Aigine Redact MCP server
se.aigine/redactaigine.sestreamable-httpv2.5.18Scanned
EU descriptive AI redaction (GDPR & OSL: 98.3% precision, 93.2% recall). Zero retention.
3 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Aigine Redact MCP server can do
The Aigine Redact MCP server is published by aigine.se, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (propose_masking) and create or change data (2 tools: create_upload_link and fetch_reviewed_document), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
1 tool reads private data (fetch_reviewed_document); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (propose_masking and fetch_reviewed_document).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 4 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 2.5.18.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
propose_maskingDetects and masks personal data (GDPR, including Art.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description says "irreversible".
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Detects and masks personal data (GDPR, including Art. 9 special categories) and confidential information (trade secrets, procurement tenders, FOIA exemptions, and statutory secrecy such as Swedish OSL) in a PDF, DOCX, PPTX, or image document, using non-generative encoder classifiers on EU GPUs (98.30% precision, 93.17% recall, 95.67% F1; 10.8 s median latency; strict zero retention). Requires exactly one document source: upload_id from create_upload_link (in a chat, call create_upload_link first), document_base64 for files of 45 KB or less, or file_url (a direct HTTPS link to the file). Calls without a document source fail. The policy selects which detection categories are used. Returns download_url for a flattened PDF with irreversible masks, or review_url and doc_id when require_human_review is true. With no person present, use require_human_review: false. Free tier: watermarked PDF, 100 documents per day.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
create_upload_linkStart here when a person in a chat wants a document masked.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "create_upload_link" says "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Start here when a person in a chat wants a document masked. Aigine Redact detects and masks personal data and confidential information in documents. This creates a 15-minute upload slot on Aigine's EU server and shows an inline upload box in MCP Apps clients, so the PDF, DOCX, PPTX or image (up to 50 MB) goes directly to the EU server and never passes through the chat. Returns upload_id and upload_url (fallback when no widget is shown). When the widget is shown, the user picks policy and mode in it and the widget starts masking itself: do not ask for these choices in chat and do not call propose_masking for that upload, unless the widget sends a message asking you to. When only upload_url is available, ask the user to upload there, then call propose_masking with the upload_id.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
fetch_reviewed_documentUse only after review: requires a doc_id returned by propose_masking with require_human_review: true, and the user must have clicked Redact in the review GUI.Reads private dataReads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "fetch_reviewed_document" says "fetch": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "fetch_reviewed_document" says "fetch" and "document": it reads documents.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "doc": it reads documents.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "fetch_reviewed_document" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "fetch_reviewed_document" says "fetch": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Use only after review: requires a doc_id returned by propose_masking with require_human_review: true, and the user must have clicked Redact in the review GUI. Returns a temporary download_url for the finalized masked PDF, then deletes the document from the processing server. Do not call it with a guessed doc_id or before the user confirms the review is done.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:23 UTC, unchanged since Nov 4, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://redact.aigine.se/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including propose_masking (irreversible), create_upload_link (write), fetch_reviewed_document (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "fetch_reviewed_document" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "fetch_reviewed_document" says "fetch": a word for reading.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:create_upload_linkChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:fetch_reviewed_documentChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:propose_maskingCan't be undonedescription
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:fetch_reviewed_documentChanges thingstitledescription
- Changed:propose_maskingCan't be undonetitledescription
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:create_upload_linkChanges thingstitledescription
- Changed:fetch_reviewed_documentChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:propose_maskingCan't be undonetitledescriptioninputSchema
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:propose_maskingCan't be undonedescription
Install
Pinned to version 2.5.18. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http redact https://redact.aigine.se/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http redact https://redact.aigine.se/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__redact__create_upload_link",
"mcp__redact__propose_masking",
"mcp__redact__fetch_reviewed_document"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as redact. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__redact__propose_masking untrusted-input
- mcp__redact__fetch_reviewed_document private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/se.aigine/redact/verify?hash=1808ef946ec85c572637b89a660edcc4ddf3c45233418827774244ca168c996c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 1808ef946ec8, from Nov 16, 2026, 12:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/se.aigine/redact/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/se.aigine/redact)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 16, 2026, 12:18 UTC.
Aigine Redact MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Aigine Redact MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Aigine Redact MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Aigine Redact MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: propose_masking.
What tools does the Aigine Redact MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 1 irreversible, 2 write. propose_masking, create_upload_link and fetch_reviewed_document.
Does the Aigine Redact MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Aigine Redact MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Aigine Redact MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 4 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 16, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.