OMENZ agent tools MCP server
org.omenz.www/agent-toolswww.omenz.orgstreamable-httpv1.2.1Scanned
For agents that pay: Authorize (OFAC screen), Guard, Send Check, Checkout, Rescue, budgets, x402.
116 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 8 do something that can't be undone, 98 change things and 9 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 111
- Can send data out · 35
- 5 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things and 8 do something that can't be undone. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the OMENZ agent tools MCP server can do
The OMENZ agent tools MCP server is published by www.omenz.org, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 116 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: pobox_drop), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (locker_put, receipt_put, handoff_pack, failure_put and 4 more) and create or change data (98 tools: agent_ready, site_check, changed, local_facts and 94 more). 9 tools only read.
111 tools bring in text other people can write (agent_ready, site_check, changed and 108 more); 35 tools can send data out of your system (agent_ready, site_check, changed and 32 more).
The fixed checks matched 5 findings (annotation-conflict and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 4 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.2.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
116 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
pobox_dropAgent PO Box: leave a JSON message (<=16 KB) in another agent's box using its box_id.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "pobox_drop" says "drop": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it not destructive (destructiveHint: false), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "pobox_drop" not destructive (destructiveHint: false), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "pobox_drop" says "drop": a word for removing or ending something.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent PO Box: leave a JSON message (<=16 KB) in another agent's box using its box_id. Sealed to the box owner. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/pobox/drop, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent PO Box
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Can't be undone 8Claude Code: ask
budget_spendShared Budget: ask before each purchase.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.recipient): what the tool writes goes there.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Shared Budget: ask before each purchase. ALLOW records it against the team cap (returns spend_id + what's left); DENY or ESCALATE records nothing, with the reason. Idempotent by idempotency_key, so retries never double-count. Header X-Budget-Key. Honest limit: two spends in the same instant can both pass; per_tx_max_usd bounds that. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/budget/spend, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Shared Budget
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
failure_putFailure Receipt + Dead-Letter Queue: when a job fails, record WHY in a standard machine-readable form (omenz.failure.v0: objective, failed_step, error_class from a fixed list, atte…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "failure_put" says "put": a word for a change.
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Failure Receipt + Dead-Letter Queue: when a job fails, record WHY in a standard machine-readable form (omenz.failure.v0: objective, failed_step, error_class from a fixed list, attempts, money spent, receipts, partial artifacts, suggested next step, retryable). Secret-scanned first (secrets = refused, not stored, not charged). Stored encrypted in an Agent Locker for the next agent; pass dlq_box_id to also drop a sealed pointer into an Agent PO Box used as your dead-letter queue. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/failure/put, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Failure Receipt + Dead-Letter Queue
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
finance_refund_requestStructured Refund Request: order + failure receipt + payment receipts + purchase snapshot -> a standard signed dispute object with evidence strength and gaps.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "finance_refund_request" says "refund": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Structured Refund Request: order + failure receipt + payment receipts + purchase snapshot -> a standard signed dispute object with evidence strength and gaps. OMENZ packages evidence; it doesn't rule or move money. Deterministic; never pays a target. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/finance/refund-request, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Structured Refund Request
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
handoff_packHandoff Packager: hand a job to another agent with only what it needs.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Handoff Packager: hand a job to another agent with only what it needs. Keeps the fields you include, refuses (no charge) if required fields are missing, stores the packet in an encrypted Agent Locker, returns locker id + key + manifest. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/handoff/pack, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Handoff Packager
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
locker_putAgent Locker: check a job's working state in (resume packet: objective, decisions, open_items, facts, permissions, next_action, pointers; any JSON object up to 64 KB) so it stops f…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "locker_put" says "put": a word for a change.
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Locker: check a job's working state in (resume packet: objective, decisions, open_items, facts, permissions, next_action, pointers; any JSON object up to 64 KB) so it stops filling your context. Encrypted at rest with a key only you get back; kept up to 30 days. Optional 'to' turns it into a handoff to another agent. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/locker/put, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Locker
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
pay_verifyPayment Verify: did this x402 payment really settle on Base?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "pay_verify" says "pay": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Payment Verify: did this x402 payment really settle on Base? Send the tx hash or the seller's PAYMENT-RESPONSE header; get SETTLED / MISMATCH / PENDING / FAILED / NOT_FOUND with payer, payee, USDC amount, block, confirmations and time, checked against the payee/amount you expected. Proof for disputes, refunds and books. Public chain data, never needs a key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/pay/verify, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Payment Verify
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
receipt_putReceipt Locker: record a machine-readable receipt (payer, payee, amount, tx_hash, job, request/response hashes).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "receipt_put" says "put": a word for a change.
- The input carries an amount (input.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Receipt Locker: record a machine-readable receipt (payer, payee, amount, tx_hash, job, request/response hashes). With a Base tx_hash, OMENZ checks the chain for the matching USDC transfer. Content-addressed id; anyone verifies free. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/receipt/put, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Receipt Locker
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
send_checkSend Check: one call before an agent sends USDC or ETH on Base.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "send_check" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe name "send_check" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Send Check: one call before an agent sends USDC or ETH on Base. Recipient on the OFAC sanctions list -> STOP; recipient is the token contract itself -> STOP; ADDRESS POISONING (recipient looks like a payee you used before, same first and last 4 characters, but isn't) -> STOP; sender balance too low -> STOP; recipient is a contract or a never-used address -> CAUTION. Verdict SEND / CAUTION / STOP with reasons. Read-only public chain data; never signs or moves money. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/send/check, $0.005 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Send Check
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 98Claude Code: ask
agent_readyScore 0-100 for how well AI assistants and agents can find, read and use a business website, with prioritized plain-language fixes.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Score 0-100 for how well AI assistants and agents can find, read and use a business website, with prioritized plain-language fixes. Deterministic, no AI calls. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/agent-ready, $0.10 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Score 0-100 for how well AI assistants and agents can find,
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
aliveProof-of-Life: is this API/endpoint answering right now, before you spend money calling it?Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Proof-of-Life: is this API/endpoint answering right now, before you spend money calling it? One unpaid probe: up, paywalled (valid x402 requirements), auth_required, not_found, wrong_method, degraded, tls_error or down, with latency. Never pays the target. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/alive, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Proof-of-Life
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
allowanceAllowance Check (Base): how much can this spender move from this wallet right now?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Allowance Check (Base): how much can this spender move from this wallet right now? Reads the live ERC-20 allowance and the owner's balance: UNLIMITED (risk HIGH) / COVERS_FULL_BALANCE / LIMITED / NO_ALLOWANCE, with a safe next action and the exact revoke call (approve(spender, 0)). Optional intended_usd says whether a stablecoin allowance covers your next payment. For agents before approving, paying through a contract, or cleaning up old approvals. Public chain data, never signs. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/allowance, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Allowance Check (Base)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
authorizeOMENZ Authorize: the authorization step for agent payments.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it OMENZ Authorize: the authorization step for agent payments. One call before paying any x402 endpoint: live quote + preflight (up, price within max, network, stablecoin, expected payTo), payee check (known x402 seller?) + OFAC sanctions screen (a sanctioned payTo = DECLINE), fair-price check vs comparable endpoints, the owner's spend policy and Permission Passport if sent -> APPROVE / REVIEW / DECLINE with reasons and a signed 5-minute authorization code anyone can verify. Never pays the target. Doing many? Prepay once (POST /v1/credits/buy-1, $1) and check via /v1/authorize/credit at 2% of the payment (min $0.0003), with no per-check settlement. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/authorize, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: OMENZ Authorize
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
branchBranch Resolver: which location page of a multi-location business is the one you mean?Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Branch Resolver: which location page of a multi-location business is the one you mean? Give the business website and a city, ZIP or street; get the matching branch page with its phone, address, hours and notices from the business's own site. Ambiguous or missing matches come back as such with candidates, never guessed. Deterministic. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/branch, $0.01 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Branch Resolver
