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Secret Santa Raffle MCP server

net.secretsantaraffle/mcpsecretsantaraffle.netstreamable-httpv0.4.0Scanned

Organise a Secret Santa from Claude or ChatGPT. Matchings never appear in the chat.

3 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 2 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 2 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Secret Santa Raffle MCP server can do

The Secret Santa Raffle MCP server is published by secretsantaraffle.net, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (send_invitations_email) and create or change data (2 tools: create_draw and get_group_share_message), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool reads private data (get_group_share_message); 3 tools bring in text other people can write (create_draw, send_invitations_email and get_group_share_message); 1 tool can send data out of your system (send_invitations_email). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 0.4.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • send_invitations_emailSends the email invitation to all participants of a draw created in this same conversation.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "send_invitations_email" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "send_invitations_email" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.shareCode.description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.shareCode.description: "Access credential of the draw, returned by create_draw (s..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Sends the email invitation to all participants of a draw created in this same conversation. Each participant receives a personal email invitation. The send is immediate and cannot be recalled; a draw admits one bulk send. Takes the drawId and shareCode returned by create_draw.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Email the invitations
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • create_drawCreates a Secret Santa / Amigo Invisible / Amigo Secreto / gift exchange draw and pairs the participants randomly, honouring exclusion rules (e.g.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_draw" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Creates a Secret Santa / Amigo Invisible / Amigo Secreto / gift exchange draw and pairs the participants randomly, honouring exclusion rules (e.g. couple-couple, sibling-sibling). The first participant in the list is the organizer. The required inputs are the date and at least 3 participants; the budget, the exclusions, a personal invitation message and the locale are optional. The draw is created immediately and cannot be modified from this server afterwards. The result returns the draw id and its share code, and lists two ways to invite the participants: send_invitations_email (an email to each participant) or get_group_share_message (a message to paste into a group chat).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Create a Secret Santa draw
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_group_share_messageGenerates a ready-to-paste WhatsApp/Telegram message announcing a freshly created draw, which the user copies into the relevant chat.Reads private dataReads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_group_share_message" says "get": a word for reading.
    • The description's first verb is "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "get_group_share_message" says "get" and "message": it reads messages.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "message": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "get_group_share_message" says "get" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "generate" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "get_group_share_message" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_group_share_message" says "get": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generates a ready-to-paste WhatsApp/Telegram message announcing a freshly created draw, which the user copies into the relevant chat. Localized in Spanish (Spain), Spanish (Latin America), Spanish (Mexico) or English according to the brand. It is the alternative to send_invitations_email for sharing without emails: nothing is sent.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get a group chat message
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

3 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__secretsantaraffle__send_invitations_email"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:16 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.secretsantaraffle.net/claude/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including send_invitations_email (irreversible), create_draw (write), get_group_share_message (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn1 info
  • The server marks "get_group_share_message" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_group_share_message" says "get": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.shareCode.description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.shareCode.description: "Access credential of the draw, returned by create_draw (s..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.4.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http secretsantaraffle https://mcp.secretsantaraffle.net/claude/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http secretsantaraffle https://mcp.secretsantaraffle.net/claude/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__secretsantaraffle__create_draw",
      "mcp__secretsantaraffle__send_invitations_email",
      "mcp__secretsantaraffle__get_group_share_message"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as secretsantaraffle. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__secretsantaraffle__create_draw untrusted-input
  • mcp__secretsantaraffle__send_invitations_email untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__secretsantaraffle__get_group_share_message private-data, untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/net.secretsantaraffle/mcp/verify?hash=7b9f5e2c40e8e999e51ebdfe36e749724ae5830738d428f6b73915b2c4a38407" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 7b9f5e2c40e8, from Nov 18, 2026, 20:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/net.secretsantaraffle/mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for net.secretsantaraffle/mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/net.secretsantaraffle/mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/net.secretsantaraffle/mcp)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:53 UTC.

Secret Santa Raffle MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Secret Santa Raffle MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Secret Santa Raffle MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Secret Santa Raffle MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: send_invitations_email.

What tools does the Secret Santa Raffle MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 irreversible, 2 write. send_invitations_email, create_draw and get_group_share_message.

Does the Secret Santa Raffle MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Secret Santa Raffle MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): send_invitations_email.

Has the Secret Santa Raffle MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.