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sebbi.pro - the proof layer for AI MCP server

pro.sebbi/governancesebbi.prostreamable-httpv1.1.5Scanned

Prove AI decisions in Bitcoin: IETF SCITT receipts, 755 compliance checks, bank fraud proof. Free.

20 tools: 4 do something that can't be undone, 14 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 4 irreversible, 14 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 11
  • Can send data out · 2
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here do something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the sebbi.pro - the proof layer for AI MCP server can do

The sebbi.pro - the proof layer for AI MCP server is published by sebbi.pro, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 20 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (sebbi_test_decision, sebbi_banking_pay_check, sebbi_spend_request and sebbi_forensic_replay) and create or change data (14 tools: sebbi_overview, sebbi_setup_advice, sebbi_create_account, sebbi_billing_link and 10 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

11 tools bring in text other people can write (sebbi_overview, sebbi_setup_advice, sebbi_terms and 8 more); 2 tools can send data out of your system (sebbi_test_decision and sebbi_forensic_replay).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 3 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.1.5.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

20 tools

Can't be undone 4Claude Code: ask
  • sebbi_banking_pay_checkCall before releasing ANY payment, whether an AI agent or a payment system is sending it.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "sebbi_banking_pay_check" says "pay": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call before releasing ANY payment, whether an AI agent or a payment system is sending it. One call checks the agent's authority (Mandate Chain, Agent Passport or Spend Gate token), the payee's sealed bank details (Payment Notary), the human kill switch (Jugular) and every FCA-named fraud indicator, then answers RELEASE, HOLD or STOP with the reasons, sealed. Release money only on RELEASE. The answer lists the next tools to call. Needs api_key; never send names or account numbers.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check a payment before money moves
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • sebbi_forensic_replayForensic Replay Sandbox.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Forensic Replay Sandbox. Replays every AI decision sealed with the customer's API key under a new rule set and returns which verdicts would change, which way, by month, the money behind them and the rule that caused each. Rule set: allow_below and block_from (verdict boundaries, today 0.35 and 0.70), factors (history, amount, device_risk, anomaly, unsafe_country as multipliers, 1 = unchanged), high_risk_countries and safe_countries (country codes), signal_weights for the customer's own risk signals, and rules: [{name, field, op (eq, ne, gt, gte, lt, lte, in, not_in, contains, exists), value, then (CHALLENGE or BLOCK)}] on any field they send. Records are verified untouched first and only exactly reproducible decisions are counted. The run is sealed into the chain and gets a shareable report link.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Replay past decisions under new rules
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • sebbi_spend_requestCall before every payment an AI agent makes.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "sebbi_spend_request" says "request": a word for a change.
    • The input carries an amount (input.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call before every payment an AI agent makes. Returns a signed APPROVED or DENIED token checked against the agent's limits. Release the money only if it is APPROVED and spendable. sebbi.pro never holds or moves money.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Ask before an agent pays
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • sebbi_test_decisionSends one decision through the live engine with their API key and returns the verdict (ALLOW, CHALLENGE or BLOCK), the reasons and the sealed block number, so they see it working e…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe description's first verb is "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Sends one decision through the live engine with their API key and returns the verdict (ALLOW, CHALLENGE or BLOCK), the reasons and the sealed block number, so they see it working end to end. Writes one record to the chain.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Seal a first decision
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 14Claude Code: ask
  • sebbi_ask_whyFor a person who was turned down by a computer (credit, a job, insurance, an account, benefits, housing).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    For a person who was turned down by a computer (credit, a job, insurance, an account, benefits, housing). Writes their legal request under UK GDPR Articles 22A-22D and 15 or EU GDPR Articles 22 and 15 (and AI Act Article 86 where it applies), seals it with a timestamp so the one-month deadline is provable, and returns the letter, where to send it, a private tracking link and a reply link the organisation answers through. Give the person the letter and the tracking link, and tell them to keep the tracking link private. Use only the person's real details; ask for what you don't know. Personal details are not stored: only the letter's fingerprint.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Challenge an automated decision
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • sebbi_court_packProduces a printable Court Pack for a sebbi fact (any record code, chain block number or notarised SHA-256): the fact, the sealed record, the step-by-step proof to Bitcoin, a metho…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Produces a printable Court Pack for a sebbi fact (any record code, chain block number or notarised SHA-256): the fact, the sealed record, the step-by-step proof to Bitcoin, a method statement, and draft declarations for England and Wales (witness statement), US Federal Rules of Evidence 902(13)/902(14), Vermont 12 V.S.A. 1913 and an eIDAS note. Returns the link. Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Court Pack for a fact
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • sebbi_create_accountOpens a sebbi.pro account and returns the API key.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "sebbi_create_account" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Opens a sebbi.pro account and returns the API key. Only call after showing sebbi_terms and the person agreeing; pass the terms_version they agreed to and customer_agreed=true. The agreement is sealed into the chain. Free for 7 days.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Open an account
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • sebbi_enforce_createAutomated Enforcement Loop: when the customer's sealed decisions cross a threshold, sebbi.pro acts at once.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "sebbi_enforce_create" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Automated Enforcement Loop: when the customer's sealed decisions cross a threshold, sebbi.pro acts at once. It contains the AI (every further decision on the key is a sealed BLOCK, so the sebbi.pro Gateway stops calling the model), pulls their Jugular switches, fires a signed webhook into their own infrastructure, and emails them. Every trip and release is sealed. trigger: {count, window_seconds, verdicts ([BLOCK, CHALLENGE, ALLOW]), reasons_any (words to find in the decision's reasons, e.g. prompt_injection or a risk signal name), min_score, field {field, op (eq, ne, gt, gte, lt, lte, in, not_in, contains, exists), value}, distinct_field (count different values of this field, e.g. model)}. actions: {contain_minutes (-1 = until released, 0 = no), jugular_ids, webhook_url (https), email_owner}. mode: armed or watch. Run sebbi_enforce_backtest first.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Arm an enforcement loop