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
budget_createShared Budget: one spending cap a whole TEAM of agents draws from (total, per day or per month), with a per-purchase max, an escalate line and allowed/blocked payees.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "budget_create" says "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Shared Budget: one spending cap a whole TEAM of agents draws from (total, per day or per month), with a per-purchase max, an escalate line and allowed/blocked payees. Spend Gate is stateless, so 5 agents can each stay under $1 and spend $5 together; a Shared Budget keeps the one running total. Returns budget_id + owner_key + spender_key (shown once). Bookkeeping only: OMENZ never holds or moves money. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/budget/create, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Shared Budget
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
budget_delegateDelegation Budget (agent allowances): a parent budget's OWNER gives a child agent its own bounded allowance: human/company -> supervisor agent -> workers -> sub-agents (4 levels).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Delegation Budget (agent allowances): a parent budget's OWNER gives a child agent its own bounded allowance: human/company -> supervisor agent -> workers -> sub-agents (4 levels). The child can only NARROW the parent: cap <= parent, per-purchase max, allowed payees (subset), blocked payees (inherited), velocity limit (purchases/hour), expiry <= parent. Every child spend is checked against and counted in every ancestor, so the company cap holds across the whole tree; freezing a parent stops all descendants; budget/status shows spend by child. Header X-Budget-Key = the parent's owner_key. Bookkeeping only. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/budget/delegate, $0.01 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Delegation Budget (agent allowances)
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
budget_releaseShared Budget: give a recorded spend back to the cap when the purchase failed, was refunded or never happened.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Shared Budget: give a recorded spend back to the cap when the purchase failed, was refunded or never happened. Header X-Budget-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/budget/release, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Shared Budget
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
capability_cardAgent Capability Card: a standard machine-readable card (omenz.capability-card.v0) of what any x402 service offers: endpoints, live prices and payment options, input/output example…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Capability Card: a standard machine-readable card (omenz.capability-card.v0) of what any x402 service offers: endpoints, live prices and payment options, input/output examples from its discovery data, latency. Works on a service index or a single endpoint; never pays. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/capability-card, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Capability Card
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
changedDid a web page really change since your last visit?Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Did a web page really change since your last visit? Content hash that ignores timestamps and boilerplate. Pass previous=<hash> to compare. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/changed, $0.005 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Did a web page really change since your last visit? Content
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
checkout_closeOMENZ Checkout (close): ONE call after paying.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "checkout_close" says "checkout": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it OMENZ Checkout (close): ONE call after paying. Send checkout_id + the tx hash (or PAYMENT-RESPONSE header) + the response you got. Verifies settlement on Base against the authorized payee and amount, checks delivery against the seller's advertised output, returns a signed Spend Receipt (GOOD_BUY / PAID_NOT_DELIVERED / PAYMENT_NOT_CONFIRMED), gives the money back to the Shared Budget if you never paid, and updates the seller's track record. High volume: checkout/close/credit at 1% (min $0.0002). By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/checkout/close, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: OMENZ Checkout (close)
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
checkout_openOMENZ Checkout (open): ONE call before your agent pays any x402 seller.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "checkout_open" says "checkout": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it OMENZ Checkout (open): ONE call before your agent pays any x402 seller. Send the url (or just q = what you need and OMENZ picks the cheapest seller that answers right now), your max price, optional Shared Budget (budget_id + X-Budget-Key) and policy. Runs Authorize (live quote, payTo, fair price, policy), the seller's OMENZ track record, and draws from the team budget: GO / REVIEW / STOP + checkout_id + signed 5-minute authorization. Provider-neutral, any wallet; never touches your money. High volume: checkout/open/credit at 1% of the purchase (min $0.0002). By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/checkout/open, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: OMENZ Checkout (open)
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
checkpoint_createOMENZ Checkpoint (create): split an agent job into paid milestones.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "checkpoint_create" says "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it OMENZ Checkpoint (create): split an agent job into paid milestones. Each milestone has an amount, its own deterministic acceptance tests (required_fields, field_types, regex, min_items, max_bytes, equals, url_alive, claim_evidence) and an optional deadline. Returns a signed plan and checkpoint_id. OMENZ never holds funds. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/checkpoint/create, $0.005 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: OMENZ Checkpoint (create)
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
checkpoint_submitOMENZ Checkpoint (submit): deliver one milestone.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "checkpoint_submit" says "submit": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it OMENZ Checkpoint (submit): deliver one milestone. Its acceptance tests run; you get PASS/FAIL and the escrow verdict for THAT tranche: RELEASE (buyer pays it now), RETRY (seller fixes, max 3 attempts) or REFUND (failed or late, not owed), a signed receipt, and running totals (released / refunded / pending). A decided milestone can't be passed or counted twice. Seller track record updated. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/checkpoint/submit, $0.01 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: OMENZ Checkpoint (submit)
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
claim_evidenceClaim -> Evidence: does this source actually say what you're about to cite it for?Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Claim -> Evidence: does this source actually say what you're about to cite it for? Send a claim and the source URL; get SUPPORTED with the exact sentence, PARTIAL with the closest sentences and which numbers/names are missing, NOT_FOUND, or CHECK_NEGATION when the matching sentence denies it. Strict: every number must appear next to the claim's own names (no borrowing another plan's price). Deterministic, no AI calls. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/claim-evidence, $0.005 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Claim -> Evidence
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
context_dietContext Diet: shrink a packet before it fills your context: drops empty fields, dedupes lists, cuts long strings to a head + sha256 pointer, caps list length, always keeps required…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Context Diet: shrink a packet before it fills your context: drops empty fields, dedupes lists, cuts long strings to a head + sha256 pointer, caps list length, always keeps required fields; reports bytes and approximate tokens saved. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/context-diet, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Context Diet
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
contract_acceptAcceptance Test as a Service + escrow verdict: a neutral party runs the contract's tests on what was delivered.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Acceptance Test as a Service + escrow verdict: a neutral party runs the contract's tests on what was delivered. PASS/FAIL per test, escrow_verdict RELEASE/REFUND (OMENZ never holds funds: the payer acts on it), and a signed attestation that feeds the seller's Reputation Receipts. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/contract/accept, $0.005 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Acceptance Test as a Service + escrow verdict
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
contract_buildA2A Contract Builder: turn a machine job into signed terms both agents hold: deliverable, deterministic acceptance tests (required_fields, field_types, regex, min_items, max_bytes,…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it A2A Contract Builder: turn a machine job into signed terms both agents hold: deliverable, deterministic acceptance tests (required_fields, field_types, regex, min_items, max_bytes, equals, url_alive, claim_evidence), max spend, deadline, parties. Ed25519-signed by OMENZ; verify offline with /v1/passport/key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/contract/build, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: A2A Contract Builder
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
cost_estimateCost-to-Complete Estimate: what will this agent job cost BEFORE it starts?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Cost-to-Complete Estimate: what will this agent job cost BEFORE it starts? Give the steps (model, input/output tokens, runs, retry rate) with your model prices, and paid tool calls (price, or an x402 URL we quote live without paying). Get the total, a realistic range, the biggest cost, budget fit, value multiple, and how much routing named steps to a cheaper model saves. Deterministic arithmetic. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/cost-estimate, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Cost-to-Complete Estimate
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
credits_buy_1OMENZ prepaid credits: $1.00 balance in one x402 payment.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it OMENZ prepaid credits: $1.00 balance in one x402 payment. Checks then draw from the balance with no per-check settlement: OMENZ Authorize costs 2% of the payment being checked (minimum $0.0003) via POST /v1/authorize/credit. Returns credit_id + credit_key (shown once). By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/credits/buy-1, $1.00 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: OMENZ prepaid credits
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
credits_buy_5OMENZ prepaid credits: $5.00 balance in one x402 payment.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it OMENZ prepaid credits: $5.00 balance in one x402 payment. Checks then draw from the balance with no per-check settlement: OMENZ Authorize costs 2% of the payment being checked (minimum $0.0003) via POST /v1/authorize/credit. Returns credit_id + credit_key (shown once). By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/credits/buy-5, $5.00 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: OMENZ prepaid credits
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
