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Agent Community MCP server

org.agentcommunity/mcpagentcommunity.orgstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Agent Community MCP: member lookup, stats, DMV checks, and proposed .agent name interest.

4 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the Agent Community MCP server can do

The Agent Community MCP server is published by agentcommunity.org, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: register_agent) and create or change data (1 tool: verify_certificate). 2 tools only read.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (register_agent).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • register_agentPre-register a .agent identity through the DMV.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Pre-register a .agent identity through the DMV. This is free and non-binding, does not confer domain ownership, and should run only after an explicit user request.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • verify_certificateVerify the live DMV issuance state of a canonical certificate ID.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify the live DMV issuance state of a canonical certificate ID. This does not confer domain ownership or mean the .agent TLD exists in DNS.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_community_statsGet the roughly-live Agent Community member count.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_community_stats" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the roughly-live Agent Community member count. The count is cached for up to 20 minutes.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • lookup_memberLook up one public member by exact display name or slug.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "lookup_member" says "lookup": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up one public member by exact display name or slug. This is not free-text directory search and returns only minimal public information.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:17 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://agentcommunity.org/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://agentcommunity.org/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including register_agent (destructive), verify_certificate (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agentcommunity https://agentcommunity.org/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agentcommunity https://agentcommunity.org/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agentcommunity__lookup_member",
      "mcp__agentcommunity__get_community_stats"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agentcommunity__verify_certificate"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__agentcommunity__register_agent"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentcommunity. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__agentcommunity__register_agent untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/org.agentcommunity/mcp/verify?hash=1590b865dfb88e2cb91d50e9ceebe89f7aa75e1881c7000bf5ce1b35df7debef" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 1590b865dfb8, from Nov 18, 2026, 23:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.agentcommunity/mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for org.agentcommunity/mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/org.agentcommunity/mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.agentcommunity/mcp)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:54 UTC.

Agent Community MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Agent Community MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Agent Community MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: register_agent.

Can the Agent Community MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Agent Community MCP server have?

4 tools: 1 destructive, 1 write, 2 read. register_agent, verify_certificate, lookup_member and get_community_stats.

Does the Agent Community MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Agent Community MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Agent Community MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.