web-tools MCP server
org.echoempire/web-toolsechoempire.orgstreamable-httpv1.3.1Scanned
Web extraction MCP: page content, metadata, articles, contacts, email checks, URL probes.
6 tools: 5 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 6
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
5 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the web-tools MCP server can do
The web-tools MCP server is published by echoempire.org, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: extract_web_metadata, extract_article, extract_contact_details, verify_emails and 1 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
6 tools bring in text other people can write (extract_website_content, extract_web_metadata, extract_article and 3 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (probe_urls).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.3.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
extract_articleExtract structured article data: title, author, published date, clean body text, word count and content hash.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Extract structured article data: title, author, published date, clean body text, word count and content hash. Failed URLs are not billed. Runs Apify Actor skilled_glee/article-text-extractor on YOUR Apify account (pay-per-event $0.001/article, billed by Apify).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
extract_contact_detailsExtract emails (incl.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Extract emails (incl. mailto), North American phone numbers, LinkedIn/X/Facebook/Instagram/YouTube links and contact/about/team page links from web pages. Runs Apify Actor skilled_glee/contact-details-extractor on YOUR Apify account (pay-per-event $0.0015/page, billed by Apify).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
extract_web_metadataExtract title, meta description, Open Graph, Twitter Card, JSON-LD structured data, canonical URL, language and H1s from web pages as JSON.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Extract title, meta description, Open Graph, Twitter Card, JSON-LD structured data, canonical URL, language and H1s from web pages as JSON. Runs Apify Actor skilled_glee/web-metadata-extractor on YOUR Apify account (pay-per-event $0.001/page, billed by Apify).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
probe_urlsCheck URLs with HEAD or GET: HTTP status, final URL after redirects, redirect count, Content-Type and timing.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.urls): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Check URLs with HEAD or GET: HTTP status, final URL after redirects, redirect count, Content-Type and timing. No page body is read. Runs Apify Actor skilled_glee/http-url-probe on YOUR Apify account (pay-per-event $0.0004/URL, billed by Apify).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
verify_emailsCheck email addresses without sending mail: syntax, MX, null MX, disposable domains, role accounts, free providers and common typos, with a pass/risky/fail verdict and reason codes…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Check email addresses without sending mail: syntax, MX, null MX, disposable domains, role accounts, free providers and common typos, with a pass/risky/fail verdict and reason codes. Runs Apify Actor skilled_glee/email-verifier on YOUR Apify account (pay-per-event $0.001/email, billed by Apify).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
extract_website_contentFetch web pages and return clean readable text (boilerplate, nav and ads stripped), title, description, word count and language.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "fetch": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe name "extract_website_content" says "website": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch web pages and return clean readable text (boilerplate, nav and ads stripped), title, description, word count and language. Deterministic, no AI, no browser. Runs Apify Actor skilled_glee/website-content-extractor on YOUR Apify account (pay-per-event $0.002646/page, billed by Apify).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write6
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 30, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://echoempire-web-tools-mcp.echoempire-in-co.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including extract_web_metadata (write), extract_article (write), extract_contact_details (write), verify_emails (write), probe_urls (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.3.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http web-tools https://echoempire-web-tools-mcp.echoempire-in-co.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http web-tools https://echoempire-web-tools-mcp.echoempire-in-co.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__web-tools__extract_website_content"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__web-tools__extract_web_metadata",
"mcp__web-tools__extract_article",
"mcp__web-tools__extract_contact_details",
"mcp__web-tools__verify_emails",
"mcp__web-tools__probe_urls"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as web-tools. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 6 rules
- mcp__web-tools__extract_website_content untrusted-input
- mcp__web-tools__extract_web_metadata untrusted-input
- mcp__web-tools__extract_article untrusted-input
- mcp__web-tools__extract_contact_details untrusted-input
- mcp__web-tools__verify_emails untrusted-input
- mcp__web-tools__probe_urls untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/org.echoempire/web-tools/verify?hash=800ad634a46b704e0584dfd0c7b509f8b34a5b7be47299095ee413256429bd8b" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 800ad634a46b, from Nov 20, 2026, 01:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.echoempire/web-tools/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.echoempire/web-tools)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 01:17 UTC.
web-tools MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the web-tools MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the web-tools MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the web-tools MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the web-tools MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 5 write, 1 read. extract_web_metadata, extract_article, extract_contact_details, verify_emails, probe_urls and extract_website_content.
Does the web-tools MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the web-tools MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): probe_urls.
Has the web-tools MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.