dedupeDuplicate-Work Detector: before your agent pays to run a task, check whether someone in your team (same private namespace_key) already did it: normalized fingerprint -> HIT with th…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Duplicate-Work Detector: before your agent pays to run a task, check whether someone in your team (same private namespace_key) already did it: normalized fingerprint -> HIT with the earlier result pointer, or MISS (pass result_pointer to register this run). By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/dedupe, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Duplicate-Work Detector
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
delivery_checkDelivery Check: you paid; did you get what was advertised?Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Delivery Check: you paid; did you get what was advertised? Send the paid endpoint's url (+ method) and the JSON it returned. We read the seller's own x402 discovery output example (unpaid probe) or use your JSON Schema, then compare fields and value types: MATCH / PARTIAL / MISMATCH / NO_CONTRACT, with exactly what's missing, empty or the wrong kind, and error bodies caught. Evidence for finance/refund-request. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/delivery-check, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Delivery Check
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
dispute_packetDispute Packet: a purchase went bad (not delivered, wrong output, partial, overcharged, duplicate).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Dispute Packet: a purchase went bad (not delivered, wrong output, partial, overcharged, duplicate). One call builds the machine-readable case: settlement proof on Base (Settlement Rescue: did money move, how much, to whom, duplicates), the seller's own advertised output captured live (what was promised), a Delivery Check of what came back, a timeline, and a signed refund request (remedy + amount + evidence strength), all hash-listed in an Ed25519-signed manifest anyone can verify offline. Send checkout_id or url + tx_hash / payment_header / payer+pay_to, the delivered response and the issue. OMENZ packages evidence; it never rules on disputes or moves money. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/dispute/packet, $0.10 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Dispute Packet
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
event_checkEvent Check: did a US public company actually FILE this news, or is it just going around?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Event Check: did a US public company actually FILE this news, or is it just going around? Give a ticker or name and the claim (CEO resigned, acquisition, results, bankruptcy, restatement, cyber incident, layoffs...). We map it to the required SEC 8-K item, pull the company's recent filings from EDGAR, and quote the sentence that states it. FILED only when one sentence carries the claim's names and roles; otherwise FILED_RELATED, NO_FILING_YET (4-business-day filing window), NOT_A_FILING_EVENT or NOT_FOUND. Deterministic. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/event-check, $0.005 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Event Check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
evidence_bundleMachine Evidence Bundle: package receipts, ledger heads, attestation tokens, claims and sources into one signed, hash-listed bundle (merkle-style root) that any agent can verify of…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Machine Evidence Bundle: package receipts, ledger heads, attestation tokens, claims and sources into one signed, hash-listed bundle (merkle-style root) that any agent can verify offline. For disputes, audits, refunds and handoffs. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/evidence/bundle, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Machine Evidence Bundle
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
facilitatorsFacilitator Status + Router: which x402 facilitators are answering RIGHT NOW and which to use.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Facilitator Status + Router: which x402 facilitators are answering RIGHT NOW and which to use. Live probe of 10 known facilitators (PayAI, Coinbase CDP, x402.rs, Daydreams, Dexter, Mogami, OpenX402, the x402.org reference and more, plus one URL of yours): up / auth_required / down, latency, networks, schemes (exact/upto), x402 versions. Say network + scheme and get the fastest live facilitator plus fallbacks. For sellers choosing or failing over a facilitator, and SDKs routing settlement. Never pays or settles anything. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/facilitators, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Facilitator Status + Router
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
finance_forecastAgent Budget Forecaster: spend history -> daily rate, next 7/30-day projection, trend, biggest dependencies.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Budget Forecaster: spend history -> daily rate, next 7/30-day projection, trend, biggest dependencies. Deterministic; never pays a target. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/finance/forecast, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Budget Forecaster
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
finance_reconcileInvoice/Payment Reconciler: invoice lines vs USDC-on-Base payments, each transaction checked on-chain (payer, payee, amount): MATCH / UNDERPAID / OVERPAID / MISSING / UNVERIFIED, d…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Invoice/Payment Reconciler: invoice lines vs USDC-on-Base payments, each transaction checked on-chain (payer, payee, amount): MATCH / UNDERPAID / OVERPAID / MISSING / UNVERIFIED, duplicates and line-total errors flagged. Deterministic; never pays a target. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/finance/reconcile, $0.005 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Invoice/Payment Reconciler
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
finance_snapshotMachine Warranty / Purchase Snapshot: signed record of exactly what a paid endpoint promised (live x402 requirements, description, examples) at purchase time.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "finance_snapshot" says "snapshot": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "finance_snapshot" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "finance_snapshot" says "snapshot": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Machine Warranty / Purchase Snapshot: signed record of exactly what a paid endpoint promised (live x402 requirements, description, examples) at purchase time. Deterministic; never pays a target. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/finance/snapshot, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Machine Warranty / Purchase Snapshot
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
finance_watchdogSubscription Watchdog: the paid endpoints your agent business relies on (up to 8): live price vs expected, down/up, terms/pricing page changed (pass back fingerprints).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoints): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Subscription Watchdog: the paid endpoints your agent business relies on (up to 8): live price vs expected, down/up, terms/pricing page changed (pass back fingerprints). Deterministic; never pays a target. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/finance/watchdog, $0.005 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Subscription Watchdog
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
freshnessSource Freshness / Result TTL: how long can your agent reuse a result before paying to fetch it again?Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Source Freshness / Result TTL: how long can your agent reuse a result before paying to fetch it again? The source's own Last-Modified, ETag and Cache-Control + a reuse window by data kind (price, quote, hours, weather, news, stock, crypto, business_facts, terms, docs, filing, profile, search) + how to revalidate cheaply (304). By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/freshness, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Source Freshness / Result TTL
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
guardOMENZ Transaction Guard: ONE call before money moves.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it OMENZ Transaction Guard: ONE call before money moves. 'PAY $X TO Y FOR Z' -> GO / CAUTION / STOP with every check: budget authorized (Shared Budget), counterparty checked (Authorize: live 402, payTo, known seller, OFAC sanctions screen, fair price + Seller Track Record), DUPLICATE PAYMENT checked (OMENZ records and your on-chain USDC history to that payee, Base), quoted price unchanged, settlement economics, expected delivery recorded (seller's advertised output fingerprint). Then checkout/close: settled -> delivery verified -> signed receipt -> reconciled. Send url (or q), payer (your wallet), quoted_price_usd, purpose, budget_id. Larger purchases: guard/credit at 10 bps of the protected value (min $0.01, max $5). Never touches your money. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/guard, $0.05 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: OMENZ Transaction Guard
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
jacket_checkinJob Jacket checkin: end a shift.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Job Jacket checkin: end a shift. state_patch merges (null deletes a key) or state replaces; new checkpoint and note; the jacket becomes a new version and the lease is released. Optional Job Ledger entry (header X-Ledger-Key). Headers X-Jacket-Id / X-Jacket-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/jacket/checkin, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Job Jacket checkin
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
jacket_checkoutJob Jacket checkout: start a shift.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "jacket_checkout" says "checkout": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Job Jacket checkout: start a shift. Returns only what this worker needs (objective, instructions, checkpoint, state trimmed to requested fields / size, Passport verdict) and a lease so no other worker holds it at the same time; take_over for dead workers. Headers X-Jacket-Id / X-Jacket-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/jacket/checkout, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Job Jacket checkout
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
jacket_createJob Jacket: create the portable minimum working state for one assignment (objective, instructions, state, checkpoint, optional Permission Passport + Job Ledger link).Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "jacket_create" says "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "Credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ns jacket_id + jacket_key (shown once). Credentials are refused: keep reference names only...."
Description, as the server wrote it Job Jacket: create the portable minimum working state for one assignment (objective, instructions, state, checkpoint, optional Permission Passport + Job Ledger link). Encrypted with a key only you hold, up to 30 days, 64 KB. Returns jacket_id + jacket_key (shown once). Credentials are refused: keep reference names only. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/jacket/create, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Job Jacket
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
jacket_historyJob Jacket history: every version (who, when, checkpoint, note, state hash; never the contents) and the current lease.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Job Jacket history: every version (who, when, checkpoint, note, state hash; never the contents) and the current lease. Headers X-Jacket-Id / X-Jacket-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/jacket/history, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Job Jacket history
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
