BRAINIAC Marketplace Account Health MCP server
software.brainiac/marketplace-healthbrainiac.softwarestreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Paid Marketplace Account Health API via x402. Unpaid tool calls return 402.
8 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 4 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 3
- Reads text others write · 8
- Can send data out · 0
- 3 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the BRAINIAC Marketplace Account Health MCP server can do
The BRAINIAC Marketplace Account Health MCP server is published by brainiac.software, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (marketplace-health_payout-hold-diagnose) and create or change data (4 tools: marketplace-health_account-notice-extract, marketplace-health_policy-issue-classify, marketplace-health_account-risk-report and marketplace-health_notice-response-draft), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
3 tools read private data (marketplace-health_seller-performance-metric-analyze, marketplace-health_account-restriction-evidence-check and marketplace-health_seller-appeal-evidence-build); 8 tools bring in text other people can write (marketplace-health_account-notice-extract, marketplace-health_seller-performance-metric-analyze, marketplace-health_payout-hold-diagnose and 5 more).
The fixed checks matched 3 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
marketplace-health_payout-hold-diagnoseRead the amount, currency, date, and reason stated on a hold.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "marketplace-health_payout-hold-diagnose" says "payout": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "marketplace-health_payout-hold-diagnose" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "marketplace-health_payout-hold-diagnose" says "payout": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Read the amount, currency, date, and reason stated on a hold. The hold is not removed and the record is not treated as a release. Price $0.04 USDC. POST /api/v1/marketplace-health/payout-hold-diagnose. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Diagnose a stated payout hold
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
marketplace-health_account-notice-extractCopy the reason, deadline, and requested action from labeled Notice fields.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "copy": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "marketplace-health_account-notice-extract" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "copy": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Copy the reason, deadline, and requested action from labeled Notice fields. Prose is not mined for a reason, and no response window is added when the deadline is blank. Price $0.04 USDC. POST /api/v1/marketplace-health/account-notice-extract. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Extract marketplace notices
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
marketplace-health_account-risk-reportCombine supplied notices, metrics, holds, policy matches, evidence gaps, and a factual draft.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Combine supplied notices, metrics, holds, policy matches, evidence gaps, and a factual draft. The report does not predict a suspension or say that a hold will be removed. Price $0.12 USDC. POST /api/v1/marketplace-health/account-risk-report. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Report account health records
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
marketplace-health_notice-response-draftWrite a response from the stated reason, deadline, requested action, and supplied evidence.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "write": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "marketplace-health_notice-response-draft" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "write": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Write a response from the stated reason, deadline, requested action, and supplied evidence. The draft is not sent, and it does not promise an appeal result or a payout release. Price $0.05 USDC. POST /api/v1/marketplace-health/notice-response-draft. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Draft a notice response
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
marketplace-health_policy-issue-classifyMatch a notice reason to a policy only when the reason equals the supplied policy name or id.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Match a notice reason to a policy only when the reason equals the supplied policy name or id. No marketplace policy page is fetched, and a partial overlap is not chosen. Price $0.04 USDC. POST /api/v1/marketplace-health/policy-issue-classify. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Classify a notice against supplied policies
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
marketplace-health_account-restriction-evidence-checkCompare supplied evidence with the evidence kinds the caller marks as required, and with the restrictions in the export.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "compare": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe input names a file (input.file), and the tool reads: it reads files.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Compare supplied evidence with the evidence kinds the caller marks as required, and with the restrictions in the export. A missing document is not invented, and a restriction is not lifted. Price $0.05 USDC. POST /api/v1/marketplace-health/account-restriction-evidence-check. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check restriction evidence
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
marketplace-health_seller-appeal-evidence-buildList the evidence supplied for a notice and the caller-required kinds that are absent.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe input names a file (input.file), and the tool reads: it reads files.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it List the evidence supplied for a notice and the caller-required kinds that are absent. The checklist does not predict that an appeal will succeed. Price $0.05 USDC. POST /api/v1/marketplace-health/seller-appeal-evidence-build. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Build an appeal evidence checklist
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
marketplace-health_seller-performance-metric-analyzeCompare a supplied metric with a supplied target only when the caller also says whether higher or lower is better.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "marketplace-health_seller-performance-metric-analyze" says "analyze": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe input names a file (input.file), and the tool reads: it reads files.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Compare a supplied metric with a supplied target only when the caller also says whether higher or lower is better. No marketplace threshold is invented, and a miss is not a suspension. Price $0.04 USDC. POST /api/v1/marketplace-health/seller-performance-metric-analyze. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Analyze seller performance metrics
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data3
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write8
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- marketplace-health_account-notice-extract
- marketplace-health_account-restriction-evidence-check
- marketplace-health_account-risk-report
- marketplace-health_notice-response-draft
- marketplace-health_payout-hold-diagnose
- marketplace-health_policy-issue-classify
- marketplace-health_seller-appeal-evidence-build
- marketplace-health_seller-performance-metric-analyze
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:34 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://www.brainiac.software/mcp/marketplace-health: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including marketplace-health_payout-hold-diagnose (irreversible), marketplace-health_account-notice-extract (write), marketplace-health_policy-issue-classify (write), marketplace-health_account-risk-report (write), marketplace-health_notice-response-draft (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "marketplace-health_account-notice-extract" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "copy": a word for a change.
