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crx-permission-risk MCP server

one.zovo/crx-permission-riskzovo.onestreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Score the privilege a Chrome MV3 extension takes from its manifest, and diff permission sets.

3 tools: 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

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Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
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A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the crx-permission-risk MCP server can do

The crx-permission-risk MCP server is published by zovo.one, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • analyze_manifestStatic privilege analysis of a Chrome MV3 manifest.json.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "analyze_manifest" says "analyze": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Static privilege analysis of a Chrome MV3 manifest.json. Returns a 0-100 risk score, the permissions and host patterns that drive it, dangerous permission combinations, and MV3 policy problems (remote code, unsafe-eval, <all_urls> web_accessible_resources). Content-script matches are counted as host access even when host_permissions is empty.
  • compare_permission_setsCompares the permissions and host patterns of two versions of an extension.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "compare_permission_sets" says "compare": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Compares the permissions and host patterns of two versions of an extension. Reports the score delta, what was added or removed, and whether the change widens the install-time warning set, which makes Chrome disable the extension for existing users until they re-accept.
  • explain_permissionReturns the privilege weight (0-10) for a single Chrome extension permission or host pattern, what it actually grants, whether it triggers an install-time warning, and the narrower…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "explain_permission" says "explain": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the privilege weight (0-10) for a single Chrome extension permission or host pattern, what it actually grants, whether it triggers an install-time warning, and the narrower alternative if one exists.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:27 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http crx-permission-risk https://crx-permission-risk-mcp.lipmichal.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http crx-permission-risk https://crx-permission-risk-mcp.lipmichal.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__crx-permission-risk__analyze_manifest",
      "mcp__crx-permission-risk__explain_permission",
      "mcp__crx-permission-risk__compare_permission_sets"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as crx-permission-risk. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/one.zovo/crx-permission-risk/verify?hash=522b0ff92ad0c263240cc7906517eaf3d83723d7b970bacf08f8c03c38faaeac" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 522b0ff92ad0, from Nov 18, 2026, 23:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/one.zovo/crx-permission-risk/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for one.zovo/crx-permission-risk
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/one.zovo/crx-permission-risk.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/one.zovo/crx-permission-risk)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:54 UTC.

crx-permission-risk MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the crx-permission-risk MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the crx-permission-risk MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the crx-permission-risk MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the crx-permission-risk MCP server have?

3 tools: 3 read. analyze_manifest, explain_permission and compare_permission_sets.

Does the crx-permission-risk MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the crx-permission-risk MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the crx-permission-risk MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.