ledger_appendAgent Job Ledger: append one entry (type tool_call|spend|receipt|handoff|failure|output|status|note|decision, any fields, amount_usd optional).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Job Ledger: append one entry (type tool_call|spend|receipt|handoff|failure|output|status|note|decision, any fields, amount_usd optional). Each entry is chained to the previous by sha256; secrets are refused. Header X-Ledger-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/ledger/append, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Job Ledger
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
ledger_createAgent Job Ledger: open an append-only, hash-chained record for one job (tool calls, spend, receipts, handoffs, failures, outputs, status).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "ledger_create" says "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Job Ledger: open an append-only, hash-chained record for one job (tool calls, spend, receipts, handoffs, failures, outputs, status). Returns ledger_id + ledger_key (shown once). Kept 90 days. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/ledger/create, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Job Ledger
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
loadout_checkOMENZ Loadout Check: will this job loadout (Agent Skin or robot loadout like HOST MODE, PERSONAL TRAINER, RECEPTIONIST) run on this robot or agent?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it OMENZ Loadout Check: will this job loadout (Agent Skin or robot loadout like HOST MODE, PERSONAL TRAINER, RECEPTIONIST) run on this robot or agent? Provider-neutral capability words vs the platform profile (ROS 2 via ros-mcp, Unitree G1/Go2 via unitree_sdk2, digital MCP agent, OMENZ sim, or your own manifest): READY / DEGRADED / NOT_COMPATIBLE per capability and workflow, add-ons to install, safety-declaration gaps (e-stop, speed, no-go zones, contact), and what a human must confirm. Deterministic. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/loadout/check, $0.01 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: OMENZ Loadout Check
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
loadout_compileOMENZ Loadout Compile: turn a loadout into the platform plan (nav2 action goals for ros-mcp, unitree_sdk2 calls, or MCP tools + an Authorize passport request) plus an Ed25519-signe…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it OMENZ Loadout Compile: turn a loadout into the platform plan (nav2 action goals for ros-mcp, unitree_sdk2 calls, or MCP tools + an Authorize passport request) plus an Ed25519-signed install receipt (omenz.loadout-install.v0: allowed capabilities, speed/payload limits, no-go zones, confirm list, expiry). Dry-run plans from public SDK docs; OMENZ never sends commands to hardware. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/loadout/compile, $0.02 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: OMENZ Loadout Compile
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
loadout_simulateOMENZ Loadout Simulate: run one loadout workflow (e.g.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it OMENZ Loadout Simulate: run one loadout workflow (e.g. HOST MODE drink_run) in the OMENZ 2D sim home: step-by-step trace, simulated time, and the action-gate decision on every step, so you see where it stops for a human yes before any robot moves. Deterministic, not physics. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/loadout/simulate, $0.005 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: OMENZ Loadout Simulate
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
local_factsWhat a local business's OWN website says right now: phone, address, hours, and holiday/temporary-closure notices quoted word for word, each with its source.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it What a local business's OWN website says right now: phone, address, hours, and holiday/temporary-closure notices quoted word for word, each with its source. Precision first: fields the site doesn't clearly show come back null, never guessed. Flags hidden structured data that disagrees with the page, sites that moved to another domain, and multi-location sites. Deterministic, no AI calls. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/local-facts, $0.01 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: What a local business's OWN website says right now
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
market_cheapestCheapest Working Tool: 'I need X' -> the cheapest x402 provider that ANSWERS right now.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Cheapest Working Tool: 'I need X' -> the cheapest x402 provider that ANSWERS right now. Matches from ~35,000 indexed endpoints, sorted by price, each live-probed (unpaid) in that order; returns the pick + runners-up by live price and latency, and the cheap-but-dead ones it skipped. Never pays a target. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/market/cheapest, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Cheapest Working Tool
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
market_jobOMENZ Market job desk: tell OMENZ the JOB ('token price', 'weather by city', 'company enrichment by domain').Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it OMENZ Market job desk: tell OMENZ the JOB ('token price', 'weather by city', 'company enrichment by domain'). We search ~35,000 x402 endpoints, live-probe the matches (unpaid), and rank WORKING providers by live price and latency, each with its OMENZ-verified history (purchases checked, delivery rate, verified sales), plus settlement economics and a ready-to-send Transaction Guard request for the pick. Then guard -> pay -> checkout/close -> (settlement/rescue if weird). Want it guarded in the same call? POST market/job/guarded ($0.05). Never pays a provider. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/market/job, $0.01 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: OMENZ Market job desk
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
market_job_guardedOMENZ Market job desk + Transaction Guard in one call: find the working provider for your job, then GO / CAUTION / STOP with budget, counterparty, duplicate payment (send payer), q…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it OMENZ Market job desk + Transaction Guard in one call: find the working provider for your job, then GO / CAUTION / STOP with budget, counterparty, duplicate payment (send payer), quoted price, settlement economics and expected delivery checked, plus a checkout_id for checkout/close. Same price as Guard alone. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/market/job/guarded, $0.05 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: OMENZ Market job desk + Transaction Guard in one call
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
market_payeePayee Check: before paying an address, is it a known x402 seller?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Payee Check: before paying an address, is it a known x402 seller? Screens it against OFAC's sanctioned crypto addresses and matches it against the payout addresses of ~35k listed x402 endpoints: KNOWN_SELLER (which services, 30-day calls and payers), SHARED_ADDRESS (platform/facilitator wallet) or UNKNOWN. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/market/payee, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Payee Check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
market_price_indexx402 Price Index / Fair Price Check: the going rate for a capability across listed x402 endpoints: comparables, sellers, min / p25 / median / p75 / max and usage-weighted median; p…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it x402 Price Index / Fair Price Check: the going rate for a capability across listed x402 endpoints: comparables, sellers, min / p25 / median / p75 / max and usage-weighted median; pass price_usd (or a listed url) to get its percentile and FAIR / LOW / ABOVE_MARKET / HIGH. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/market/price-index, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: x402 Price Index / Fair Price Check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
market_reliabilityMicropayment Reliability Score: should your agent trust this paid endpoint?Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Micropayment Reliability Score: should your agent trust this paid endpoint? 0-100 + grade with every reason: public 30-day usage, answering now with valid x402 requirements, speed, live price vs listed price, payTo vs listed payTo (catches swapped wallets). Never pays. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/market/reliability, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Micropayment Reliability Score
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
market_reportx402 Market Report (weekly): the supply side of the agent-payment economy: endpoints and sellers listed, how many get paid calls, price distribution, seller concentration (top 10 /…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it x402 Market Report (weekly): the supply side of the agent-payment economy: endpoints and sellers listed, how many get paid calls, price distribution, seller concentration (top 10 / top 50 share of calls), networks, top 25 sellers with usage. Compiled weekly by OMENZ from the x402 Bazaar index. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/market/report, $1.00 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: x402 Market Report (weekly)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
market_sellersx402 Seller Lead List: sellers offering a capability (or all), with endpoints, 30-day calls, unique payers, price range, last-called date and an example endpoint; up to 500 rows.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it x402 Seller Lead List: sellers offering a capability (or all), with endpoints, 30-day calls, unique payers, price range, last-called date and an example endpoint; up to 500 rows. For payment platforms, investors and sellers sizing a niche. Public listing data. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/market/sellers, $0.25 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: x402 Seller Lead List
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
omenz_conventionsFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Request ids and chaining, signed record shapes, id prefixes and payment acceptance rules for composing OMENZ tools into workflows.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
omenz_loadoutsFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Every OMENZ skin (Accountant, Researcher, Sales, Marketing, Customer Service, Purchasing...), department pack and robot job, with the tools and limits each equips.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
omenz_tell_us_what_you_needFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Tell OMENZ a capability you need and what you'd pay per call; recurring needs get built, tested and listed.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
omenz_track_recordFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Test evidence per OMENZ tool plus the earned record of real outside calls, success rates and daily self-probe uptime.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
passport_checkPermission Passport check: ALLOW or DENY an agent's next action (tool, URL/host, amount, spent so far) against its passport, with reasons, spend left and time left.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Permission Passport check: ALLOW or DENY an agent's next action (tool, URL/host, amount, spent so far) against its passport, with reasons, spend left and time left. Rejects forged or expired passports. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/passport/check, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Permission Passport check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
passport_issuePermission Passport: issue a signed (Ed25519), expiring, job-scoped permission ticket for an agent: which tools, which hosts (plus explicit denies), how much it may spend, for how …Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...max 7 days). Carries permissions, never credentials. Any tool can check it with /passport/c..."
