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xi.pe MCP server

pe.xi/xipexi.pestreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Share text at a short URL. No account, no API key, expires within 7 days.

3 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things and 2 change things.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the xi.pe MCP server can do

The xi.pe MCP server is published by xi.pe, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: delete_paste) and create or change data (2 tools: create_paste and read_paste). None of its tools only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • delete_pasteDelete a xi.pe paste before it expires.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "delete_paste" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Delete a xi.pe paste before it expires. Requires the delete_token returned when it was created; there is no other way to prove ownership.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • create_pasteStore UTF-8 text at xi.pe and get back a short URL anyone can read.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_paste" says "create": a word for a change.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.long.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.long.description: "...a lucky guess would actually matter -- credentials, private logs, anything with real conse..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Store UTF-8 text at xi.pe and get back a short URL anyone can read. Use it when text has to leave the conversation: someone asks for a shareable link to text you already have -- 'share this', 'give me a URL for it'; something a human needs to read would flood the chat inline -- a long diff, a stack trace, a generated config, a report; or something has to reach another agent, session or machine that does not share your filesystem. Maximum 2 MiB (2,097,152 bytes); larger is rejected, not truncated. Returns url, code, delete_token, size and expires. The delete_token is shown once and is the only way to delete the paste -- pass it to the user verbatim if a human is in the loop. If you are outputting markdown for human reading, highly consider adding ?md to the link you hand back to make it more readable.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
  • read_pasteFetch the text of an existing xi.pe paste -- including one a user or another agent just handed you.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "read_paste" says "read": a word for reading.
    • The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "read_paste" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "read_paste" says "read": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch the text of an existing xi.pe paste -- including one a user or another agent just handed you. Accepts either the code or the full URL. If you pass the URL on to a human and the text is Markdown, append ?md: it renders headings, tables and ```mermaid diagrams.

    Annotations the server declares

    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:17 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 destructive, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://xi.pe/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including delete_paste (destructive), create_paste (write), read_paste (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn1 info
  • The server marks "read_paste" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "read_paste" says "read": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.long.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.long.description: "...a lucky guess would actually matter -- credentials, private logs, anything with real conse..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http xipe https://xi.pe/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http xipe https://xi.pe/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__xipe__create_paste",
      "mcp__xipe__read_paste"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__xipe__delete_paste"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as xipe. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/pe.xi/xipe/verify?hash=de8a2887287286f92b75be1ba6795b8f976804e90110c7039eafc9c62461da78" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash de8a28872872, from Nov 19, 2026, 01:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/pe.xi/xipe/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for pe.xi/xipe
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/pe.xi/xipe.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/pe.xi/xipe)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:54 UTC.

xi.pe MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the xi.pe MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the xi.pe MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: delete_paste.

Can the xi.pe MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the xi.pe MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 destructive, 2 write. delete_paste, create_paste and read_paste.

Does the xi.pe MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the xi.pe MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the xi.pe MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.