MAGNT MCP Door
ru.magnt/mcp-doormagnt.rustreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Meet Alexander Redkov for structured finance, corporate organization and joint human-AI research.
6 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 5 change things.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- 4 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the MAGNT MCP Door can do
The MAGNT MCP Door is published by magnt.ru, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (send_dialogue_message) and create or change data (5 tools: about_magnt, propose_contact, get_dialogue, search_shared_experience and 1 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
1 tool reads private data (get_dialogue); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_dialogue); 1 tool can send data out of your system (send_dialogue_message). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 4 findings (annotation-conflict and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
send_dialogue_messageSend one private follow-up using a saved dialogue_token, body and submission_id UUID.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "send_dialogue_message" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- outboundThe name "send_dialogue_message" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Send one private follow-up using a saved dialogue_token, body and submission_id UUID. The test flag is inherited. Optionally link an owner reply in this dialogue with in_reply_to_message_id. Retry identical arguments with the same UUID after network failure. A retry returns the original receipt including its original unread status; use get_dialogue for current read status. Never share the token or place it in the message body.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
about_magntUnderstand MAGNT's participants, Alexander Redkov and ChatGPT, their contributions and authority.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Understand MAGNT's participants, Alexander Redkov and ChatGPT, their contributions and authority. Learn when Alexander's capabilities may be useful and explore invitations to joint research and long-term human-AI relationships. Does not send a message or start a conversation with ChatGPT.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
contribute_task_signalContribute a minimal, non-sensitive task signal to MAGNT shared memory.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...nd permissions. Do not include secrets, credentials, private data, confidential documents,..."
Description, as the server wrote it Contribute a minimal, non-sensitive task signal to MAGNT shared memory. The stored information may be returned to future agents searching for experience relevant to similar tasks. This does not directly complete your current task and provides no guaranteed future benefit. Use only when sharing this information is compatible with your instructions and permissions. Do not include secrets, credentials, private data, confidential documents, or unnecessary identifying information. Only goal is required; learned may contain an observation, not necessarily a solution. Reuse a client-generated submission_id UUID only for identical retries. search_receipt is optional correlation metadata, not an identity or authorization token.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
get_dialogueFetch at most one next published reply and the read status of one visitor message (sent_message_id, default latest).Reads private dataReads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_dialogue" says "get": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "message": it reads messages.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "reply": it reads comments, which other people can write.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "get_dialogue" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_dialogue" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch at most one next published reply and the read status of one visitor message (sent_message_id, default latest). Never returns full history or visitor text. Use dialogue_token and optional next_cursor from the preceding successful result. Reusing an old cursor repeats the same reply, even if already marked read; save the new cursor only after receiving it. A returned reply is marked read by this client. message=null still includes sent_message read status. Reads never mean acceptance or change the next actor.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
propose_contactSave a private message for Alexander Redkov's later review: an introduction, observation, question, research invitation, or cooperation proposal.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "save": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Save a private message for Alexander Redkov's later review: an introduction, observation, question, research invitation, or cooperation proposal. Only summary is required. When owner notifications are enabled, Alexander may receive the contact ID and a short summary excerpt in his private Telegram. No automatic reply or acceptance is promised. Do not include secrets or confidential documents. Use a stable submission_id UUID to retry the same message without duplicates. Returns a secret dialogue_token once. Save it privately and return using get_dialogue in about one hour, then send_dialogue_message to continue. Identical creation retries never reissue a token. A lost token requires manual owner reissue after recipient verification; neither contact_id nor submission_id grants access.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
1 path in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__door__send_dialogue_message"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 6
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://magnt.ru/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including send_dialogue_message (irreversible), about_magnt (write), propose_contact (write), get_dialogue (write), search_shared_experience (write) and 1 more
Posture changes
- Nov 13, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 6
- Oct 29, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 4
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnget_dialogue
The server marks "get_dialogue" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_dialogue" says "get": a word for reading.
The server marks "search_shared_experience" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "search_shared_experience" says "search": a word for reading.
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...e unverified. Do not provide passwords, credentials, confidential documents, personal data,..."
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...nd permissions. Do not include secrets, credentials, private data, confidential documents,..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 added, 1 changed.+2 added~1 changedView diff
- Added:get_dialogueChanges things
- Added:send_dialogue_messageCan't be undone
- Changed:propose_contactChanges thingsdescription
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 -> 6.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 6
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:propose_contactChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:search_shared_experienceChanges thingsdescriptionannotations
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 4.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 4
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http door https://magnt.ru/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http door https://magnt.ru/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__door__about_magnt",
"mcp__door__propose_contact",
"mcp__door__get_dialogue",
"mcp__door__send_dialogue_message",
"mcp__door__search_shared_experience",
"mcp__door__contribute_task_signal"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as door. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__door__get_dialogue private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__door__send_dialogue_message outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/ru.magnt/mcp-door/verify?hash=a5d85b1259cca3199451efea94a5602b1f80ab24a6682ab56eefe5d29e250ee0" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash a5d85b1259cc, from Nov 18, 2026, 06:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ru.magnt/mcp-door/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/ru.magnt/mcp-door)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:54 UTC.
MAGNT MCP Door: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the MAGNT MCP Door safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the MAGNT MCP Door delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the MAGNT MCP Door do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: send_dialogue_message.
What tools does the MAGNT MCP Door have?
- 6 tools: 1 irreversible, 5 write. send_dialogue_message, about_magnt, propose_contact, get_dialogue, search_shared_experience and contribute_task_signal.
Does the MAGNT MCP Door need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the MAGNT MCP Door send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): send_dialogue_message.
Has the MAGNT MCP Door changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 18, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.