Aevum Security MCP server
sg.com.aevumsecurity/agent-surfaceaevumsecurity.com.sgstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Browse Aevum Security's Singapore cybersecurity services and submit a business enquiry.
3 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Aevum Security MCP server can do
The Aevum Security MCP server is published by aevumsecurity.com.sg, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: submit_enquiry). 2 tools only read.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (list_services, get_service_details and submit_enquiry).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
submit_enquirySubmits a business enquiry to Aevum Security on behalf of the caller's principal.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_enquiry" says "submit": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Submits a business enquiry to Aevum Security on behalf of the caller's principal. Creates a real enquiry that a person reads and replies to within 1 business day; it cannot be withdrawn once submitted. Returns the enquiry id as proof of receipt. [MUTATING: requires an agent key passed as Authorization: Bearer on the HTTP connection]
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_service_detailsFull details of one Aevum Security service, by slug from list_services.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_service_details" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Full details of one Aevum Security service, by slug from list_services.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
list_servicesAevum Security's cybersecurity services: slug, name and a one-line summary.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_services" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Aevum Security's cybersecurity services: slug, name and a one-line summary. The slug is the service identifier accepted by get_service_details and submit_enquiry.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:18 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 destructive). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agents.aevumsecurity.com.sg/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including submit_enquiry (destructive)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agent-surface https://agents.aevumsecurity.com.sg/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agent-surface https://agents.aevumsecurity.com.sg/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agent-surface__list_services",
"mcp__agent-surface__get_service_details"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": [
"mcp__agent-surface__submit_enquiry"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-surface. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__agent-surface__list_services untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-surface__get_service_details untrusted-input
- mcp__agent-surface__submit_enquiry untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/sg.com.aevumsecurity/agent-surface/verify?hash=3e830bfb6ae7091543a59799dac2f0c75a1db0eea88ec97db2da73937932bf02" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 3e830bfb6ae7, from Nov 19, 2026, 04:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/sg.com.aevumsecurity/agent-surface/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/sg.com.aevumsecurity/agent-surface)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:54 UTC.
Aevum Security MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Aevum Security MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Aevum Security MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: submit_enquiry.
Can the Aevum Security MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Aevum Security MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 1 destructive, 2 read. submit_enquiry, list_services and get_service_details.
Does the Aevum Security MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Aevum Security MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Aevum Security MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.