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isitdns MCP server

net.isitdns/isitdnsisitdns.netstreamable-httpv2026-11-21Scanned

Is it DNS? Audit a site or domain that isn't working: one call says if it resolves and why. No key.

6 tools: 5 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 5 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 6
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

5 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the isitdns MCP server can do

The isitdns MCP server is published by isitdns.net, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: check_domain, dig, trace, dnssec_chain and 1 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

6 tools bring in text other people can write (check_domain, dig, trace and 3 more).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 4 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 2026-11-21.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
  • check_domainCheck a domain that is not working: whether the name resolves in public DNS, then the eleven-check audit of its zone, each row ok, warn, fail or skipped with why.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check a domain that is not working: whether the name resolves in public DNS, then the eleven-check audit of its zone, each row ok, warn, fail or skipped with why. DNS only, not HTTP or TLS. Measured from the isitdns edge and its probes, never the caller's network. from moves the recursion, TTL and UDP truncation rows to that region's probe.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Check a domain's DNS
  • digDig one name and type at one board resolver, or at Cloudflare, Google, Quad9 and AdGuard side by side (resolver all): records, flags, rcode, EDE, latency.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Dig one name and type at one board resolver, or at Cloudflare, Google, Quad9 and AdGuard side by side (resolver all): records, flags, rcode, EDE, latency. Asked over DoH from the isitdns edge. from moves the question to that region's probe as Do53 over UDP, and follow: true adds the CNAME chain as separate reads with DNSSEC off. A resolver given as an address must be on the board.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Dig one record
  • dnssec_chainWalk the DNSSEC chain from the root to one answer: DS and DNSKEY at each signed zone cut, key tags, signers, signature windows, the first link that breaks or goes insecure, and whe…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Walk the DNSSEC chain from the root to one answer: DS and DNSKEY at each signed zone cut, key tags, signers, signature windows, the first link that breaks or goes insecure, and whether the zone where it goes insecure is itself signed (an island of security). Read through Cloudflare's resolver over DoH with CD=1 from the isitdns edge, and a key set a break would rest on again through Google's. Signature bytes are not verified, so a clean walk does not prove the answer validates. type (default A) is the record checked at the end, not OPT, RRSIG or a meta type such as ANY, and anchor (a DS or DNSKEY record, with anchor_zone) starts the walk at that zone instead of the root.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Walk the DNSSEC chain
  • sweep_domainSweep a zone's nameservers: the same names and types asked at a sample of its authoritative addresses, reporting disagreements, lame or silent servers, serial and TTL differences, …Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Sweep a zone's nameservers: the same names and types asked at a sample of its authoritative addresses, reporting disagreements, lame or silent servers, serial and TTL differences, the CAA in effect, and each _acme-challenge TXT or CNAME. Asked with RD=0 over TCP from the isitdns edge or a probe, named on each answer. Every question not asked is listed with why, and an answer past 22,000 bytes is trimmed with counts, the whole sweep at its api: URL. names are labels under domain (@ for domain itself), 16 at most, and types 8 at most.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Sweep a zone's nameservers
  • traceTrace a delegation from the root to the authority: each referral and its glue, the one server that answered at each zone cut and any dial that failed, the final answer and its TTLs…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Trace a delegation from the root to the authority: each referral and its glue, the one server that answered at each zone cut and any dial that failed, the final answer and its TTLs. Each hop is asked with RD=0 over TCP from the isitdns edge or a probe, named on the hop. Give the full host name: the walk ends at the zone that answers for it, and type (default A) is what it asks there.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Trace a delegation
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • registrationRead a domain's registration from its registry's RDAP server: each status with what it means for resolution, the registration, expiry and change dates, the nameservers, whether the…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read a domain's registration from its registry's RDAP server: each status with what it means for resolution, the registration, expiry and change dates, the nameservers, whether the delegation is signed. Read over HTTPS from the isitdns edge through IANA's RDAP bootstrap, and no contacts are returned. A hostname is read at the name, then each parent down to the registered domain, and each HTTP read is listed with its URL, status and time.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Read a registration

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write6
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:16 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://isitdns.net/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including check_domain (write), dig (write), trace (write), dnssec_chain (write), sweep_domain (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools6 changed.~6 changedView diff
  2. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
    • Changed:digChanges thingsinputSchema
  3. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
    • Changed:digChanges thingsinputSchema
  4. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 2026-11-21. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http isitdns https://isitdns.net/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http isitdns https://isitdns.net/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__isitdns__registration"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__isitdns__check_domain",
      "mcp__isitdns__dig",
      "mcp__isitdns__trace",
      "mcp__isitdns__dnssec_chain",
      "mcp__isitdns__sweep_domain"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as isitdns. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 6 rules
  • mcp__isitdns__check_domain untrusted-input
  • mcp__isitdns__dig untrusted-input
  • mcp__isitdns__trace untrusted-input
  • mcp__isitdns__dnssec_chain untrusted-input
  • mcp__isitdns__sweep_domain untrusted-input
  • mcp__isitdns__registration untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/net.isitdns/isitdns/verify?hash=a1c695d00599e1e7a6e51a46f9ebeec0bceb075d15f758546758f0c4cf4d8900" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash a1c695d00599, from Nov 21, 2026, 20:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/net.isitdns/isitdns/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for net.isitdns/isitdns
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/net.isitdns/isitdns.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/net.isitdns/isitdns)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 20:18 UTC.

isitdns MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the isitdns MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the isitdns MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the isitdns MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the isitdns MCP server have?

6 tools: 5 write, 1 read. check_domain, dig, trace, dnssec_chain, sweep_domain and registration.

Does the isitdns MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the isitdns MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the isitdns MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 4 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 18, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.