solana-token-launch MCP server
net.postandshare/solana-token-launchpostandshare.netstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Create, launch and rug-check Solana SPL tokens over x402. Non-custodial, no keys handed over.
4 tools: 3 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 2
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the solana-token-launch MCP server can do
The solana-token-launch MCP server is published by postandshare.net, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: sol_launch_plan, sol_token_audit and sol_build_launch_tx), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool reads private data (sol_networks); 2 tools can send data out of your system (sol_launch_plan and sol_build_launch_tx).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
sol_build_launch_tx$0.02 per call.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.uri): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it $0.02 per call. Returns a complete, unsigned Solana transaction that creates an SPL mint, writes Metaplex metadata on-chain, mints the supply to the payer and revokes the mint authority in the same transaction. NON-CUSTODIAL: the service never sees a private key — the caller signs with their own wallet. Requires a payer public key. Test on devnet first.
sol_launch_planFree.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.uri): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Validate a Solana token launch before building it: normalises name/symbol/supply/decimals, applies a typed allow/review/deny gate, states the authority policy (mint revoked, no freeze authority by default) and returns the exact on-chain cost in SOL and USD. Use this first — it costs nothing and catches the mistakes that would otherwise be signed.
sol_token_audit$0.003 per call.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it $0.003 per call. Read a Solana SPL mint's real authority state: who can mint more supply, who can freeze holders, whether the metadata is immutable, plus on-chain name/symbol/logo and a verdict with machine-readable flags. Reads the chain directly — no opinion, no blacklist.
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
sol_networksList Solana networks this API builds for (mainnet-beta, devnet), the on-chain programs used, and the exact rent + fee table for a token launch in lamports.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "table": it reads databases.
Description, as the server wrote it List Solana networks this API builds for (mainnet-beta, devnet), the on-chain programs used, and the exact rent + fee table for a token launch in lamports. Free — no payment required.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 25, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.postandshare.net/mcp/solana: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including sol_launch_plan (write), sol_token_audit (write), sol_build_launch_tx (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http solana-token-launch https://api.postandshare.net/mcp/solanaclaude mcp add --transport http solana-token-launch https://api.postandshare.net/mcp/solanaRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__solana-token-launch__sol_networks"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__solana-token-launch__sol_launch_plan",
"mcp__solana-token-launch__sol_token_audit",
"mcp__solana-token-launch__sol_build_launch_tx"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as solana-token-launch. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__solana-token-launch__sol_networks private-data
- mcp__solana-token-launch__sol_launch_plan outbound
- mcp__solana-token-launch__sol_build_launch_tx outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/net.postandshare/solana-token-launch/verify?hash=71d8e88750b4185923968afa5dd6a0e660ee37ad3cdd364f5f6ce818b2e96530" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 71d8e88750b4, from Nov 9, 2026, 05:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/net.postandshare/solana-token-launch/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/net.postandshare/solana-token-launch)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 25, 2026, 14:25 UTC.
solana-token-launch MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the solana-token-launch MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the solana-token-launch MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the solana-token-launch MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the solana-token-launch MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 3 write, 1 read. sol_launch_plan, sol_token_audit, sol_build_launch_tx and sol_networks.
Does the solana-token-launch MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the solana-token-launch MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): sol_launch_plan and sol_build_launch_tx.
Has the solana-token-launch MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.