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Celo x402 Facilitator MCP server

org.celo/x402-facilitatorcelo.orgstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Check supported assets and verify x402 payments on Celo

5 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 0 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Celo x402 Facilitator MCP server can do

The Celo x402 Facilitator MCP server is published by celo.org, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (verify_payment), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

4 tools bring in text other people can write (get_supported, get_health, verify_payment and 1 more).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • verify_paymentCheck a signed x402 payment against its requirements: signature, amount, balance and simulation.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "verify_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "verify_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "verify_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check a signed x402 payment against its requirements: signature, amount, balance and simulation. Moves no funds. Same answer as POST /verify, and it spends the same per-IP allowance.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • get_configEvery settleable asset with its address, decimals, transfer method and EIP-712 domain values, plus the pricing model (gas at cost, plus a fee in basis points on the payment value w…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_config" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Every settleable asset with its address, decimals, transfer method and EIP-712 domain values, plus the pricing model (gas at cost, plus a fee in basis points on the payment value when the asset has a USD price), the gas fallback and the free-credit allowances. Same answer as GET /api/config.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_healthWhether the facilitator behind this host is answering.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_health" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Whether the facilitator behind this host is answering. Same answer as GET /health.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_supportedThe (x402Version, scheme, network) kinds and extensions this facilitator verifies and settles.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_supported" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The (x402Version, scheme, network) kinds and extensions this facilitator verifies and settles. Same answer as GET /supported.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • payment_statusWhether a signed payment authorization has been used on chain, for a client whose settle reply was lost.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "payment_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "reply": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Whether a signed payment authorization has been used on chain, for a client whose settle reply was lost. Answers unspent, consumed or expired from the chain (EIP-3009 authorizationState, or the Permit2 nonce bitmap). unspent is not final: the authorization can still be used until validBefore, and a settlement already in flight reads as unspent here. Only consumed and expired are final; expired is only reported 5 s after validBefore, so a payment still in flight is not called final. The settled and pending states need the owning API key and are only served over HTTP. Same answer as GET /settle/status, and it spends the same per-IP allowance.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 28, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 irreversible). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.x402.celo.org/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_payment (irreversible)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "verify_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "verify_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http x402-facilitator https://api.x402.celo.org/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http x402-facilitator https://api.x402.celo.org/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__x402-facilitator__get_supported",
      "mcp__x402-facilitator__get_config",
      "mcp__x402-facilitator__get_health",
      "mcp__x402-facilitator__payment_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__x402-facilitator__verify_payment"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as x402-facilitator. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__x402-facilitator__get_supported untrusted-input
  • mcp__x402-facilitator__get_health untrusted-input
  • mcp__x402-facilitator__verify_payment untrusted-input
  • mcp__x402-facilitator__payment_status untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/org.celo/x402-facilitator/verify?hash=fcb9a174785d85035f69cc7023f0a77b06c0d91834ab179a0280a2ed24337e77" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash fcb9a174785d, from Nov 9, 2026, 18:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.celo/x402-facilitator/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for org.celo/x402-facilitator
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/org.celo/x402-facilitator.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.celo/x402-facilitator)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 27, 2026, 21:18 UTC.

Celo x402 Facilitator MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Celo x402 Facilitator MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Celo x402 Facilitator MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Celo x402 Facilitator MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: verify_payment.

What tools does the Celo x402 Facilitator MCP server have?

5 tools: 1 irreversible, 4 read. verify_payment, get_supported, get_config, get_health and payment_status.

Does the Celo x402 Facilitator MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Celo x402 Facilitator MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Celo x402 Facilitator MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.