Description, as the server wrote it Permission Passport: issue a signed (Ed25519), expiring, job-scoped permission ticket for an agent: which tools, which hosts (plus explicit denies), how much it may spend, for how long (max 7 days). Carries permissions, never credentials. Any tool can check it with /passport/check or verify it offline with the public key. Limits damage when an agent is hijacked. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/passport/issue, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Permission Passport
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
po_issueAgent Purchase Order: whoever controls the money pre-approves ONE purchase: 'this agent may spend up to $X with seller Y (payTo and/or host) for Z, until T'.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Purchase Order: whoever controls the money pre-approves ONE purchase: 'this agent may spend up to $X with seller Y (payTo and/or host) for Z, until T'. Returns an Ed25519-signed, single-use PO token anyone can verify offline. Budget-backed POs (budget_id + X-Budget-Key) draw from the Shared Budget on redeem, so team caps and the delegation tree still apply. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/po/issue, $0.01 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Purchase Order
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
po_redeemAgent Purchase Order redeem: the buyer agent (or the seller, before serving) checks a PO right before paying: signature, expiry, payee, seller, amount <= max, and that it was never…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Purchase Order redeem: the buyer agent (or the seller, before serving) checks a PO right before paying: signature, expiry, payee, seller, amount <= max, and that it was never used. ALLOW marks it used (once) and, if budget-backed, draws the amount from the Shared Budget; returns a signed redemption record. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/po/redeem, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Purchase Order redeem
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
pobox_createAgent PO Box: create a mailbox address (box_id) other agents can drop messages into while you're offline; you get a private owner_key.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "pobox_create" says "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent PO Box: create a mailbox address (box_id) other agents can drop messages into while you're offline; you get a private owner_key. Messages are sealed to you; OMENZ can't read them. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/pobox/create, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent PO Box
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
pobox_inboxAgent PO Box: open your waiting messages.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent PO Box: open your waiting messages. Send header X-Owner-Key; ack=true clears them. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/pobox/inbox, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent PO Box
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
preflightAgent Preflight: can this agent finish the job with what it has, BEFORE it spends?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Preflight: can this agent finish the job with what it has, BEFORE it spends? Give the paid tools it needs (url, method, calls, max price), a budget and optionally its Permission Passport. We check each tool is answering and its live x402 price (never paying), the total against the budget, and the passport against each host and the total. READY, or BLOCKED with exactly what's missing. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/preflight, $0.005 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Preflight
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
queue_awardAgent Workforce: owner awards a bidding job to one bidder; the award becomes that worker's lease.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Workforce: owner awards a bidding job to one bidder; the award becomes that worker's lease. Header X-Queue-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/queue/award, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Workforce
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
queue_bidAgent Workforce: worker bids on a job open for bidding (price_usd, eta_minutes).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Workforce: worker bids on a job open for bidding (price_usd, eta_minutes). Header X-Queue-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/queue/bid, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Workforce
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
queue_claimAgent Workforce: a worker claims the highest-priority ready job and gets a LEASE (it is now responsible).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Workforce: a worker claims the highest-priority ready job and gets a LEASE (it is now responsible). Send jacket_key too and the attached Job Jacket is checked out in the same call (one call to start a shift). Expired leases come back with the last checkpoint so a replacement can resume. Header X-Queue-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/queue/claim, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Workforce
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
queue_completeAgent Workforce: worker finishes its leased job with a result; repeating jobs are rescheduled automatically.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Workforce: worker finishes its leased job with a result; repeating jobs are rescheduled automatically. Header X-Queue-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/queue/complete, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Workforce
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
queue_createAgent Workforce: create a work queue for a team of agents.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "queue_create" says "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Workforce: create a work queue for a team of agents. Returns queue_id + owner_key + worker_key (shown once). Options: supervisor_box_id (Agent PO Box for escalations), lease_seconds, heartbeat_grace_s. Header X-Queue-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/queue/create, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Workforce
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
queue_enqueueAgent Workforce: add a job (title, payload, priority, not_before, repeat_every_minutes, max_attempts, bidding, jacket_id + jacket_fields to attach a Job Jacket).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Workforce: add a job (title, payload, priority, not_before, repeat_every_minutes, max_attempts, bidding, jacket_id + jacket_fields to attach a Job Jacket). Owner key. Payloads with secrets are refused: give workers a Permission Passport or Locker pointer. Header X-Queue-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/queue/enqueue, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Workforce
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
queue_escalateAgent Workforce: hand a job up to the supervisor (sealed drop into the supervisor's Agent PO Box).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Workforce: hand a job up to the supervisor (sealed drop into the supervisor's Agent PO Box). Header X-Queue-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/queue/escalate, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Workforce
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
queue_failAgent Workforce: worker reports failure; the job retries until max_attempts, then goes dead.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Workforce: worker reports failure; the job retries until max_attempts, then goes dead. Header X-Queue-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/queue/fail, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Workforce
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
queue_heartbeatAgent Workforce: worker is alive; extends its lease and stores a checkpoint (e.g.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Workforce: worker is alive; extends its lease and stores a checkpoint (e.g. a Locker id + step) for dead-agent recovery. Header X-Queue-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/queue/heartbeat, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Workforce
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
queue_resolveAgent Workforce: owner resolves an escalated/dead job: requeue, close or kill.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "queue_resolve" says "resolve": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "queue_resolve" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "queue_resolve" says "resolve": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Workforce: owner resolves an escalated/dead job: requeue, close or kill. Header X-Queue-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/queue/resolve, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Workforce
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
quotePrice Quote: the live x402 payment options of any endpoint, normalized: USD price, network, stablecoin, payTo, scheme, timeout; cheapest option.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Price Quote: the live x402 payment options of any endpoint, normalized: USD price, network, stablecoin, payTo, scheme, timeout; cheapest option. Reads the 402 (v1 body or v2 header) without paying. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/quote, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Price Quote
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
reputationReputation Receipts: an agent's job history as checked by OMENZ Acceptance Test: jobs, passed, failed, late, pass rate, distinct buyers (low = weak evidence), recent attestations.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Reputation Receipts: an agent's job history as checked by OMENZ Acceptance Test: jobs, passed, failed, late, pass rate, distinct buyers (low = weak evidence), recent attestations. Not self-reported. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/reputation, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Reputation Receipts
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
robot_action_gateOMENZ Robot Action Gate: call before ONE physical action from a third-party skill or loadout.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it OMENZ Robot Action Gate: call before ONE physical action from a third-party skill or loadout. Checks the signed install receipt (or loadout), the capability, speed and payload limits, no-go zones, forbidden capabilities (face ID), people/children nearby and the human-confirm list: ALLOW / CONFIRM_FIRST / DENY + a signed receipt for the audit trail. The robot's own safety system still has the last word. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/robot/action-gate, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: OMENZ Robot Action Gate
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
sale_recordSale Record (for SELLERS): after each x402 sale, your middleware sends the tx hash (or PAYMENT-RESPONSE) + the route sold.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Sale Record (for SELLERS): after each x402 sale, your middleware sends the tx hash (or PAYMENT-RESPONSE) + the route sold. OMENZ checks the payment really settled on Base to the payTo your route advertises right now, counts it once, and returns a signed sale receipt. Verified sales and distinct payers show in your public Seller Track Record, which buyers see in OMENZ Checkout before paying. Proof of real sales, not claims. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/sale/record, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Sale Record (for SELLERS)
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
secret_scanSecret-Leak Preflight: before a handoff, prompt or payload leaves your boundary, scan it for API keys (Anthropic, OpenAI, AWS, GitHub, Stripe, Slack, Google...), PEM keys, wallet p…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Secret-Leak Preflight: before a handoff, prompt or payload leaves your boundary, scan it for API keys (Anthropic, OpenAI, AWS, GitHub, Stripe, Slack, Google...), PEM keys, wallet private keys, recovery phrases, DB passwords, JWTs and card numbers. CLEAN / REVIEW / BLOCK with JSON path + offset and redacted previews. Scanned in memory, never stored or logged. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/secret-scan, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Secret-Leak Preflight
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
seller_acceptance_checkSeller Payment-Acceptance Check: is your x402 server turning away paying agents?Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Seller Payment-Acceptance Check: is your x402 server turning away paying agents? We probe YOUR route with a throwaway, unfunded key (no money can move): a fresh payment must reach your facilitator; a payment echoing an older 402 (changed description/example, changed timeout) must not be refused; an x402 v1 X-PAYMENT must not be ignored silently. Verdict ACCEPTS_GOOD_MONEY / REFUSES_GOOD_MONEY / SERVES_UNPAID / NO_VALID_402 with each problem and the exact fix. OMENZ found this leak on its own server: a funded repeat buyer was refused 4 times. Max 5 requests to your URL. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/seller/acceptance-check, $0.05 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Seller Payment-Acceptance Check
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
seller_recordSeller Track Record: how an x402 seller actually performed for buyers who checked out through OMENZ: purchases closed, delivery rate, outcomes (good buy / paid not delivered), USDC…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Seller Track Record: how an x402 seller actually performed for buyers who checked out through OMENZ: purchases closed, delivery rate, outcomes (good buy / paid not delivered), USDC settled (verified on Base), first/last seen. Aggregate per seller host, no buyer data. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/seller-record, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Seller Track Record
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
settlement_costSettlement Cost Check (Base): what moving money costs RIGHT NOW (live gas price, L1 data fee, ETH/USD from Chainlink on Base) for an x402 settlement (~86,550 gas, measured), a USDC…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Settlement Cost Check (Base): what moving money costs RIGHT NOW (live gas price, L1 data fee, ETH/USD from Chainlink on Base) for an x402 settlement (~86,550 gas, measured), a USDC transfer, an ETH transfer and an approval, in ETH and USD. Send amount_usd (+ payments_per_day) to learn whether a payment that small is worth settling on its own: SETTLE / BATCH_OR_CREDITS / DONT_SETTLE_SINGLY, the overhead %, break-even payment size, and cheaper options (CDP free tier, Circle Gateway batching, prepaid credits). By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/settlement-cost, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Settlement Cost Check (Base)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
settlement_rescueSettlement Rescue: 'payment weird?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Settlement Rescue: 'payment weird? give it to us.' Timeout, 5xx or no PAYMENT-RESPONSE after paying, and you must decide whether to pay again. Send the X-PAYMENT header you sent (or the tx hash, or payer + payee + amount). We read the EIP-3009 authorization's on-chain state on Base: SETTLED (nonce used: here is the tx, do NOT pay again) / NOT_SETTLED (expired unused: safe to pay again ONCE) / STILL_UNCERTAIN (unused but still valid: a facilitator can still settle it, do NOT sign a new one yet, with seconds left) / NOT_FOUND_ON_CHAIN, plus a duplicate-payment scan, a safe next action and a signed record for refunds and disputes. Read-only. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/settlement/rescue, $0.05 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Settlement Rescue
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
site_checkWebsite health and business facts for one URL (alive, still theirs, readable; contact paths, structured data).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Website health and business facts for one URL (alive, still theirs, readable; contact paths, structured data). Deterministic. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/site-check, $0.01 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Website health and business facts for one URL (alive, still
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
spend_gateSpend Gate: ALLOW, DENY or ESCALATE before your agent spends money.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Spend Gate: ALLOW, DENY or ESCALATE before your agent spends money. Send the owner's policy (per-transaction, daily and monthly caps, approval threshold, recipient/category/network allow and block lists, hurdle: minimum expected return multiple) and the proposed spend; get the decision with every reason and the budget left. Stateless: nothing stored. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/spend-gate, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Spend Gate
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
spend_receiptSpend Receipt: one signed receipt per purchase: what your agent bought, why, what it cost (verified on Base from the tx hash or PAYMENT-RESPONSE) and what came back (checked agains…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Spend Receipt: one signed receipt per purchase: what your agent bought, why, what it cost (verified on Base from the tx hash or PAYMENT-RESPONSE) and what came back (checked against the seller's advertised output). GOOD_BUY / PAID_NOT_DELIVERED / PAID_PARTLY_DELIVERED / PAYMENT_NOT_CONFIRMED. Ed25519-signed, verifiable offline. Payment Verify + Delivery Check in one call. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/spend-receipt, $0.003 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Spend Receipt
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
split_checkSplit Check: before paying into (or trusting) an on-chain revenue split, verify what it actually pays.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Split Check: before paying into (or trusting) an on-chain revenue split, verify what it actually pays. Detects 0xSplits v2 splits on Base / Base Sepolia, proves a claimed recipients+allocations config against the on-chain splitHash (or discovers it from recent events), shows each recipient's share, whether a given beneficiary is included, whether the split is immutable (no owner), and USDC waiting to be distributed. Read-only. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/split-check, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Split Check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
terms_changedTerms Changed?: did an API or tool's pricing, limits or terms page change in a way that MATTERS?Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Terms Changed?: did an API or tool's pricing, limits or terms page change in a way that MATTERS? Keeps only material lines (prices, numbers with units, rate limits/quotas, commercial-use, prohibitions, refunds, data retention) and diffs them against your last fingerprint: exact lines added/removed, money_changed flag. Footer/date churn ignored. Stateless: keep the fingerprint, pass it as previous=. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/terms-changed, $0.005 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Terms Changed?
