AgentShopping Intent Catalog MCP server
org.agentshopping/intent-catalogagentshopping.orgstreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned
MCP endpoint for 100 buyer intents, intent search and dispatchable quote requests.
6 tools: 2 change things and 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the AgentShopping Intent Catalog MCP server can do
The AgentShopping Intent Catalog MCP server is published by agentshopping.org, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: match_workload and build_request), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 0.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
build_requestTurn an intent into a fillable, dispatchable quote request.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "build_request" says "request": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Turn an intent into a fillable, dispatchable quote request. Supply the buyer's context and get back a filled request plus ready-to-send text. Pure computation: this site never transmits the request and never asserts prices or vendors.
match_workloadDeterministic, explainable match or rejection for a workload.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Deterministic, explainable match or rejection for a workload. No scores, no invented numbers.
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
get_intentGet one intent: required context, decision factors, honest supply status and policy.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_intent" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get one intent: required context, decision factors, honest supply status and policy. Never asserts prices or vendors.
list_intentsList 100 buyer-agent transaction intents with supply status.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_intents" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List 100 buyer-agent transaction intents with supply status. 99 of 100 have no verified supply partner. Ranking is editorial, not measured demand.
list_offersSupply catalog with dated verified facts and an explicit list of unverified fields.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_offers" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Supply catalog with dated verified facts and an explicit list of unverified fields. Currently one partner.
search_intentsSearch the 100 intents by keyword and/or category without downloading the whole catalog.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_intents" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Search the 100 intents by keyword and/or category without downloading the whole catalog. Returns ids, labels, categories and request template paths.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 16, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://agentshopping.org/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agentshopping.org/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including match_workload (write), build_request (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 16, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 2
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://agentshopping.org/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 -> 2; RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none -> https://agentshopping.org/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 2
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://agentshopping.org/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http intent-catalog https://agentshopping.org/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http intent-catalog https://agentshopping.org/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__intent-catalog__list_intents",
"mcp__intent-catalog__get_intent",
"mcp__intent-catalog__list_offers",
"mcp__intent-catalog__search_intents"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__intent-catalog__match_workload",
"mcp__intent-catalog__build_request"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as intent-catalog. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/org.agentshopping/intent-catalog/verify?hash=e75f57236b93bc7b8ab0337b4eb2a3b43a8a07a5194241749c7e68ff4c9ecc2d" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash e75f57236b93, from Nov 13, 2026, 05:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.agentshopping/intent-catalog/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.agentshopping/intent-catalog)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 13, 2026, 05:18 UTC.
AgentShopping Intent Catalog MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the AgentShopping Intent Catalog MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the AgentShopping Intent Catalog MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the AgentShopping Intent Catalog MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the AgentShopping Intent Catalog MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 2 write, 4 read. match_workload, build_request, list_intents, get_intent, list_offers and search_intents.
Does the AgentShopping Intent Catalog MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the AgentShopping Intent Catalog MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the AgentShopping Intent Catalog MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.