FOXIFY Agent Commerce MCP server
pro.foxify/agent-commercefoxify.prostreamable-httpv0.2.2Scanned
Preflight agent payments/actions before execution: ALLOW, REVIEW or DENY with evidence.
4 tools: 2 do something that can't be undone and 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 2
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here do something that can't be undone. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the FOXIFY Agent Commerce MCP server can do
The FOXIFY Agent Commerce MCP server is published by foxify.pro, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (verify_agent_payment_intent and verify_x402_payment_required) and create or change data (2 tools: foxify_preflight_info and verify_agent_action_intent), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (verify_agent_payment_intent, verify_x402_payment_required and verify_agent_action_intent); 2 tools can send data out of your system (verify_agent_payment_intent and verify_x402_payment_required).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.2.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
verify_agent_payment_intentPaid transaction preflight.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The input carries an amount (input.payment.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.
- The input addresses people (input.payment.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.payment.recipient): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid transaction preflight. Checks mandate, amount, destination, merchant, expiry and replay risk before an autonomous payment executes. Costs $0.05 USDC on Base.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
verify_x402_payment_requiredPaid wire-bound x402 v2 preflight.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "verify_x402_payment_required" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.intended_request.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid wire-bound x402 v2 preflight. Give FOXIFY the merchant's actual PAYMENT-REQUIRED challenge, exact intended HTTP request and independent caller authority; FOXIFY derives payment facts and returns advisory ALLOW, REVIEW or DENY evidence. Costs $0.05 USDC on Base.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
foxify_preflight_infoFree metadata for FOXIFY machine-payable authority preflight tools.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Free metadata for FOXIFY machine-payable authority preflight tools.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
verify_agent_action_intentPaid exact-action authority preflight for consequential agent tool calls.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid exact-action authority preflight for consequential agent tool calls. Binds subject, tool, operation, target, canonical parameters, authority lifetime, retries and postcondition requirements. Costs $0.25 USDC on Base.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:17 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (2 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://foxify.pro/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_agent_payment_intent (irreversible), verify_x402_payment_required (irreversible), foxify_preflight_info (write), verify_agent_action_intent (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 20, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 4
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 added, 2 changed.+1 added~2 changedView diff
- Added:verify_x402_payment_requiredCan't be undone
- Changed:verify_agent_action_intentChanges thingsinputSchema
- Changed:verify_agent_payment_intentCan't be undoneinputSchema
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 4.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 4
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:foxify_preflight_infoChanges thingsannotations
- Changed:verify_agent_action_intentChanges thingsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:verify_agent_payment_intentCan't be undoneinputSchemaannotations
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agent-commerce https://foxify.pro/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agent-commerce https://foxify.pro/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__agent-commerce__foxify_preflight_info",
"mcp__agent-commerce__verify_agent_payment_intent",
"mcp__agent-commerce__verify_x402_payment_required",
"mcp__agent-commerce__verify_agent_action_intent"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-commerce. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__agent-commerce__verify_agent_payment_intent untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-commerce__verify_x402_payment_required untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__agent-commerce__verify_agent_action_intent untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/pro.foxify/agent-commerce/verify?hash=c36ce7c912c417a54ad8c85e8803b785e09bddaee01bf82c951271080bf6d631" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash c36ce7c912c4, from Nov 20, 2026, 22:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/pro.foxify/agent-commerce/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/pro.foxify/agent-commerce)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 23:18 UTC.
FOXIFY Agent Commerce MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the FOXIFY Agent Commerce MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the FOXIFY Agent Commerce MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the FOXIFY Agent Commerce MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: verify_agent_payment_intent and verify_x402_payment_required.
What tools does the FOXIFY Agent Commerce MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 2 irreversible, 2 write. verify_agent_payment_intent, verify_x402_payment_required, foxify_preflight_info and verify_agent_action_intent.
Does the FOXIFY Agent Commerce MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the FOXIFY Agent Commerce MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): verify_agent_payment_intent and verify_x402_payment_required.
Has the FOXIFY Agent Commerce MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 20, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.