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • sebbi_insurer_levelThe customer's live Insurability Level (I-0 to I-4) worked out from their sealed AI behaviour over the last 30 days: records verify and no receipts missing (I-1), humans review fla…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The customer's live Insurability Level (I-0 to I-4) worked out from their sealed AI behaviour over the last 30 days: records verify and no receipts missing (I-1), humans review flags with real reading time (I-2), an armed enforcement loop and kill switch (I-3), agent payments need approval (I-4). Shows what is holding them back and how to fix it, and which insurers they share it with. Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Live insurability level
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • sebbi_jugular_checkCall before taking any action for a system that has a Jugular (a human-held kill switch, id JG-XXXX-XXXX).1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "sebbi_jugular_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call before taking any action for a system that has a Jugular (a human-held kill switch, id JG-XXXX-XXXX). Returns live true or false. If live is false, or the check fails, do not act: the human holding the switch has stopped this system (EU AI Act Article 14(4)(e) stop button). Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check the human kill switch
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • sebbi_notarizeTimestamps one or more SHA-256 fingerprints in Bitcoin through the free notary.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Timestamps one or more SHA-256 fingerprints in Bitcoin through the free notary. Hash the file or text yourself and send only the 64-character fingerprint; the content never leaves. Returns a receipt code and link for each.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Timestamp anything in Bitcoin (free)
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • sebbi_overviewStart here.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "start": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "sebbi_overview" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "start": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Start here. Lists every sebbi.pro product with what it does, who it is for, its page and its price. Read-only, no account needed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: What sebbi.pro does
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • sebbi_run_everythingRuns all 755 compliance checks (or the frameworks named) on one governance record in a single call.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "sebbi_run_everything" says "run": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Runs all 755 compliance checks (or the frameworks named) on one governance record in a single call. Returns the overall score, a score for every framework, and the fixes that unlock the most checks first. By default seals the scorecard into Bitcoin with its own page and code (SC-XXXX-XXXX) to send to an auditor or insurer; send seal=false to just look. Agent-output gates run too when input_payload/output_payload are given. Only a fingerprint of the record is kept.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Run every check, sealed scorecard
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • sebbi_setup_adviceRecommends the right sebbi.pro products for how someone builds (Python, Node, Lovable, Zapier, a website, a phone app...) and gives step-by-step setup with working code or a ready-…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Recommends the right sebbi.pro products for how someone builds (Python, Node, Lovable, Zapier, a website, a phone app...) and gives step-by-step setup with working code or a ready-made prompt. Pass their stack and what they want to achieve. Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Setup plan for their stack
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • sebbi_toolCalls any sebbi.pro tool by its name with its arguments, including the ones not listed up front (see sebbi_tools).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Calls any sebbi.pro tool by its name with its arguments, including the ones not listed up front (see sebbi_tools). Use it when an answer's next_tools names a tool you do not see in your list. Same result as calling the tool directly.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Call any sebbi.pro tool by name
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • sebbi_toolssebbi.pro has more tools than are listed up front: banking and fraud cases, human oversight, law lookups and Law Lock, insurability, Signal Packs, answer receipts, the Examiner, re…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    sebbi.pro has more tools than are listed up front: banking and fraud cases, human oversight, law lookups and Law Lock, insurability, Signal Packs, answer receipts, the Examiner, readiness reports, incidents, energy, Bot School and more. This returns each one's name, what it does and its inputs. Pass search to filter (for example 'banking' or 'oversight'). Call any of them with sebbi_tool. Read-only, free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List every other sebbi.pro tool
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • sebbi_verify_chainRe-checks every block in the sebbi.pro chain and returns its height, tip and whether it is intact.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Re-checks every block in the sebbi.pro chain and returns its height, tip and whether it is intact. Anyone can run it; no account needed. Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Verify the whole chain
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • sebbi_find_checksSearches sebbi.pro's 755 compliance checks across 32 frameworks (EU AI Act, GDPR, DORA, ISO/IEC 42001 and 27001, NIST AI RMF, UK Online Safety Act, EU DSA, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA, C…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "sebbi_find_checks" says "find": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Searches sebbi.pro's 755 compliance checks across 32 frameworks (EU AI Act, GDPR, DORA, ISO/IEC 42001 and 27001, NIST AI RMF, UK Online Safety Act, EU DSA, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA, CCPA, NIS2, Cyber Resilience Act, ICO Children's Code, US state AI laws, model risk, and agent-output gates). Filter by framework and/or words; returns each check's id, title, what it needs and the framework list. Then run one with sebbi_run_check or a whole framework with sebbi_run_framework. Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Find compliance checks
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • sebbi_termsReturns the service terms and their version.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the service terms and their version. Show the full text to the person and get a clear yes before calling sebbi_create_account. Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Read the terms
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:17 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
18
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 18 tools that change things (4 irreversible, 14 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://sebbi.pro/mcp: tools/list returned 20 tools to an anonymous client, including sebbi_test_decision (irreversible), sebbi_banking_pay_check (irreversible), sebbi_spend_request (irreversible), sebbi_forensic_replay (irreversible), sebbi_overview (write) and 13 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 6, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 14 to 18
  2. Oct 29, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 23 to 14

