Thru Explorer MCP server
org.thru/thru-explorerthru.orgstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Thru blockchain explorer: blocks, transactions, accounts, and program ABIs on the Thru RISC-V L1
8 tools: 8 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
Run the operations that matter as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the Thru Explorer MCP server can do
The Thru Explorer MCP server is published by thru.org, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Last scanned Nov 5, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Only reads 8Show 8 read-only tools
get_accountGet account details by address, including balance, owner, and metadataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_account" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get account details by address, including balance, owner, and metadata
get_blockGet block details by slot number, including producer, timestamp, and transactionsNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_block" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get block details by slot number, including producer, timestamp, and transactions
get_program_abiGet the on-chain ABI for a program, including instruction and event definitionsNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_program_abi" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get the on-chain ABI for a program, including instruction and event definitions
get_transactionGet transaction details by signature, including status, accounts, instructions, and eventsNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_transaction" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get transaction details by signature, including status, accounts, instructions, and events
list_account_transactionsList transactions for an account with paginationNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_account_transactions" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List transactions for an account with pagination
list_recent_blocksList the most recent blocks on the chainNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_recent_blocks" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the most recent blocks on the chain
list_recent_transactionsList the most recent transactions across recent blocksNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_recent_transactions" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the most recent transactions across recent blocks
searchSearch for blocks, transactions, or accounts by query (block number, tx signature, or address)No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Search for blocks, transactions, or accounts by query (block number, tx signature, or address)
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:17 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 410
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 410.
Posture changes
- Nov 20, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 410
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 410; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Protocol version: 2025-06-18 -> none.View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 410
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http thru-explorer https://scan.thru.org/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http thru-explorer https://scan.thru.org/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__thru-explorer__get_block",
"mcp__thru-explorer__get_transaction",
"mcp__thru-explorer__get_account",
"mcp__thru-explorer__list_account_transactions",
"mcp__thru-explorer__list_recent_blocks",
"mcp__thru-explorer__list_recent_transactions",
"mcp__thru-explorer__search",
"mcp__thru-explorer__get_program_abi"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as thru-explorer. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/org.thru/thru-explorer/verify?hash=60d4119d478d10e5802e9ca2d40f6924f8e59afc76a3fbe670ed8ee56a09d56b" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 60d4119d478d, from Nov 5, 2026, 06:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.thru/thru-explorer/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/org.thru/thru-explorer)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:54 UTC.
Thru Explorer MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Thru Explorer MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the Thru Explorer MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Thru Explorer MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Thru Explorer MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 8 read. get_block, get_transaction, get_account, list_account_transactions, list_recent_blocks, list_recent_transactions, search and get_program_abi.
Does the Thru Explorer MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the Thru Explorer MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Thru Explorer MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 5, 2026.