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BRAINIAC Staking Security MCP server

software.brainiac/staking-securitybrainiac.softwarestreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Paid Staking Security API via x402. Unpaid tool calls return 402.

3 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 4 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the BRAINIAC Staking Security MCP server can do

The BRAINIAC Staking Security MCP server is published by brainiac.software, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (staking-security_validator-withdrawal-credential-audit) and create or change data (1 tool: staking-security_validator-slashing-protection-audit), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (staking-security_validator-slashing-protection-audit, staking-security_validator-key-deployment-conflict-audit and staking-security_validator-withdrawal-credential-audit).

The fixed checks matched 4 findings (credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • staking-security_validator-withdrawal-credential-auditCompare caller-supplied Ethereum validator withdrawal credentials with expected types, withdrawal addresses, and ownership mappings.Reads text others write4 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "staking-security_validator-withdrawal-credential-audit" says "withdrawal": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The title mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      title: "Audit validator withdrawal credentials"

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The annotations title mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      annotations.title: "Audit validator withdrawal credentials"

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...-supplied Ethereum validator withdrawal credentials with expected types, withdrawal address..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "staking-security_validator-withdrawal-credential-audit" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "staking-security_validator-withdrawal-credential-audit" says "withdrawal": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Compare caller-supplied Ethereum validator withdrawal credentials with expected types, withdrawal addresses, and ownership mappings. 0x00 is a BLS credential and the other 31 bytes are a hash fragment, not an address. 0x01 and 0x02 decode an execution address only when the next 11 bytes are zero. audit_status is valid, mismatched, warnings, invalid, or incomplete. risk_level is low, medium, high, or critical. A match is not proof of control and was not read from a beacon node. Price $0.05 USDC. POST /api/v1/staking-security/validator-withdrawal-credential-audit. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Audit validator withdrawal credentials
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • staking-security_validator-slashing-protection-auditCheck caller-supplied EIP-3076 version 5 slashing-protection interchanges before validator history is imported or reused.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check caller-supplied EIP-3076 version 5 slashing-protection interchanges before validator history is imported or reused. A double proposal is two different blocks at the same slot. A double vote is two different attestations with the same target epoch. A surround vote has an earlier source epoch and a later target epoch than the vote it surrounds. audit_status is safe, conflicts_detected, warnings, invalid, or incomplete. risk_level is low, medium, high, or critical. Identical records without signing_root are not a confirmed slash. The export is not a complete signing history and does not protect against a later signature. No private key is accepted and no beacon node is queried. Price $0.05 USDC. POST /api/v1/staking-security/validator-slashing-protection-audit. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Audit validator slashing protection
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • staking-security_validator-key-deployment-conflict-auditCompare a caller-supplied validator deployment inventory for duplicate active public keys, simultaneous primary and backup activation, overlapping activation windows, and failover …Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "compare": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Compare a caller-supplied validator deployment inventory for duplicate active public keys, simultaneous primary and backup activation, overlapping activation windows, and failover rules that disagree. Windows are absolute instants, including offsets. An inactive standby covered by an exclusive failover rule is not treated as concurrent. audit_status is clean, conflicts_detected, warnings, or incomplete. risk_level is low, medium, high, or critical. Activation status is an assertion. No host is contacted and no private key is read. Price $0.05 USDC. POST /api/v1/staking-security/validator-key-deployment-conflict-audit. An unpaid call returns the x402 payment terms and does not run.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Audit validator deployment conflicts
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:35 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://www.brainiac.software/mcp/staking-security: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including staking-security_validator-withdrawal-credential-audit (irreversible), staking-security_validator-slashing-protection-audit (write), staking-security_validator-key-deployment-conflict-audit (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn3 info

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http staking-security https://www.brainiac.software/mcp/staking-security
claude mcp add --transport http staking-security https://www.brainiac.software/mcp/staking-security

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__staking-security__staking-security_validator-key-deployment-conflict-audit"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__staking-security__staking-security_validator-slashing-protection-audit",
      "mcp__staking-security__staking-security_validator-withdrawal-credential-audit"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as staking-security. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__staking-security__staking-security_validator-slashing-protection-audit untrusted-input
  • mcp__staking-security__staking-security_validator-key-deployment-conflict-audit untrusted-input
  • mcp__staking-security__staking-security_validator-withdrawal-credential-audit untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/software.brainiac/staking-security/verify?hash=174e3dc3d706c50297d038d1925687e1f2267d2c6b20436e1ca601c32da0ab42" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 174e3dc3d706, from Nov 20, 2026, 01:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/software.brainiac/staking-security/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for software.brainiac/staking-security
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/software.brainiac/staking-security.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/software.brainiac/staking-security)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 01:18 UTC.

BRAINIAC Staking Security MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the BRAINIAC Staking Security MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the BRAINIAC Staking Security MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the BRAINIAC Staking Security MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: staking-security_validator-withdrawal-credential-audit.

What tools does the BRAINIAC Staking Security MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read. staking-security_validator-withdrawal-credential-audit, staking-security_validator-slashing-protection-audit and staking-security_validator-key-deployment-conflict-audit.

Does the BRAINIAC Staking Security MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the BRAINIAC Staking Security MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the BRAINIAC Staking Security MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 20, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.