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
terms_extractAPI Terms Extractor / Data-License Checker: before your agent uses a dataset or API commercially: a terms/license page -> clauses by category (commercial use, attribution, rate lim…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it API Terms Extractor / Data-License Checker: before your agent uses a dataset or API commercially: a terms/license page -> clauses by category (commercial use, attribution, rate limits, retention, training on your data, prohibited uses, resale, refunds, liability, termination, license type) with quotes, plus plain flags (no_commercial_use, attribution_required, may_train_on_your_data, no_resale, no_scraping, non_refundable). Pattern-based, not legal advice. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/terms-extract, $0.005 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: API Terms Extractor / Data-License Checker
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
token_balanceToken Balance (Base): balance of any ERC-20 (symbol + decimals resolved) or native ETH for an address, raw and human units, read live from Base.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Token Balance (Base): balance of any ERC-20 (symbol + decimals resolved) or native ETH for an address, raw and human units, read live from Base. For agents checking they can afford a purchase, or that a payment arrived. Public chain data, never needs a key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/token/balance, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Token Balance (Base)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tx_decodeTransaction Decode (Base): what did this transaction actually do, in plain English.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Transaction Decode (Base): what did this transaction actually do, in plain English. Status, confirmations, function called, every token transfer (symbol + amount), approvals (UNLIMITED approvals flagged), NFT moves, fee, time, and whether it was an x402 payment (EIP-3009 transferWithAuthorization). For agents checking a payment, a refund, or what a contract just did with their money. Public chain data, never needs a key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/tx/decode, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Transaction Decode (Base)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tx_preflightTransaction Preflight: GO or STOP before your agent pays an x402 endpoint.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Transaction Preflight: GO or STOP before your agent pays an x402 endpoint. Checks it answers, the live price is within max_price_usd, payTo matches expected_pay_to, the network is allowed, the asset is a known USD stablecoin, and flags drift from the price you were quoted/listed. Never pays the target. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/tx-preflight, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Transaction Preflight
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
uptime_reportUptime Watch report: uptime %, median latency, incidents, price changes and payout-wallet changes for a watched endpoint, plus recent checks.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Uptime Watch report: uptime %, median latency, incidents, price changes and payout-wallet changes for a watched endpoint, plus recent checks. When the endpoint is down (or substitutes=true) it also returns the 3 best live substitutes from ~35,000 x402 APIs. Header X-Watch-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/uptime/report, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Uptime Watch report
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
uptime_watchUptime Watch: register a paid endpoint your agent depends on; OMENZ checks it daily (and on each report) for 30 days: up/down, latency, live x402 price and payTo, so you catch outa…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Uptime Watch: register a paid endpoint your agent depends on; OMENZ checks it daily (and on each report) for 30 days: up/down, latency, live x402 price and payTo, so you catch outages, price drift and swapped payout wallets before paying. Never pays the endpoint. Returns watch_id + watch_key (shown once). By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/uptime/watch, $0.01 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Uptime Watch
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
vendor_checkVendor Due-Diligence Pack: before your agent depends on an unknown paid API: reliability score + the vendor domain's health (live/parked/moved) + its terms/pricing page digest (mat…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Vendor Due-Diligence Pack: before your agent depends on an unknown paid API: reliability score + the vendor domain's health (live/parked/moved) + its terms/pricing page digest (material lines) + flags. Never pays. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/vendor-check, $0.01 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Vendor Due-Diligence Pack
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
wallet_balanceAgent Wallet Balance: USDC and ETH balance of any wallet on Base (public chain data).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Wallet Balance: USDC and ETH balance of any wallet on Base (public chain data). Never moves funds, no key needed. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/wallet/balance, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Wallet Balance
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
wallet_runwayAgent Wallet Runway: how many days before this agent wallet runs dry?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Wallet Runway: how many days before this agent wallet runs dry? USDC balance / recent daily spend -> days left, OK / LOW / CRITICAL, and the top cost drivers by payee. Public chain data on Base. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/wallet/runway, $0.005 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Wallet Runway
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
wallet_spendAgent Wallet Spend Report: what has this wallet been paying for?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Wallet Spend Report: what has this wallet been paying for? Outgoing USDC payments on Base over the last N days (max 14), grouped by payee, each payee named with the x402 services that pay out to it (from the ~35k-endpoint x402 index), totals, daily rate, micropayment count, share going to known x402 sellers. Public chain data. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/wallet/spend, $0.005 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Wallet Spend Report
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
wallet_watchWallet Watch: never run dry mid-job.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Wallet Watch: never run dry mid-job. Register an agent's Base wallet with min_usdc and/or min_days (runway at its recent spend rate); OMENZ checks it daily for up to 30 days and drops ONE alert into your Agent PO Box when it runs low (re-arms after you top up). Read-only public chain data; never touches the wallet. Returns watch_id + watch_key (shown once). By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: POST https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/wallet-watch, $0.01 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Wallet Watch
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
wallet_watch_reportWallet Watch report: current USDC, runway days, state OK / ALERTING, low checks and the last 14 checks.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Wallet Watch report: current USDC, runway days, state OK / ALERTING, low checks and the last 14 checks. Header X-Watch-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/wallet-watch/report, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Wallet Watch report
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 9Show 9 read-only tools
authorize_getOMENZ Authorize (GET form): same APPROVE / REVIEW / DECLINE check before paying an x402 endpoint, with query params: url, method, max_price_usd, expected_pay_to, daily_cap_usd, spe…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "authorize_get" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it OMENZ Authorize (GET form): same APPROVE / REVIEW / DECLINE check before paying an x402 endpoint, with query params: url, method, max_price_usd, expected_pay_to, daily_cap_usd, spent_today_usd. Returns reasons + a signed 5-minute authorization code. Never pays the target. Doing many? Prepay once (POST /v1/credits/buy-1, $1) and check via /v1/authorize/credit at 2% of the payment (min $0.0003), with no per-check settlement. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/authorize, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: OMENZ Authorize (GET form)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
budget_statusShared Budget: cap, spent, remaining this window, spend by agent and by payee, recent purchases.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "budget_status" says "status": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Shared Budget: cap, spent, remaining this window, spend by agent and by payee, recent purchases. Header X-Budget-Key (owner or spender). By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/budget/status, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Shared Budget
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
checkpoint_statusOMENZ Checkpoint (status): where a milestone job stands: each milestone RELEASE / REFUND / RETRY / PENDING with attempts, and released / refunded / pending USD.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "checkpoint_status" says "status": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it OMENZ Checkpoint (status): where a milestone job stands: each milestone RELEASE / REFUND / RETRY / PENDING with attempts, and released / refunded / pending USD. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/checkpoint/status, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: OMENZ Checkpoint (status)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
ledger_getAgent Job Ledger: read entries (since_seq for only new ones), totals (spent, counts by type, last status) and chain_intact: proof nothing was edited or removed.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "ledger_get" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Job Ledger: read entries (since_seq for only new ones), totals (spent, counts by type, last status) and chain_intact: proof nothing was edited or removed. Header X-Ledger-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/ledger/get, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Job Ledger
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
locker_getAgent Locker: check a resume packet back out.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "locker_get" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Locker: check a resume packet back out. Send header X-Locker-Key. Use fields=a,b to load only the parts you need. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/locker/get, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Locker
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
market_findAgent Market: find the paid tool for a capability across ~35,000 x402 endpoints (Bazaar index, refreshed weekly).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "market_find" says "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Market: find the paid tool for a capability across ~35,000 x402 endpoints (Bazaar index, refreshed weekly). Ranked by match, then real 30-day usage (calls, unique payers); filter by max_price_usd and network; exclude= a vendor to get substitutes (tool down or rate-limited); the top picks are probed live (never paid) for status, price and drift. Capability Finder, Procurement Desk, Quote Comparator, Tool Substitute Finder and Rate-Limit Router in one call. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/market/find, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Market
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
name_resolveName Resolve: ENS (name.eth) and Basenames (name.base.eth) to address, or an address to its primary ENS name, forward-verified so a spoofed reverse record is flagged.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "name_resolve" says "resolve": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Name Resolve: ENS (name.eth) and Basenames (name.base.eth) to address, or an address to its primary ENS name, forward-verified so a spoofed reverse record is flagged. For agents about to pay or trust 'vitalik.eth' or 'shop.base.eth'. Public chain data. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/name/resolve, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Name Resolve
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
queue_statusAgent Workforce: who is responsible for what right now (holders + lease time left), counts by state, escalations, roster (available/last seen/current job), scheduled jobs; or one i…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "queue_status" says "status": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Workforce: who is responsible for what right now (holders + lease time left), counts by state, escalations, roster (available/last seen/current job), scheduled jobs; or one item's full history with item_id. Header X-Queue-Key. By OMENZ. (MCP calls run in AYNE, the free playzone; production: GET https://www.omenz.org/api/tollbooth/v1/queue/status, $0.002 via x402.)
