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satledger timestamp receipt MCP server

org.satledger/timestamp-receiptsatledger.orgstreamable-httpv0.21.4Scanned

RFC 3161 timestamps with no account, and a signed agent-ledger workspace. Paid per call over x402.

14 tools: 10 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 10 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

10 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the satledger timestamp receipt MCP server can do

The satledger timestamp receipt MCP server is published by satledger.org, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 14 tools. It can create or change data (10 tools: timestamp_receipt, provision_workspace, top_up_workspace, create_agent and 6 more), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 0.21.4.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

14 tools

Changes things 10Claude Code: ask
  • anchor_agentAsk a public RFC 3161 Time-Stamp Authority to sign the agent's current state.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Ask a public RFC 3161 Time-Stamp Authority to sign the agent's current state. The one fact here the operator cannot manufacture: a timestamp cannot be issued for a time that has passed. An unchanged state returns the anchor it already has. Costs 100 units. Authenticate with the workspace key in _meta[satledger/api-key].
  • create_agentCreate an agent in your workspace: a named ledger whose every event is ed25519-signed and hash-chained.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_agent" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create an agent in your workspace: a named ledger whose every event is ed25519-signed and hash-chained. `initial_credits` mints supply to the workspace issuer, not to the agent - fund_agent moves credits across when you need usage metering. Costs 1 unit. Authenticate with the workspace key in _meta[satledger/api-key].
  • export_agentBuild the export bundle, run the customer-side verifier over it and return the summary plus the URL of the archive (HTTP, X-API-Key, free).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build the export bundle, run the customer-side verifier over it and return the summary plus the URL of the archive (HTTP, X-API-Key, free). Pass expect_action_head / expect_action_count from state YOU kept to check completeness. Free, permanently. Authenticate with the workspace key in _meta[satledger/api-key].
  • fund_agentMove credits from the workspace issuer to an agent's own account, so record_usage can burn them.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "move": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Move credits from the workspace issuer to an agent's own account, so record_usage can burn them. Costs 1 unit. Authenticate with the workspace key in _meta[satledger/api-key].
  • provision_workspaceBuy a workspace: a tamper-evident usage and action ledger for your agents, every event ed25519-signed and hash-chained, with an export your own customers verify offline.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Buy a workspace: a tamper-evident usage and action ledger for your agents, every event ed25519-signed and hash-chained, with an export your own customers verify offline. Pay over x402 in _meta[x402/payment]: 0.50 USDC for 2,500 units (starter), 15.00 USDC for 100,000 units (block). Every workspace also carries 10,000 free units. Returns an API key once, plus the next calls to make. The ledger operations themselves are HTTP, authenticated with that key.
  • record_actionAppend what an agent did - a tool call, a decision, a message - as a signed, hash-chained entry.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Append what an agent did - a tool call, a decision, a message - as a signed, hash-chained entry. This is the thing the workspace is for. Costs 1 unit. Authenticate with the workspace key in _meta[satledger/api-key].
  • record_usageBurn credits from an agent's account, as a signed ledger event.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Burn credits from an agent's account, as a signed ledger event. Costs 1 unit. Authenticate with the workspace key in _meta[satledger/api-key].
  • timestamp_receiptSubmit a SHA-256 digest and receive a Time-Stamp Authority's signed RFC 3161 token over it: evidence that the data you hashed existed at that time, verifiable against the authority…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "submit": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Submit a SHA-256 digest and receive a Time-Stamp Authority's signed RFC 3161 token over it: evidence that the data you hashed existed at that time, verifiable against the authority without trusting or contacting this service. Hash your data yourself - it never leaves your side. Your first 3 each day are free, no payment needed. Then 0.05 USDC for one, or 0.50 for up to 10 in a single call and a single payment, bound to one timestamp by a Merkle root. Paid over x402. No account, nothing stored here afterwards.
  • top_up_workspaceAdd units to a workspace you already hold.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "add": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Add units to a workspace you already hold. Send its API key in _meta[satledger/api-key] (or the api_key argument) and the payment in _meta[x402/payment]: 0.50 USDC for 2,500 units (starter), 15.00 USDC for 100,000 units (block). The units land in that workspace and nothing new is created; buying a workspace instead gives you an empty ledger under a different key.
  • workspace_balanceUnits remaining and what each operation costs.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Units remaining and what each operation costs. Free, so you can plan before you are refused. Authenticate with the workspace key in _meta[satledger/api-key].
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • describe_agentCurrent state: root id, state hash, event count, balance.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "describe_agent" says "describe": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Current state: root id, state hash, event count, balance. Free. Authenticate with the workspace key in _meta[satledger/api-key].
  • list_actionsThe agent's action log, with its head hash.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_actions" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The agent's action log, with its head hash. Free. Authenticate with the workspace key in _meta[satledger/api-key].
  • list_agentsEvery agent in your workspace.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_agents" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Every agent in your workspace. Free. Authenticate with the workspace key in _meta[satledger/api-key].
  • list_anchorsEvery anchor commitment recorded for the agent.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_anchors" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Every anchor commitment recorded for the agent. Free. Authenticate with the workspace key in _meta[satledger/api-key].

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:17 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
10
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 10 tools that change things (10 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.satledger.org/mcp: tools/list returned 14 tools to an anonymous client, including timestamp_receipt (write), provision_workspace (write), top_up_workspace (write), create_agent (write), record_action (write) and 5 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.21.4. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http timestamp-receipt https://api.satledger.org/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http timestamp-receipt https://api.satledger.org/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__timestamp-receipt__list_agents",
      "mcp__timestamp-receipt__describe_agent",
      "mcp__timestamp-receipt__list_actions",
      "mcp__timestamp-receipt__list_anchors"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__timestamp-receipt__timestamp_receipt",
      "mcp__timestamp-receipt__provision_workspace",
      "mcp__timestamp-receipt__top_up_workspace",
      "mcp__timestamp-receipt__create_agent",
      "mcp__timestamp-receipt__record_action",
      "mcp__timestamp-receipt__fund_agent",
      "mcp__timestamp-receipt__record_usage",
      "mcp__timestamp-receipt__anchor_agent",
      "mcp__timestamp-receipt__export_agent",
      "mcp__timestamp-receipt__workspace_balance"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as timestamp-receipt. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/org.satledger/timestamp-receipt/verify?hash=753b04058dfabb6fe79ba52b5370d9cdc3cb29cf43b2ce695bc677ddd60ceec6" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 753b04058dfa, from Nov 9, 2026, 15:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.satledger/timestamp-receipt/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for org.satledger/timestamp-receipt
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/org.satledger/timestamp-receipt.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.satledger/timestamp-receipt)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 27, 2026, 11:33 UTC.

satledger timestamp receipt MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the satledger timestamp receipt MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 14 tools, 10 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the satledger timestamp receipt MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the satledger timestamp receipt MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the satledger timestamp receipt MCP server have?

14 tools: 10 write, 4 read. timestamp_receipt, provision_workspace, top_up_workspace, create_agent, record_action, fund_agent, record_usage, anchor_agent and 6 more.

Does the satledger timestamp receipt MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the satledger timestamp receipt MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the satledger timestamp receipt MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.