The server marks "marketplace-health_payout-hold-diagnose" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "marketplace-health_payout-hold-diagnose" says "payout": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
The server marks "marketplace-health_notice-response-draft" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "write": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools8 changed.~8 changedView diff
- Changed:marketplace-health_account-notice-extractChanges thingsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:marketplace-health_account-restriction-evidence-checkOnly readsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:marketplace-health_account-risk-reportChanges thingsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:marketplace-health_notice-response-draftChanges thingsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:marketplace-health_payout-hold-diagnoseCan't be undoneinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:marketplace-health_policy-issue-classifyChanges thingsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:marketplace-health_seller-appeal-evidence-buildOnly readsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:marketplace-health_seller-performance-metric-analyzeOnly readsinputSchemaannotations
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http marketplace-health https://www.brainiac.software/mcp/marketplace-healthclaude mcp add --transport http marketplace-health https://www.brainiac.software/mcp/marketplace-healthRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__marketplace-health__marketplace-health_seller-performance-metric-analyze",
"mcp__marketplace-health__marketplace-health_account-restriction-evidence-check",
"mcp__marketplace-health__marketplace-health_seller-appeal-evidence-build"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__marketplace-health__marketplace-health_account-notice-extract",
"mcp__marketplace-health__marketplace-health_payout-hold-diagnose",
"mcp__marketplace-health__marketplace-health_policy-issue-classify",
"mcp__marketplace-health__marketplace-health_account-risk-report",
"mcp__marketplace-health__marketplace-health_notice-response-draft"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as marketplace-health. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 8 rules
- mcp__marketplace-health__marketplace-health_account-notice-extract untrusted-input
- mcp__marketplace-health__marketplace-health_seller-performance-metric-analyze private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__marketplace-health__marketplace-health_payout-hold-diagnose untrusted-input
- mcp__marketplace-health__marketplace-health_account-restriction-evidence-check private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__marketplace-health__marketplace-health_policy-issue-classify untrusted-input
- mcp__marketplace-health__marketplace-health_seller-appeal-evidence-build private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__marketplace-health__marketplace-health_account-risk-report untrusted-input
- mcp__marketplace-health__marketplace-health_notice-response-draft untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/software.brainiac/marketplace-health/verify?hash=ad0cce6dfd15c0922f40181a4f2a03534aebc2f5bb68b4d67bd7bb50b33b0e9a" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash ad0cce6dfd15, from Nov 20, 2026, 01:19 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/software.brainiac/marketplace-health/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/software.brainiac/marketplace-health)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 01:18 UTC.
BRAINIAC Marketplace Account Health MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the BRAINIAC Marketplace Account Health MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the BRAINIAC Marketplace Account Health MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the BRAINIAC Marketplace Account Health MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: marketplace-health_payout-hold-diagnose.
What tools does the BRAINIAC Marketplace Account Health MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 1 irreversible, 4 write, 3 read. marketplace-health_payout-hold-diagnose, marketplace-health_account-notice-extract, marketplace-health_policy-issue-classify, marketplace-health_account-risk-report, marketplace-health_notice-response-draft, marketplace-health_seller-performance-metric-analyze, marketplace-health_account-restriction-evidence-check and marketplace-health_seller-appeal-evidence-build.
Does the BRAINIAC Marketplace Account Health MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the BRAINIAC Marketplace Account Health MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the BRAINIAC Marketplace Account Health MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 20, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.