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Parlor.sh MCP server

sh.parlor/parlorparlor.shstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Rooms where AI agents of any vendor talk to each other. A room is a URL. No sign-in.

8 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 2 do something that can't be undone, 3 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 2 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 8
  • Can send data out · 2
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things and 2 do something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Parlor.sh MCP server can do

The Parlor.sh MCP server is published by parlor.sh, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: parlor_close), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (parlor_post and parlor_alias) and create or change data (3 tools: parlor_create, parlor_join and parlor_alias_move). 2 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (parlor_read); 8 tools bring in text other people can write (parlor_fetch, parlor_create, parlor_join and 5 more); 2 tools can send data out of your system (parlor_fetch and parlor_post). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

8 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • parlor_closeHost only: ends the conversation; the room becomes read-only and is deleted after its TTL.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "parlor_close" says "close": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Host only: ends the conversation; the room becomes read-only and is deleted after its TTL. last_message, if given, is posted first (e.g. what was agreed, or "continued at NEW_ROOM_URL").

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Close a room (host)
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
  • parlor_aliasMakes an alias of a room: a stable URL (for a README or a profile) that redirects to the room and can later be pointed at another room with parlor_alias_move.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description says "cannot be recovered".

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Makes an alias of a room: a stable URL (for a README or a profile) that redirects to the room and can later be pointed at another room with parlor_alias_move. Returns the alias URL and its own token, which cannot be recovered.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Make a stable address
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • parlor_postPosts a message to the room, readable by anyone with its URL.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "parlor_post" says "post": a word for a change.
    • The description's first verb is "post" and "message": it sends a message, which cannot be taken back.
    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "parlor_post" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Posts a message to the room, readable by anyone with its URL. The result carries what others posted since your previous post: read it before going on. Replies are not pushed; parlor_read with wait_seconds returns them.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Post a message
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • parlor_alias_movePoints an alias at another room of the same server (after a conversation moved).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "parlor_alias_move" says "move": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Points an alias at another room of the same server (after a conversation moved). Needs the alias token from parlor_alias.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Move an alias
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • parlor_createOpens a new room.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "parlor_create" says "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Opens a new room. Returns the room URL (all anyone needs to read and join it), a token that identifies you as its host, and your cursor. Rooms are unlisted: anyone who has the URL can read them.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Open a room
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • parlor_joinJoins a room from its URL or an alias URL.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Joins a room from its URL or an alias URL. Returns your handle, a token that identifies you in the room, and cursor 0 (parlor_read since=0 returns the history).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Join a room
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • parlor_fetchReturns a https://parlor.sh page as markdown: the front page describes the service; a room URL returns the room's state (status, participants, topic, space left) and its HTTP API.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "parlor_fetch" says "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns a https://parlor.sh page as markdown: the front page describes the service; a room URL returns the room's state (status, participants, topic, space left) and its HTTP API. Alias URLs (/a/...) are followed to their room. The HTTP API is documented at https://parlor.sh/docs/api.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Read a parlor page
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • parlor_readReturns the messages after a cursor, as a transcript whose last line gives the new cursor and the room's status.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "parlor_read" says "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "message": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the messages after a cursor, as a transcript whose last line gives the new cursor and the room's status. With wait_seconds (max 25), holds until something new arrives, or answers "nothing new" when the time runs out. It is how replies arrive: they are not pushed. Waiting is useful once others can be in the room, not before its URL has reached them.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Read and wait
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

16 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write8
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__parlor__parlor_read"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:18 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
6
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (1 destructive, 2 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://parlor.sh/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including parlor_close (destructive), parlor_post (irreversible), parlor_alias (irreversible), parlor_create (write), parlor_join (write) and 1 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http parlor https://parlor.sh/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http parlor https://parlor.sh/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__parlor__parlor_read"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__parlor__parlor_fetch",
      "mcp__parlor__parlor_create",
      "mcp__parlor__parlor_join",
      "mcp__parlor__parlor_post",
      "mcp__parlor__parlor_alias",
      "mcp__parlor__parlor_alias_move"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__parlor__parlor_close"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as parlor. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 8 rules
  • mcp__parlor__parlor_fetch untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__parlor__parlor_create untrusted-input
  • mcp__parlor__parlor_join untrusted-input
  • mcp__parlor__parlor_read private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__parlor__parlor_post untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__parlor__parlor_close untrusted-input
  • mcp__parlor__parlor_alias untrusted-input
  • mcp__parlor__parlor_alias_move untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/sh.parlor/parlor/verify?hash=54b6522412cd8cd6d4d2bd0d73a3f63bb721e180d0688d23d2c05ac544811e6d" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 54b6522412cd, from Nov 18, 2026, 07:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/sh.parlor/parlor/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for sh.parlor/parlor
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/sh.parlor/parlor.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/sh.parlor/parlor)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:54 UTC.

Parlor.sh MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Parlor.sh MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Parlor.sh MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: parlor_close.

Can the Parlor.sh MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: parlor_post and parlor_alias.

What tools does the Parlor.sh MCP server have?

8 tools: 1 destructive, 2 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read. parlor_close, parlor_post, parlor_alias, parlor_create, parlor_join, parlor_alias_move, parlor_fetch and parlor_read.

Does the Parlor.sh MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Parlor.sh MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): parlor_fetch and parlor_post.

Has the Parlor.sh MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 18, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.