Skip to content

Docker Recipes MCP server

recipes.docker/docker-recipesdocker.recipesstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Search and fetch 870+ ready-to-run Docker Compose stacks for self-hosting and home labs.

4 tools: 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding, 1 high

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

Run the operations that matter as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the Docker Recipes MCP server can do

The Docker Recipes MCP server is published by docker.recipes, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

1 tool reads private data (get_recipe).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding, 1 of them high severity (sensitive-path). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • get_recipeGet one recipe as Markdown: overview, docker-compose.yml, .env template, prerequisites, usage notes and troubleshooting.Reads private data1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_recipe" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "get" and "note": it reads notes.

    Findings

    • High

      The description refers to ".env".

      Matched text

      description: "...Markdown: overview, docker-compose.yml, .env template, prerequisites, usage notes an..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get one recipe as Markdown: overview, docker-compose.yml, .env template, prerequisites, usage notes and troubleshooting.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_categoriesList all recipe categories with their slug, name, description and recipe count.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_categories" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List all recipe categories with their slug, name, description and recipe count.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_recipesList every recipe in one category (slug, title, description, URLs).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_recipes" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List every recipe in one category (slug, title, description, URLs).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_recipesSearch Docker Compose recipes by keywords (app name, technology, use case).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_recipes" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search Docker Compose recipes by keywords (app name, technology, use case). Returns ranked matches with slug, title, description and URLs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 high
  • The description refers to ".env".

    Matched text

    description: "...Markdown: overview, docker-compose.yml, .env template, prerequisites, usage notes an..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http docker-recipes https://docker.recipes/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http docker-recipes https://docker.recipes/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__docker-recipes__search_recipes",
      "mcp__docker-recipes__get_recipe",
      "mcp__docker-recipes__list_categories",
      "mcp__docker-recipes__list_recipes"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as docker-recipes. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__docker-recipes__get_recipe private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/recipes.docker/docker-recipes/verify?hash=6c87e116c30959c22a0ea435e9d227bb2574616de9d28eadc01ba2538c144b67" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 6c87e116c309, from Nov 19, 2026, 22:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/recipes.docker/docker-recipes/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for recipes.docker/docker-recipes
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/recipes.docker/docker-recipes.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/recipes.docker/docker-recipes)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 14:18 UTC.

Docker Recipes MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Docker Recipes MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, all of which only read, and 1 finding (1 high) from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the Docker Recipes MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Docker Recipes MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Docker Recipes MCP server have?

4 tools: 4 read. search_recipes, get_recipe, list_categories and list_recipes.

Does the Docker Recipes MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Docker Recipes MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Docker Recipes MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.