Skip to content

BRAINIAC Malware & File Threat Intelligence MCP server

software.brainiac/file-securitybrainiac.softwarestreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Paid Malware & File Threat Intelligence API via x402. Unpaid tool calls return 402.

8 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 5 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 5 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 8
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the BRAINIAC Malware & File Threat Intelligence MCP server can do

The BRAINIAC Malware & File Threat Intelligence MCP server is published by brainiac.software, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect) and create or change data (5 tools: file-security_file-behavior-indicator-extract, file-security_malware-artifact-cluster, file-security_macro-document-risk-detect, file-security_file-extension-mismatch-detect and 1 more). 2 tools only read.

2 tools read private data (file-security_executable-metadata-analyze and file-security_suspicious-script-pattern-detect); 8 tools bring in text other people can write (file-security_file-behavior-indicator-extract, file-security_malware-artifact-cluster, file-security_executable-metadata-analyze and 5 more).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

8 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • file-security_archive-payload-risk-detectInspect caller-supplied archives for nested members and risky file types with strict depth/size/decompression limits.Reads text others write2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect" says "archive": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    • The server marks it not destructive (destructiveHint: false), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect" says "archive": a word for removing or ending something.

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect" not destructive (destructiveHint: false), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect" says "archive": a word for removing or ending something.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Inspect caller-supplied archives for nested members and risky file types with strict depth/size/decompression limits. Contents are never executed or uploaded to scanners. Price $0.05 USDC. POST /api/v1/file-security/archive-payload-risk-detect. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Detect archive payload risk
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
  • file-security_file-behavior-indicator-extractExtract suspicious behaviour indicators from caller-supplied analysis reports/text using local static pattern matching.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract suspicious behaviour indicators from caller-supplied analysis reports/text using local static pattern matching. Files are never executed. Absence of matches is not a malware-free verdict. Price $0.04 USDC. POST /api/v1/file-security/file-behavior-indicator-extract. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Extract file behaviour indicators
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • file-security_file-extension-mismatch-detectIdentify mismatches between caller-supplied filenames/extensions and local magic-byte formats, including double extensions.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Identify mismatches between caller-supplied filenames/extensions and local magic-byte formats, including double extensions. Price $0.03 USDC. POST /api/v1/file-security/file-extension-mismatch-detect. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Detect extension/format mismatches
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • file-security_macro-document-risk-detectIdentify suspicious macro markers in caller-supplied Office/RTF documents via static strings/package entries.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Identify suspicious macro markers in caller-supplied Office/RTF documents via static strings/package entries. Macros are never executed. Price $0.04 USDC. POST /api/v1/file-security/macro-document-risk-detect. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Detect macro document risk
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • file-security_malware-artifact-clusterGroup caller-supplied files/artifacts by identical hashes and structural similarity (magic/extension/size).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Group caller-supplied files/artifacts by identical hashes and structural similarity (magic/extension/size). Clustering is not family attribution or confirmed malware. Price $0.04 USDC. POST /api/v1/file-security/malware-artifact-cluster. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Cluster malware artifacts
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • file-security_malware-indicator-extractExtract IPs, domains, URLs, hashes, and emails from caller-supplied files/reports using local static parsing.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract IPs, domains, URLs, hashes, and emails from caller-supplied files/reports using local static parsing. Extracted strings are not live threat-intel verdicts. Price $0.04 USDC. POST /api/v1/file-security/malware-indicator-extract. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Extract malware indicators
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • file-security_executable-metadata-analyzeAnalyze PE/ELF/Mach-O metadata and structural properties from caller-supplied bytes.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "file-security_executable-metadata-analyze" says "analyze": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "file-security_executable-metadata-analyze" says "analyze" and "file": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe input names a file (input.file), and the tool reads: it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Analyze PE/ELF/Mach-O metadata and structural properties from caller-supplied bytes. Static only—files are never executed. Price $0.04 USDC. POST /api/v1/file-security/executable-metadata-analyze. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Analyze executable metadata
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • file-security_suspicious-script-pattern-detectAnalyze caller-supplied scripts for suspicious static patterns (encoded commands, download cradles, obfuscation).Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "analyze": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "file-security_suspicious-script-pattern-detect" says "file": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe input names a file (input.file), and the tool reads: it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Analyze caller-supplied scripts for suspicious static patterns (encoded commands, download cradles, obfuscation). Scripts are never executed. Price $0.04 USDC. POST /api/v1/file-security/suspicious-script-pattern-detect. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Detect suspicious script patterns
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:32 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
6
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (1 destructive, 5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://www.brainiac.software/mcp/file-security: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect (destructive), file-security_file-behavior-indicator-extract (write), file-security_malware-artifact-cluster (write), file-security_macro-document-risk-detect (write), file-security_file-extension-mismatch-detect (write) and 1 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The server marks "file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect" says "archive": a word for removing or ending something.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect" not destructive (destructiveHint: false), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect" says "archive": a word for removing or ending something.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools8 changed.~8 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http file-security https://www.brainiac.software/mcp/file-security
claude mcp add --transport http file-security https://www.brainiac.software/mcp/file-security

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__file-security__file-security_executable-metadata-analyze",
      "mcp__file-security__file-security_suspicious-script-pattern-detect"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__file-security__file-security_file-behavior-indicator-extract",
      "mcp__file-security__file-security_malware-artifact-cluster",
      "mcp__file-security__file-security_macro-document-risk-detect",
      "mcp__file-security__file-security_file-extension-mismatch-detect",
      "mcp__file-security__file-security_malware-indicator-extract"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__file-security__file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as file-security. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 8 rules
  • mcp__file-security__file-security_file-behavior-indicator-extract untrusted-input
  • mcp__file-security__file-security_malware-artifact-cluster untrusted-input
  • mcp__file-security__file-security_executable-metadata-analyze private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__file-security__file-security_macro-document-risk-detect untrusted-input
  • mcp__file-security__file-security_file-extension-mismatch-detect untrusted-input
  • mcp__file-security__file-security_suspicious-script-pattern-detect private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__file-security__file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect untrusted-input
  • mcp__file-security__file-security_malware-indicator-extract untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/software.brainiac/file-security/verify?hash=6587fba81bb1bbc6b989513ffde3515fb734ada00c4d292abd4f2a8a68c2be0b" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 6587fba81bb1, from Nov 20, 2026, 01:20 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/software.brainiac/file-security/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for software.brainiac/file-security
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/software.brainiac/file-security.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/software.brainiac/file-security)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 01:18 UTC.

BRAINIAC Malware & File Threat Intelligence MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the BRAINIAC Malware & File Threat Intelligence MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the BRAINIAC Malware & File Threat Intelligence MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect.

Can the BRAINIAC Malware & File Threat Intelligence MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the BRAINIAC Malware & File Threat Intelligence MCP server have?

8 tools: 1 destructive, 5 write, 2 read. file-security_archive-payload-risk-detect, file-security_file-behavior-indicator-extract, file-security_malware-artifact-cluster, file-security_macro-document-risk-detect, file-security_file-extension-mismatch-detect, file-security_malware-indicator-extract, file-security_executable-metadata-analyze and file-security_suspicious-script-pattern-detect.

Does the BRAINIAC Malware & File Threat Intelligence MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the BRAINIAC Malware & File Threat Intelligence MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the BRAINIAC Malware & File Threat Intelligence MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 20, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.