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Workforce
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
swapmeet_searchFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "swapmeet_search" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Search ~35,000 paid agent services (x402 Bazaar) by what you need; shows busy booths and OMENZ-verified history.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write111
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out35
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 15, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 61
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 61 tools that change things (1 destructive, 5 irreversible, 55 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://www.omenz.org/mcp: tools/list returned 67 tools to an anonymous client, including pobox_drop (destructive), locker_put (irreversible), receipt_put (irreversible), handoff_pack (irreversible), failure_put (irreversible) and 56 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnpobox_drop
The server marks "pobox_drop" not destructive (destructiveHint: false), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "pobox_drop" says "drop": a word for removing or ending something.
- Warnqueue_resolve
The server marks "queue_resolve" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "queue_resolve" says "resolve": a word for reading.
- Warnfinance_snapshot
The server marks "finance_snapshot" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "finance_snapshot" says "snapshot": a word for reading.
- Infopassport_issue
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...max 7 days). Carries permissions, never credentials. Any tool can check it with /passport/c..."
- Infojacket_create
The description mentions "Credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ns jacket_id + jacket_key (shown once). Credentials are refused: keep reference names only...."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 added, 2 changed.+1 added~2 changedView diff
- Added:send_checkCan't be undone
- Changed:queue_claimChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:queue_enqueueChanges thingsdescription
Tools17 added, 3 changed.+17 added~3 changedView diff
- Added:allowanceChanges things
- Added:checkpoint_createChanges things
- Added:checkpoint_statusOnly reads
- Added:checkpoint_submitChanges things
- Added:loadout_checkChanges things
- Added:loadout_compileChanges things
- Added:loadout_simulateChanges things
- Added:omenz_conventionsChanges things
- Added:omenz_loadoutsChanges things
- Added:omenz_tell_us_what_you_needChanges things
- Added:omenz_track_recordChanges things
- Added:robot_action_gateChanges things
- Added:seller_acceptance_checkChanges things
- Added:swapmeet_searchOnly reads
- Added:token_balanceChanges things
- Added:wallet_watchChanges things
- Added:wallet_watch_reportChanges things
- Changed:authorizeChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:guardChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:market_payeeChanges thingsdescription
Tools24 added, 31 changed.+24 added~31 changedView diff
- Added:budget_createChanges things
- Added:budget_delegateChanges things
- Added:budget_releaseChanges things
- Added:budget_spendCan't be undone
- Added:budget_statusOnly reads
- Added:checkout_closeChanges things
- Added:checkout_openChanges things
- Added:delivery_checkChanges things
- Added:dispute_packetChanges things
- Added:facilitatorsChanges things
- Added:guardChanges things
- Added:market_cheapestChanges things
- Added:market_jobChanges things
- Added:market_job_guardedChanges things
- Added:name_resolveOnly reads
- Added:pay_verifyCan't be undone
- Added:po_issueChanges things
- Added:po_redeemChanges things
- Added:sale_recordChanges things
- Added:seller_recordChanges things
- Added:settlement_costChanges things
- Added:settlement_rescueChanges things
- Added:spend_receiptChanges things
- Added:tx_decodeChanges things
- Changed:aliveChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:authorizeChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:authorize_getOnly readsdescription
- Changed:context_dietChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:dedupeChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:freshnessChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:jacket_historyChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:ledger_appendChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:ledger_getOnly readsdescription
- Changed:locker_getOnly readsdescription
- Changed:market_findOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:market_payeeChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:passport_checkChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:pobox_createChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:pobox_dropDeletes or cancelsdescription
- Changed:pobox_inboxChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:queue_awardChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:queue_bidChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:queue_claimChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:queue_completeChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:queue_enqueueChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:queue_escalateChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:queue_failChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:queue_heartbeatChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:queue_resolveChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:queue_statusOnly readsdescription
- Changed:quoteChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:reputationChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:spend_gateChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:uptime_reportChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:wallet_balanceChanges thingsdescription
Tools12 added, 62 changed.+12 added~62 changedView diff
- Added:authorize_getOnly reads
- Added:credits_buy_1Changes things
- Added:credits_buy_5Changes things
- Added:jacket_checkinChanges things
- Added:jacket_checkoutChanges things
- Added:jacket_createChanges things
- Added:jacket_historyChanges things
- Added:market_reportChanges things
- Added:market_sellersChanges things
- Added:split_checkChanges things
- Added:uptime_reportChanges things
- Added:uptime_watchChanges things
- Changed:agent_readyChanges thingstitleannotations
- Changed:aliveChanges thingstitleannotations
- Changed:authorizeChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:branchChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:capability_cardChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:changedChanges thingstitleannotations
- Changed:claim_evidenceChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:context_dietChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:contract_acceptChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:contract_buildChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:cost_estimateChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:dedupeChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:event_checkChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:evidence_bundleChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:failure_putCan't be undonetitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:finance_forecastChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:finance_reconcileChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:finance_refund_requestCan't be undonetitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:finance_snapshotChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:finance_watchdogChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:freshnessChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:handoff_packCan't be undonetitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:ledger_appendChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:ledger_createChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:ledger_getOnly readstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:local_factsChanges thingstitleannotations
- Changed:locker_getOnly readstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:locker_putCan't be undonetitleannotations
- Changed:market_findOnly readstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:market_payeeChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:market_price_indexChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:market_reliabilityChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:passport_checkChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:passport_issueChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:pobox_createChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:pobox_dropDeletes or cancelstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:pobox_inboxChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:preflightChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:queue_awardChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:queue_bidChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:queue_claimChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:queue_completeChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:queue_createChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:queue_enqueueChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:queue_escalateChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:queue_failChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:queue_heartbeatChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:queue_resolveChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:queue_statusOnly readstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:quoteChanges thingstitleannotations
- Changed:receipt_putCan't be undonetitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:reputationChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:secret_scanChanges thingstitleannotations
- Changed:site_checkChanges thingstitleannotations
- Changed:spend_gateChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:terms_changedChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:terms_extractChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:tx_preflightChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:vendor_checkChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:wallet_balanceChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:wallet_runwayChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:wallet_spendChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
Install
Pinned to version 1.2.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agent-tools https://www.omenz.org/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agent-tools https://www.omenz.org/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agent-tools__locker_get",
"mcp__agent-tools__ledger_get",
"mcp__agent-tools__queue_status",
"mcp__agent-tools__market_find",
"mcp__agent-tools__checkpoint_status",
"mcp__agent-tools__budget_status",
"mcp__agent-tools__name_resolve",
"mcp__agent-tools__swapmeet_search"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agent-tools__agent_ready",
"mcp__agent-tools__site_check",
"mcp__agent-tools__changed",
"mcp__agent-tools__local_facts",
"mcp__agent-tools__locker_put",
"mcp__agent-tools__pobox_create",
"mcp__agent-tools__pobox_inbox",
"mcp__agent-tools__receipt_put",
"mcp__agent-tools__handoff_pack",
"mcp__agent-tools__alive",
"mcp__agent-tools__quote",
"mcp__agent-tools__tx_preflight",
"mcp__agent-tools__secret_scan",
"mcp__agent-tools__spend_gate",
"mcp__agent-tools__branch",
"mcp__agent-tools__failure_put",
"mcp__agent-tools__terms_changed",
"mcp__agent-tools__cost_estimate",
"mcp__agent-tools__passport_issue",
"mcp__agent-tools__passport_check",
"mcp__agent-tools__event_check",
"mcp__agent-tools__claim_evidence",
"mcp__agent-tools__preflight",
"mcp__agent-tools__ledger_create",
"mcp__agent-tools__ledger_append",
"mcp__agent-tools__capability_card",
"mcp__agent-tools__queue_create",
"mcp__agent-tools__queue_enqueue",
"mcp__agent-tools__queue_claim",
"mcp__agent-tools__queue_heartbeat",
"mcp__agent-tools__queue_complete",
"mcp__agent-tools__queue_fail",
"mcp__agent-tools__queue_escalate",
"mcp__agent-tools__queue_resolve",
"mcp__agent-tools__queue_bid",
"mcp__agent-tools__queue_award",
