FitLLM MCP server
run.fitllm/fitllmfitllm.runstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned
Will this LLM fit on your GPU, multi-GPU rig or Mac? Exact VRAM & KV-cache math. Read-only.
3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the FitLLM MCP server can do
The FitLLM MCP server is published by fitllm.run, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: check_llm_fit and what_fits_on_hardware), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Last scanned Nov 4, 2026, version 1.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
check_llm_fitCheck whether a specific local LLM fits in the memory of a specific GPU or Apple Silicon Mac.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check whether a specific local LLM fits in the memory of a specific GPU or Apple Silicon Mac. Returns fits/tight/won't-fit verdict with the memory breakdown (weights, KV cache, linear-attention state when present, runtime overhead, reserve), max context, and a concrete fix if it doesn't fit. Use this whenever a user asks anything like "can I run <model> on my <GPU/Mac>?", "will <model> fit in <N>GB?", or "what do I need to run <model>?". Estimates using curated, config-derived architecture fields (MLA, sliding-window, hybrid attention, MoE modeled).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
what_fits_on_hardwareRank which popular local LLMs fit on a given GPU or Apple Silicon Mac (at ~4-bit quantization, 8K context) — models that fit come first, biggest first, with max context each.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Rank which popular local LLMs fit on a given GPU or Apple Silicon Mac (at ~4-bit quantization, 8K context) — models that fit come first, biggest first, with max context each. Use when a user asks "what can I run on my <GPU/Mac/N GB>?", "best local model for my machine?", or gives hardware without naming a model.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
list_supportedList the built-in model names and hardware names this fit-checker knows (for mapping user wording to exact names).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_supported" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the built-in model names and hardware names this fit-checker knows (for mapping user wording to exact names). Standard text-only HuggingFace transformer configs can also be checked via fitllm.run; unsupported architectures are rejected.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 402
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 402.
Posture changes
- Nov 20, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 402
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 402; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 402
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http fitllm https://fitllm.run/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http fitllm https://fitllm.run/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__fitllm__list_supported"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__fitllm__check_llm_fit",
"mcp__fitllm__what_fits_on_hardware"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as fitllm. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/run.fitllm/fitllm/verify?hash=12e248626a1d44d65fa8df74bab960bbe1f425b7f57b3f7b441ccf16cec36b71" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 12e248626a1d, from Nov 4, 2026, 13:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/run.fitllm/fitllm/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/run.fitllm/fitllm)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:54 UTC.
FitLLM MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the FitLLM MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the FitLLM MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the FitLLM MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the FitLLM MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. check_llm_fit, what_fits_on_hardware and list_supported.
Does the FitLLM MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the FitLLM MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the FitLLM MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 4, 2026.