Skip to content

Additive Atlas MCP server

space.monon/additive-atlasmonon.spacestreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Food additive regulations of Japan, the EU and the US, side by side, with sources (free tier).

5 tools: 5 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 5 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Additive Atlas MCP server can do

The Additive Atlas MCP server is published by monon.space, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (search_substances, get_substance and analyze_label).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
  • analyze_labelFind the additives named on a label (same as HTTP POST /v1/labels/analyze).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "analyze_label" says "analyze": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "find" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find the additives named on a label (same as HTTP POST /v1/labels/analyze). Splits the additive section into tokens and returns, per token, the substances it resolves to (SubstanceSummary: facts on their own axis), plus known interactions between the detected substances. Cutting the additive section out of the label is the caller's job; sending the whole ingredient section is allowed. Matching is exact against the alias vocabulary in scope: a token with matches: [] is unresolved, which (open world) does not distinguish "not an additive" from "an additive not known here". `axis` and `lang` must be one of the accepted pairs: JP+ja, US+en, EU+nl, EU+fr, EU+de, EU+es, EU+pl, EU+el, EU+bg. Not a safety judgement: every record is a draft and needs verification.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • analyze_label_diff(Paid; not available through MCP.) Same input as analyze_label, but each detected substance carries the cross-axis derivation.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "analyze_label_diff" says "analyze": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    (Paid; not available through MCP.) Same input as analyze_label, but each detected substance carries the cross-axis derivation. This tool does not return that data: it returns the HTTP endpoint (POST /v1/labels/analyze/diff with the same JSON body, 0.01 USDC per request via x402 on Base) to call instead.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_substanceOne substance with everything its own roster says (same as HTTP GET /v1/substances/{id}): identifiers, category, aliases, translations, the source-ledger row, groups, and — dependi…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_substance" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One substance with everything its own roster says (same as HTTP GET /v1/substances/{id}): identifiers, category, aliases, translations, the source-ledger row, groups, and — depending on the axis — Japanese use standards, EU/Codex conditions of use, mandatory labelling statements, the roster's definition text or the CFR citation. Facts from the substance's own axis only; nothing here crosses an axis (that is get_substance_diff, paid, HTTP only). Axis-specific keys are present only where the roster has that concept, and an empty list means something (use_standards: [] = no use standard; use_conditions: [] = no permitted food category). Not a safety judgement: every record is a draft and needs verification.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_substance_diff(Paid; not available through MCP.) For every axis other than the substance's own, what that axis says (with a per-cell source) kept separate from what was derived from it; when not…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_substance_diff" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    (Paid; not available through MCP.) For every axis other than the substance's own, what that axis says (with a per-cell source) kept separate from what was derived from it; when nothing can be concluded, a refusal says why and what would settle it. This tool does not return that data: it returns the HTTP endpoint (GET /v1/substances/{id}/diff, 0.01 USDC per request via x402 on Base) to call instead.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_substancesLook up substances by name on one regulatory axis (same as HTTP GET /v1/substances?name=…).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_substances" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up substances by name on one regulatory axis (same as HTTP GET /v1/substances?name=…). The name is normalised (NFKC, whitespace removed, lower-cased) and matched **exactly** against the names and aliases the axis itself uses in that language (E numbers and official names for EU, 品目名 and label terms for JP, CFR names for US) — no partial or fuzzy matching. The official name is an alias of itself. Returns the matching substances (SubstanceSummary: facts from their own roster only) and, per row, what text matched. `axis` and `lang` must be one of the accepted pairs: JP+ja, US+en, EU+nl, EU+fr, EU+de, EU+es, EU+pl, EU+el, EU+bg. Not a safety judgement: every record is a draft and needs verification.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:19 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http additive-atlas https://api.additiveatlas.monon.space/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http additive-atlas https://api.additiveatlas.monon.space/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__additive-atlas__search_substances",
      "mcp__additive-atlas__get_substance",
      "mcp__additive-atlas__analyze_label",
      "mcp__additive-atlas__get_substance_diff",
      "mcp__additive-atlas__analyze_label_diff"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as additive-atlas. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__additive-atlas__search_substances untrusted-input
  • mcp__additive-atlas__get_substance untrusted-input
  • mcp__additive-atlas__analyze_label untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/space.monon/additive-atlas/verify?hash=24ff599ea61c9c1e6251e7928ebdcc020eb5c4e1f8340e9f65ad779493cc9338" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 24ff599ea61c, from Nov 19, 2026, 05:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/space.monon/additive-atlas/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for space.monon/additive-atlas
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/space.monon/additive-atlas.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/space.monon/additive-atlas)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:55 UTC.

Additive Atlas MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Additive Atlas MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the Additive Atlas MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Additive Atlas MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Additive Atlas MCP server have?

5 tools: 5 read. search_substances, get_substance, analyze_label, get_substance_diff and analyze_label_diff.

Does the Additive Atlas MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Additive Atlas MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Additive Atlas MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.