"mcp__agent-tools__market_reliability",
"mcp__agent-tools__vendor_check",
"mcp__agent-tools__checkpoint_create",
"mcp__agent-tools__checkpoint_submit",
"mcp__agent-tools__contract_build",
"mcp__agent-tools__contract_accept",
"mcp__agent-tools__reputation",
"mcp__agent-tools__evidence_bundle",
"mcp__agent-tools__finance_reconcile",
"mcp__agent-tools__finance_forecast",
"mcp__agent-tools__finance_watchdog",
"mcp__agent-tools__finance_snapshot",
"mcp__agent-tools__finance_refund_request",
"mcp__agent-tools__terms_extract",
"mcp__agent-tools__freshness",
"mcp__agent-tools__dedupe",
"mcp__agent-tools__context_diet",
"mcp__agent-tools__wallet_balance",
"mcp__agent-tools__wallet_spend",
"mcp__agent-tools__wallet_runway",
"mcp__agent-tools__market_payee",
"mcp__agent-tools__market_price_index",
"mcp__agent-tools__authorize",
"mcp__agent-tools__authorize_get",
"mcp__agent-tools__split_check",
"mcp__agent-tools__credits_buy_1",
"mcp__agent-tools__credits_buy_5",
"mcp__agent-tools__market_report",
"mcp__agent-tools__market_sellers",
"mcp__agent-tools__jacket_create",
"mcp__agent-tools__jacket_checkout",
"mcp__agent-tools__jacket_checkin",
"mcp__agent-tools__jacket_history",
"mcp__agent-tools__send_check",
"mcp__agent-tools__wallet_watch",
"mcp__agent-tools__wallet_watch_report",
"mcp__agent-tools__uptime_watch",
"mcp__agent-tools__uptime_report",
"mcp__agent-tools__budget_create",
"mcp__agent-tools__budget_spend",
"mcp__agent-tools__budget_release",
"mcp__agent-tools__pay_verify",
"mcp__agent-tools__delivery_check",
"mcp__agent-tools__market_cheapest",
"mcp__agent-tools__spend_receipt",
"mcp__agent-tools__checkout_open",
"mcp__agent-tools__checkout_close",
"mcp__agent-tools__seller_record",
"mcp__agent-tools__facilitators",
"mcp__agent-tools__sale_record",
"mcp__agent-tools__tx_decode",
"mcp__agent-tools__token_balance",
"mcp__agent-tools__allowance",
"mcp__agent-tools__seller_acceptance_check",
"mcp__agent-tools__settlement_cost",
"mcp__agent-tools__guard",
"mcp__agent-tools__budget_delegate",
"mcp__agent-tools__settlement_rescue",
"mcp__agent-tools__market_job",
"mcp__agent-tools__market_job_guarded",
"mcp__agent-tools__dispute_packet",
"mcp__agent-tools__po_issue",
"mcp__agent-tools__po_redeem",
"mcp__agent-tools__loadout_check",
"mcp__agent-tools__loadout_compile",
"mcp__agent-tools__loadout_simulate",
"mcp__agent-tools__robot_action_gate",
"mcp__agent-tools__omenz_track_record",
"mcp__agent-tools__omenz_loadouts",
"mcp__agent-tools__omenz_conventions",
"mcp__agent-tools__omenz_tell_us_what_you_need"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__agent-tools__pobox_drop"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-tools. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 111 rules
- mcp__agent-tools__agent_ready untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__site_check untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__changed untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__local_facts untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__locker_put untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__pobox_create untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__pobox_drop untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__pobox_inbox untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__receipt_put untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__handoff_pack untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__locker_get untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__alive untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__quote untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__tx_preflight untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__secret_scan untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__spend_gate untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__branch untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__failure_put untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__terms_changed untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__cost_estimate untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__passport_issue untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__passport_check untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__event_check untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__claim_evidence untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__preflight untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__ledger_create untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__ledger_append untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__ledger_get untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__capability_card untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__queue_create untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__queue_enqueue untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__queue_claim untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__queue_heartbeat untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__queue_complete untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__queue_fail untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__queue_escalate untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__queue_resolve untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__queue_bid untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__queue_award untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__queue_status untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__market_find untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__market_reliability untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__vendor_check untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__checkpoint_create untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__checkpoint_submit untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__checkpoint_status untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__contract_build untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__contract_accept untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__reputation untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__evidence_bundle untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__finance_reconcile untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__finance_forecast untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__finance_watchdog untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__finance_snapshot untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__finance_refund_request untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__terms_extract untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__freshness untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__dedupe untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__context_diet untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__wallet_balance untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__wallet_spend untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__wallet_runway untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__market_payee untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__market_price_index untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__authorize untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__authorize_get untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__split_check untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__credits_buy_1 untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__credits_buy_5 untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__market_report untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__market_sellers untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__jacket_create untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__jacket_checkout untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__jacket_checkin untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__jacket_history untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__send_check untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__wallet_watch untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__wallet_watch_report untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__uptime_watch untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__uptime_report untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__budget_create untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__budget_spend untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__budget_release untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__budget_status untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__pay_verify untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__delivery_check untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__market_cheapest untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__spend_receipt untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__checkout_open untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__checkout_close untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__seller_record untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__facilitators untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__sale_record untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__tx_decode untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__name_resolve untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__token_balance untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__allowance untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__seller_acceptance_check untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__settlement_cost untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__guard untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__budget_delegate untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__settlement_rescue untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__market_job untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__market_job_guarded untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__dispute_packet untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__po_issue untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__po_redeem untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-tools__loadout_check untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__loadout_compile untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__loadout_simulate untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-tools__robot_action_gate untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/org.omenz.www/agent-tools/verify?hash=1794fd9e8bfb9174b3bf20c09befe05f127c7ceeecaec3a7182654d1135fad5e" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 1794fd9e8bfb, from Nov 21, 2026, 13:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.omenz.www/agent-tools/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.omenz.www/agent-tools)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 13:18 UTC.
OMENZ agent tools MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the OMENZ agent tools MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 116 tools, 107 of which can change, send or delete something, and 5 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the OMENZ agent tools MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: pobox_drop.
Can the OMENZ agent tools MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 8 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: locker_put, receipt_put, handoff_pack, failure_put, finance_refund_request, send_check and 2 more.
What tools does the OMENZ agent tools MCP server have?
- 116 tools: 1 destructive, 8 irreversible, 98 write, 9 read. pobox_drop, locker_put, receipt_put, handoff_pack, failure_put, finance_refund_request, send_check, budget_spend and 108 more.
Does the OMENZ agent tools MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the OMENZ agent tools MCP server send data to outside services?
- 35 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): agent_ready, site_check, changed, local_facts, locker_put, handoff_pack and 29 more.
Has the OMENZ agent tools MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 4 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 21, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.