scienX MCP server
site.scienx/scienxscienx.sitestreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Protein protocol counts, CRO evidence and off-the-shelf listings from scienX.
3 tools: 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the scienX MCP server can do
The scienX MCP server is published by scienx.site, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
find_croCROs with publicly disclosed or literature-disclosed work for a protein: the provider, and whether the evidence is the provider’s own public claim or a literature disclosure.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_cro" says "find": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it CROs with publicly disclosed or literature-disclosed work for a protein: the provider, and whether the evidence is the provider’s own public claim or a literature disclosure. No DOIs, no sentences. Full evidence is on the public finder page.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
find_protocolProtein-level protocol aggregates for a protein symbol or alias: how many protocols scienX lists, how many are curated, how many PDB structures, and the best tier.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_protocol" says "find": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Protein-level protocol aggregates for a protein symbol or alias: how many protocols scienX lists, how many are curated, how many PDB structures, and the best tier. No per-record rows, no DOIs, no method text. Full methods need a free scienX sign-in.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
find_supplierOff-the-shelf products listed on scienX’s off-the-shelf page for a protein: supplier, catalog number, product name, species, expression host, size and price.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_supplier" says "find": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Off-the-shelf products listed on scienX’s off-the-shelf page for a protein: supplier, catalog number, product name, species, expression host, size and price. Only products the page actually lists; a protein with no listed products returns an empty list. Stock items, not made-to-order.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 14, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http scienx https://scienx.site/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http scienx https://scienx.site/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__scienx__find_protocol",
"mcp__scienx__find_cro",
"mcp__scienx__find_supplier"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as scienx. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/site.scienx/scienx/verify?hash=619acd8424eb5fb8ab25a0f0f2429db7b4ed718a5465645e17f9bfe3490648d6" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 619acd8424eb, from Nov 14, 2026, 04:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/site.scienx/scienx/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/site.scienx/scienx)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 14, 2026, 04:18 UTC.
scienX MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the scienX MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the scienX MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the scienX MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the scienX MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 3 read. find_protocol, find_cro and find_supplier.
Does the scienX MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the scienX MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the scienX MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.