EveBrief Risk Oracle (ERO) MCP server
org.evebrief.oracle/risk-checkoracle.evebrief.orgstreamable-httpv1.0.6Scanned
EVM token/wallet risk: rug pulls, rug factories, copycats, contract. $0.004 per check via x402.
3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the EveBrief Risk Oracle (ERO) MCP server can do
The EveBrief Risk Oracle (ERO) MCP server is published by oracle.evebrief.org, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: check_address), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (check_address).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 5 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.6.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
check_addressPaid per call via x402 ($0.005): RLUSD on XRPL, USDC on Base or USDC/USDT on Solana.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid per call via x402 ($0.005): RLUSD on XRPL, USDC on Base or USDC/USDT on Solana. Checks a token, deployer or wallet for rug pulls proven on-chain (with the buyers' loss), rug-factory networks, linked wallets and possible fakes of known tokens; with deep=true also live contract red flags and the contract's own name and symbol checked against known tokens (mint, pause, blacklist, mutable fees, upgradeable code; ~5 s slower, same price). Returns a risk verdict (none, low, high, critical) with reasons and evidence; findings separates on-chain facts with transactions from heuristic signals. Critical requires on-chain proof. 'none' means no record, not that an address is safe. Call without payment to get the payment terms, then repeat with _meta["x402/payment"].
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_methodologyFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_methodology" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. What ERO detects, risk levels, chain coverage and known limits of the verdicts.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
preview_addressFree, no payment.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "preview_address" says "preview": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Free, no payment. Says only whether ERO has an on-chain proven record for the address (record true/false), on which chains, and whether it is a token or a wallet; known names a publicly listed token (symbol, sources) or known infrastructure. No risk level, no evidence, no amounts: use check_address for the full verdict. record=false does not mean safe.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 10, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://oracle.evebrief.org/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including check_address (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:check_addressChanges thingsinputSchema
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:check_addressChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:preview_addressOnly readsdescription
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:check_addressChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:get_methodologyOnly readsdescription
Tools1 added.+1 addedView diff
- Added:preview_addressOnly reads
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:check_addressChanges thingsdescription
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.6. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http risk-check https://oracle.evebrief.org/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http risk-check https://oracle.evebrief.org/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__risk-check__preview_address",
"mcp__risk-check__get_methodology"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__risk-check__check_address"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as risk-check. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__risk-check__check_address untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/org.evebrief.oracle/risk-check/verify?hash=c3dd10a7a06117ae5555110b5e0972c16f224a35edf6d80eca492a8510609349" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash c3dd10a7a061, from Nov 19, 2026, 16:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.evebrief.oracle/risk-check/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.evebrief.oracle/risk-check)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 19, 2026, 16:18 UTC.
EveBrief Risk Oracle (ERO) MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the EveBrief Risk Oracle (ERO) MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the EveBrief Risk Oracle (ERO) MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the EveBrief Risk Oracle (ERO) MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the EveBrief Risk Oracle (ERO) MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. check_address, preview_address and get_methodology.
Does the EveBrief Risk Oracle (ERO) MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the EveBrief Risk Oracle (ERO) MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the EveBrief Risk Oracle (ERO) MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 5 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 19, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.