL and UDP truncation rows to that region's probe.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Check a domain's DNS
digDig one name and type at one board resolver, or at Cloudflare, Google, Quad9 and AdGuard side by side (resolver all): records, flags, rcode, EDE, latency.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Dig one name and type at one board resolver, or at Cloudflare, Google, Quad9 and AdGuard side by side (resolver all): records, flags, rcode, EDE, latency. Asked over DoH from the isitdns edge. from moves the question to that region's probe as Do53 over UDP, and follow: true adds the CNAME chain as separate reads with DNSSEC off. A resolver given as an address must be on the board.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Dig one record
dnssec_chainWalk the DNSSEC chain from the root to one answer: DS and DNSKEY at each signed zone cut, key tags, signers, signature windows, the first link that breaks or goes insecure, and whe…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Walk the DNSSEC chain from the root to one answer: DS and DNSKEY at each signed zone cut, key tags, signers, signature windows, the first link that breaks or goes insecure, and whether the zone where it goes insecure is itself signed (an island of security). Read through Cloudflare's resolver over DoH with CD=1 from the isitdns edge, and a key set a break would rest on again through Google's. Signature bytes are not verified, so a clean walk does not prove the answer validates. type (default A) is the record checked at the end, not OPT, RRSIG or a meta type such as ANY, and anchor (a DS or DNSKEY record, with anchor_zone) starts the walk at that zone instead of the root.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Walk the DNSSEC chain
sweep_domainSweep a zone's nameservers: the same names and types asked at a sample of its authoritative addresses, reporting disagreements, lame or silent servers, serial and TTL differences, …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Sweep a zone's nameservers: the same names and types asked at a sample of its authoritative addresses, reporting disagreements, lame or silent servers, serial and TTL differences, the CAA in effect, and each _acme-challenge TXT or CNAME. Asked with RD=0 over TCP from the isitdns edge or a probe, named on each answer. Every question not asked is listed with why, and an answer past 22,000 bytes is trimmed with counts, the whole sweep at its api: URL. names are labels under domain (@ for domain itself), 16 at most, and types 8 at most.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Sweep a zone's nameservers
traceTrace a delegation from the root to the authority: each referral and its glue, the one server that answered at each zone cut and any dial that failed, the final answer and its TTLs…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Trace a delegation from the root to the authority: each referral and its glue, the one server that answered at each zone cut and any dial that failed, the final answer and its TTLs. Each hop is asked with RD=0 over TCP from the isitdns edge or a probe, named on the hop. Give the full host name: the walk ends at the zone that answers for it, and type (default A) is what it asks there.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Trace a delegation
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
registrationRead a domain's registration from its registry's RDAP server: each status with what it means for resolution, the registration, expiry and change dates, the nameservers, whether the…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Read a domain's registration from its registry's RDAP server: each status with what it means for resolution, the registration, expiry and change dates, the nameservers, whether the delegation is signed. Read over HTTPS from the isitdns edge through IANA's RDAP bootstrap, and no contacts are returned. A hostname is read at the name, then each parent down to the registered domain, and each HTTP read is listed with its URL, status and time.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Read a registration
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write6
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:16 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://isitdns.net/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including check_domain (write), dig (write), trace (write), dnssec_chain (write), sweep_domain (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools6 changed.~6 changedView diff
- Changed:check_domainChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:digChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:dnssec_chainChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:registrationOnly readsdescription
- Changed:sweep_domainChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:traceChanges thingsdescription
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:digChanges thingsinputSchema
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:digChanges thingsinputSchema
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:dnssec_chainChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 2026-11-21. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http isitdns https://isitdns.net/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http isitdns https://isitdns.net/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__isitdns__registration"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__isitdns__check_domain",
"mcp__isitdns__dig",
"mcp__isitdns__trace",
"mcp__isitdns__dnssec_chain",
"mcp__isitdns__sweep_domain"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as isitdns. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 6 rules
- mcp__isitdns__check_domain untrusted-input
- mcp__isitdns__dig untrusted-input
- mcp__isitdns__trace untrusted-input
- mcp__isitdns__dnssec_chain untrusted-input
- mcp__isitdns__sweep_domain untrusted-input
- mcp__isitdns__registration untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/net.isitdns/isitdns/verify?hash=a1c695d00599e1e7a6e51a46f9ebeec0bceb075d15f758546758f0c4cf4d8900" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash a1c695d00599, from Nov 21, 2026, 20:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/net.isitdns/isitdns/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/net.isitdns/isitdns)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 20:18 UTC.
isitdns MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the isitdns MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the isitdns MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the isitdns MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the isitdns MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 5 write, 1 read. check_domain, dig, trace, dnssec_chain, sweep_domain and registration.
Does the isitdns MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the isitdns MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the isitdns MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 4 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 18, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.