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Actuary MCP server

pro.actuaryai/actuaryactuaryai.prostreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Pre-trade gate for agents on Robinhood Chain: signed ALLOW, REVIEW or DENY before a token buy.

11 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 8 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 8 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Actuary MCP server can do

The Actuary MCP server is published by actuaryai.pro, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 11 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: cancel_mandate) and create or change data (8 tools: gate, gate_batch, gate_facts, verify_receipt and 4 more). 2 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (mandate_status); 3 tools bring in text other people can write (gate, gate_batch and create_mandate); 1 tool can send data out of your system (create_mandate). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

11 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • cancel_mandateStops checks and events for a mandate, e.g.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "cancel_mandate" says "cancel": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Stops checks and events for a mandate, e.g. after selling the token.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
Changes things 8Claude Code: ask
  • create_mandateFor a token you hold: $0.05 per 7 days over x402 (pay via the REST API or the stdio MCP server).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_mandate" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.webhook_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    For a token you hold: $0.05 per 7 days over x402 (pay via the REST API or the stdio MCP server). Re-checks a token against the policy about every 30 minutes. Changes (decision, owner, implementation, mint/pause/blacklist, supply) are recorded as events you poll with mandate_events; optionally also POSTed to an https webhook. Every event carries a signed signal: exit, watch or hold. Returns an id and a secret: keep the secret.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • gateCall BEFORE buying a token on Robinhood Chain.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call BEFORE buying a token on Robinhood Chain. Returns ALLOW, DENY or REVIEW, every check with the fact it read, and an EIP-712 signed receipt. Missing data never gives ALLOW unless the policy says so.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • gate_batchGate up to 10 tokens against one policy in one call, one receipt each.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Gate up to 10 tokens against one policy in one call, one receipt each. Counts as one Gate call per token.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • gate_factsEvery fact a policy rule may use (name, type, meaning), the rule syntax, the presets, and current pricing.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Every fact a policy rule may use (name, type, meaning), the rule syntax, the presets, and current pricing.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
  • mandate_eventsEvents a mandate recorded since a unix time (0 = all).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Events a mandate recorded since a unix time (0 = all). Use next_since for the following poll.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
  • mandate_signalThe newest signed signal for a mandate: exit, watch or hold, from its last decision, valid for one hour.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The newest signed signal for a mandate: exit, watch or hold, from its last decision, valid for one hour. Verify it, then your own code decides whether to sell; Actuary never trades.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
  • verify_receiptChecks that a receipt was signed by Actuary and that nothing in it changed.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Checks that a receipt was signed by Actuary and that nothing in it changed. Pass the receipt object or its id.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
  • verify_signalChecks that a mandate signal was signed by Actuary, that nothing in it changed and that it is still fresh.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Checks that a mandate signal was signed by Actuary, that nothing in it changed and that it is still fresh. Act only on valid and fresh.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_receiptA stored decision receipt by id (rcpt_…).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_receipt" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    A stored decision receipt by id (rcpt_…).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
  • mandate_statusCurrent decision, delivery mode, last check and failures of a mandate.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "mandate_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe input names a secret (input.secret), and the tool reads: it reads secrets.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Current decision, delivery mode, last check and failures of a mandate.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

3 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__actuary__create_mandate"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 11, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
9
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 9 tools that change things (1 destructive, 8 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://actuaryai.pro/mcp: tools/list returned 11 tools to an anonymous client, including cancel_mandate (destructive), gate (write), gate_batch (write), gate_facts (write), verify_receipt (write) and 4 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http actuary https://actuaryai.pro/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http actuary https://actuaryai.pro/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__actuary__get_receipt",
      "mcp__actuary__mandate_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__actuary__gate",
      "mcp__actuary__gate_batch",
      "mcp__actuary__gate_facts",
      "mcp__actuary__verify_receipt",
      "mcp__actuary__create_mandate",
      "mcp__actuary__mandate_signal",
      "mcp__actuary__verify_signal",
      "mcp__actuary__mandate_events"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__actuary__cancel_mandate"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as actuary. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__actuary__gate untrusted-input
  • mcp__actuary__gate_batch untrusted-input
  • mcp__actuary__create_mandate untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__actuary__mandate_status private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/pro.actuaryai/actuary/verify?hash=84f15f678cb205ae39c1c9044d57b18b615dc2e29bdadef2abdfe36e74028cbf" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 84f15f678cb2, from Nov 10, 2026, 12:19 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/pro.actuaryai/actuary/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for pro.actuaryai/actuary
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/pro.actuaryai/actuary.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/pro.actuaryai/actuary)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 10, 2026, 12:19 UTC.

Actuary MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Actuary MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 11 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Actuary MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: cancel_mandate.

Can the Actuary MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Actuary MCP server have?

11 tools: 1 destructive, 8 write, 2 read. cancel_mandate, gate, gate_batch, gate_facts, verify_receipt, create_mandate, mandate_signal, verify_signal and 3 more.

Does the Actuary MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Actuary MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): create_mandate.

Has the Actuary MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.