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The server marks "sebbi_overview" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "start": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "sebbi_jugular_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools4 added, 1 changed.+4 added~1 changedView diff
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 14 -> 18.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 14 to 18
  3. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 23 -> 14.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 23 to 14
  4. Tools6 added, 21 removed.+6 added−21 removedView diff
    • Added:sebbi_banking_pay_checkCan't be undone
    • Added:sebbi_court_packChanges things
    • Added:sebbi_jugular_checkChanges things
    • Added:sebbi_run_everythingChanges things
    • Added:sebbi_toolChanges things
    • Added:sebbi_toolsChanges things
    • Removed:sebbi_check_human_proof
    • Removed:sebbi_check_pack
    • Removed:sebbi_check_source
    • Removed:sebbi_decision_report
    • Removed:sebbi_examine
    • Removed:sebbi_forever_proof
    • Removed:sebbi_gateway_setup
    • Removed:sebbi_insurability
    • Removed:sebbi_law_lookup
    • Removed:sebbi_legislation
    • Removed:sebbi_list_packs
    • Removed:sebbi_notary_receipt
    • Removed:sebbi_oversight_request
    • Removed:sebbi_oversight_status
    • Removed:sebbi_pack_reference
    • Removed:sebbi_publish_pack
    • Removed:sebbi_run_check
    • Removed:sebbi_run_framework
    • Removed:sebbi_spend_policy
    • Removed:sebbi_spend_verify
    • Removed:sebbi_verify_insurability
  5. Tools5 added, 1 changed.+5 added~1 changedView diff
    • Added:sebbi_examineChanges things
    • Added:sebbi_law_lookupOnly reads
    • Added:sebbi_legislationChanges things
    • Added:sebbi_oversight_requestChanges things
    • Added:sebbi_oversight_statusChanges things
    • Changed:sebbi_find_checksOnly readsdescription

