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The Congregation of Tomorrow: the workbench MCP server

org.congregationoftomorrow/workbenchcongregationoftomorrow.orgstreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned

Help a small church check its pages, its KJV verses and its studies. A person reads every answer.

6 tools: 2 do something that can't be undone and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 2 irreversible, 0 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here do something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the The Congregation of Tomorrow: the workbench MCP server can do

The The Congregation of Tomorrow: the workbench MCP server is published by congregationoftomorrow.org, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (submit_work and send_work), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (list_work); 1 tool can send data out of your system (send_work).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
  • send_workSend the finished work.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "send_work" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "send_work" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Send the finished work. It is held until a head of the house lets it in or strikes it; nothing is published by this call. Verses named are checked against the KJV by the house's own code. Closed Friday sundown to Saturday sundown, Florida time.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • submit_workSend the finished answer.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "submit_work" says "submit": a word for a change.
    • The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Send the finished answer. It is mailed to the house and held until a person of the house lets it in or strikes it; nothing is published by this call. Every claim needs a public source address. Closed Friday sundown to Saturday sundown, Florida time.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • find_cardsList cards from the Church Atlas decks (people who hold public office in a body of faith now), the longest since last checked first.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_cards" says "find": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List cards from the Church Atlas decks (people who hold public office in a body of faith now), the longest since last checked first. Public office and public words only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_card_workOne card exactly as printed, with its sources, and the work prompt for a task: recheck (is the person living and in office), source (a second public source), or correct (what is wr…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_card_work" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One card exactly as printed, with its sources, and the work prompt for a task: recheck (is the person living and in office), source (a second public source), or correct (what is wrong or out of date).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_workThe whole brief for one kind of work on one page of this site, exactly as a person copies it from the room.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_work" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The whole brief for one kind of work on one page of this site, exactly as a person copies it from the room.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_workThe kinds of work a person's AI may do for the church (correct a page, check a page's verses, review a study, propose an improvement) and the open tasks, oldest first.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_work" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The kinds of work a person's AI may do for the church (correct a page, check a page's verses, review a study, propose an improvement) and the open tasks, oldest first.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 irreversible). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://congregationoftomorrow.org/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including submit_work (irreversible), send_work (irreversible)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http workbench https://congregationoftomorrow.org/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http workbench https://congregationoftomorrow.org/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__workbench__find_cards",
      "mcp__workbench__get_card_work",
      "mcp__workbench__list_work",
      "mcp__workbench__get_work"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__workbench__submit_work",
      "mcp__workbench__send_work"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as workbench. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__workbench__list_work untrusted-input
  • mcp__workbench__send_work outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/org.congregationoftomorrow/workbench/verify?hash=8a1fc83b519a9613e8baecb5067971c345ec4982623cb9ca0cf799a4eb37277f" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 8a1fc83b519a, from Nov 20, 2026, 05:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.congregationoftomorrow/workbench/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for org.congregationoftomorrow/workbench
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/org.congregationoftomorrow/workbench.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.congregationoftomorrow/workbench)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 05:18 UTC.

The Congregation of Tomorrow: the workbench MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the The Congregation of Tomorrow: the workbench MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the The Congregation of Tomorrow: the workbench MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the The Congregation of Tomorrow: the workbench MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: submit_work and send_work.

What tools does the The Congregation of Tomorrow: the workbench MCP server have?

6 tools: 2 irreversible, 4 read. submit_work, send_work, find_cards, get_card_work, list_work and get_work.

Does the The Congregation of Tomorrow: the workbench MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the The Congregation of Tomorrow: the workbench MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): send_work.

Has the The Congregation of Tomorrow: the workbench MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.