Skip to content

web-tools MCP server

org.echoempire/web-toolsechoempire.orgstreamable-httpv1.3.1Scanned

Web extraction MCP: page content, metadata, articles, contacts, email checks, URL probes.

6 tools: 5 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 5 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 6
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

5 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the web-tools MCP server can do

The web-tools MCP server is published by echoempire.org, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: extract_web_metadata, extract_article, extract_contact_details, verify_emails and 1 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

6 tools bring in text other people can write (extract_website_content, extract_web_metadata, extract_article and 3 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (probe_urls).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.3.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
  • extract_articleExtract structured article data: title, author, published date, clean body text, word count and content hash.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract structured article data: title, author, published date, clean body text, word count and content hash. Failed URLs are not billed. Runs Apify Actor skilled_glee/article-text-extractor on YOUR Apify account (pay-per-event $0.001/article, billed by Apify).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • extract_contact_detailsExtract emails (incl.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract emails (incl. mailto), North American phone numbers, LinkedIn/X/Facebook/Instagram/YouTube links and contact/about/team page links from web pages. Runs Apify Actor skilled_glee/contact-details-extractor on YOUR Apify account (pay-per-event $0.0015/page, billed by Apify).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • extract_web_metadataExtract title, meta description, Open Graph, Twitter Card, JSON-LD structured data, canonical URL, language and H1s from web pages as JSON.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract title, meta description, Open Graph, Twitter Card, JSON-LD structured data, canonical URL, language and H1s from web pages as JSON. Runs Apify Actor skilled_glee/web-metadata-extractor on YOUR Apify account (pay-per-event $0.001/page, billed by Apify).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • probe_urlsCheck URLs with HEAD or GET: HTTP status, final URL after redirects, redirect count, Content-Type and timing.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.urls): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check URLs with HEAD or GET: HTTP status, final URL after redirects, redirect count, Content-Type and timing. No page body is read. Runs Apify Actor skilled_glee/http-url-probe on YOUR Apify account (pay-per-event $0.0004/URL, billed by Apify).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • verify_emailsCheck email addresses without sending mail: syntax, MX, null MX, disposable domains, role accounts, free providers and common typos, with a pass/risky/fail verdict and reason codes…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check email addresses without sending mail: syntax, MX, null MX, disposable domains, role accounts, free providers and common typos, with a pass/risky/fail verdict and reason codes. Runs Apify Actor skilled_glee/email-verifier on YOUR Apify account (pay-per-event $0.001/email, billed by Apify).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • extract_website_contentFetch web pages and return clean readable text (boilerplate, nav and ads stripped), title, description, word count and language.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "extract_website_content" says "website": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch web pages and return clean readable text (boilerplate, nav and ads stripped), title, description, word count and language. Deterministic, no AI, no browser. Runs Apify Actor skilled_glee/website-content-extractor on YOUR Apify account (pay-per-event $0.002646/page, billed by Apify).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write6
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 30, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://echoempire-web-tools-mcp.echoempire-in-co.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including extract_web_metadata (write), extract_article (write), extract_contact_details (write), verify_emails (write), probe_urls (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.3.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http web-tools https://echoempire-web-tools-mcp.echoempire-in-co.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http web-tools https://echoempire-web-tools-mcp.echoempire-in-co.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__web-tools__extract_website_content"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__web-tools__extract_web_metadata",
      "mcp__web-tools__extract_article",
      "mcp__web-tools__extract_contact_details",
      "mcp__web-tools__verify_emails",
      "mcp__web-tools__probe_urls"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as web-tools. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 6 rules
  • mcp__web-tools__extract_website_content untrusted-input
  • mcp__web-tools__extract_web_metadata untrusted-input
  • mcp__web-tools__extract_article untrusted-input
  • mcp__web-tools__extract_contact_details untrusted-input
  • mcp__web-tools__verify_emails untrusted-input
  • mcp__web-tools__probe_urls untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/org.echoempire/web-tools/verify?hash=800ad634a46b704e0584dfd0c7b509f8b34a5b7be47299095ee413256429bd8b" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 800ad634a46b, from Nov 20, 2026, 01:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.echoempire/web-tools/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for org.echoempire/web-tools
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/org.echoempire/web-tools.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.echoempire/web-tools)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 01:17 UTC.

web-tools MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the web-tools MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the web-tools MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the web-tools MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the web-tools MCP server have?

6 tools: 5 write, 1 read. extract_web_metadata, extract_article, extract_contact_details, verify_emails, probe_urls and extract_website_content.

Does the web-tools MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the web-tools MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): probe_urls.

Has the web-tools MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.