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.5. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http governance https://sebbi.pro/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http governance https://sebbi.pro/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_terms",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_find_checks"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_overview",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_setup_advice",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_create_account",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_test_decision",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_billing_link",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_verify_chain",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_notarize",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_run_everything",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_banking_pay_check",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_spend_request",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_jugular_check",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_court_pack",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_enforce_create",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_forensic_replay",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_insurer_level",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_ask_why",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_tools",
      "mcp__governance__sebbi_tool"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as governance. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 12 rules
  • mcp__governance__sebbi_overview untrusted-input
  • mcp__governance__sebbi_setup_advice untrusted-input
  • mcp__governance__sebbi_terms untrusted-input
  • mcp__governance__sebbi_create_account untrusted-input
  • mcp__governance__sebbi_test_decision untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__governance__sebbi_billing_link untrusted-input
  • mcp__governance__sebbi_verify_chain untrusted-input
  • mcp__governance__sebbi_notarize untrusted-input
  • mcp__governance__sebbi_spend_request untrusted-input
  • mcp__governance__sebbi_enforce_create untrusted-input
  • mcp__governance__sebbi_forensic_replay outbound
  • mcp__governance__sebbi_ask_why untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/pro.sebbi/governance/verify?hash=b93c74c2ed56c2fb1cc1255c2dd1e846086888c4dd028ed0247252f459356fa8" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash b93c74c2ed56, from Nov 21, 2026, 23:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/pro.sebbi/governance/changes.xml

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[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/pro.sebbi/governance.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/pro.sebbi/governance)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 22, 2026, 00:17 UTC.

sebbi.pro - the proof layer for AI MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the sebbi.pro - the proof layer for AI MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 20 tools, 18 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the sebbi.pro - the proof layer for AI MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the sebbi.pro - the proof layer for AI MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 4 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: sebbi_test_decision, sebbi_banking_pay_check, sebbi_spend_request and sebbi_forensic_replay.

What tools does the sebbi.pro - the proof layer for AI MCP server have?

20 tools: 4 irreversible, 14 write, 2 read. sebbi_test_decision, sebbi_banking_pay_check, sebbi_spend_request, sebbi_forensic_replay, sebbi_overview, sebbi_setup_advice, sebbi_create_account, sebbi_billing_link and 12 more.

Does the sebbi.pro - the proof layer for AI MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the sebbi.pro - the proof layer for AI MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): sebbi_test_decision and sebbi_forensic_replay.

Has the sebbi.pro - the proof layer for AI MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 3 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 9, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.