BRAINIAC Contract Security MCP server
software.brainiac/contract-securitybrainiac.softwarestreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Paid Contract Security API via x402. Unpaid tool calls return 402.
2 tools: 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the BRAINIAC Contract Security MCP server can do
The BRAINIAC Contract Security MCP server is published by brainiac.software, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (contract-security_contract-bytecode-compare and contract-security_bytecode-structure-diff).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
contract-security_bytecode-structure-diffDecode two caller-supplied EVM bytecodes, or two instruction lists, into opcodes and compare the instruction sequence.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "contract-security_bytecode-structure-diff" says "diff": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Decode two caller-supplied EVM bytecodes, or two instruction lists, into opcodes and compare the instruction sequence. Similarity ignores PUSH immediates. The risk delta counts CALL, SSTORE, CREATE, DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, and SELFDESTRUCT. A high similarity is not proof that the contracts behave the same. No chain is queried. Price $0.04 USDC. POST /api/v1/contract-security/bytecode-structure-diff. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Diff bytecode structure
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
contract-security_contract-bytecode-compareCompare two caller-supplied EVM bytecodes.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "contract-security_contract-bytecode-compare" says "compare": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Compare two caller-supplied EVM bytecodes. mode exact compares every byte. An omitted mode is exact. mode normalized masks only the supplied immutable ranges and a trailing Solidity CBOR metadata suffix when bytecodeKind is not creation and that suffix is present on both bytecodes. comparison_status is identical, different, partially_comparable, or invalid. Hashes are keccak256 of the supplied bytes. Similarity is the share of equal compared bytes, truncated to 4 decimal places. A difference is not a judgment that either bytecode is malicious, and similar bytecode is not equivalent behavior. No source code is verified and no chain is queried. Price $0.05 USDC. POST /api/v1/contract-security/contract-bytecode-compare. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Compare contract bytecode
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:30 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:contract-security_bytecode-structure-diffOnly readsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:contract-security_contract-bytecode-compareOnly readsinputSchemaannotations
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http contract-security https://www.brainiac.software/mcp/contract-securityclaude mcp add --transport http contract-security https://www.brainiac.software/mcp/contract-securityRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__contract-security__contract-security_contract-bytecode-compare",
"mcp__contract-security__contract-security_bytecode-structure-diff"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as contract-security. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__contract-security__contract-security_contract-bytecode-compare untrusted-input
- mcp__contract-security__contract-security_bytecode-structure-diff untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/software.brainiac/contract-security/verify?hash=2a62faf618baf76862ecaaed6ebf61e87f8e60aef2573c9b2bbf765ab1e9dc42" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 2a62faf618ba, from Nov 20, 2026, 01:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/software.brainiac/contract-security/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/software.brainiac/contract-security)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 01:18 UTC.
BRAINIAC Contract Security MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the BRAINIAC Contract Security MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the BRAINIAC Contract Security MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the BRAINIAC Contract Security MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the BRAINIAC Contract Security MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 read. contract-security_contract-bytecode-compare and contract-security_bytecode-structure-diff.
Does the BRAINIAC Contract Security MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the BRAINIAC Contract Security MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the BRAINIAC Contract Security MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 20, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.