DC5 WHOIS MCP server
tech.dc5.whois/dc5-whoiswhois.dc5.techstreamable-httpv2026.11.13Scanned
WHOIS, RDAP, DNS, IP / ASN / CIDR and Web3 name (ENS, Unstoppable, Handshake) lookups. No API key.
8 tools: 4 change things and 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the DC5 WHOIS MCP server can do
The DC5 WHOIS MCP server is published by whois.dc5.tech, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: check_aspa_path, check_lookalike, check_mail_security and check_route), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (check_mail_security, lookup_many and lookup_target).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 2026.11.13.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
check_aspa_pathCheck an AS_PATH against the published ASPA objects (RPKI attestations of which providers a network authorises), following the verification procedure of draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-ver…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check an AS_PATH against the published ASPA objects (RPKI attestations of which providers a network authorises), following the verification procedure of draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification. The result is valid, invalid or unknown, with the reason and the first hop that broke the path. Use it to find out whether a path shows a route leak or an unauthorised provider. "Unknown" only means some network on the path published no ASPA; it is not a fault. Behavior: offline, answered from the local RPKI snapshot. The procedure is an Internet-Draft, not an RFC, and the neighbor-AS and AS_SET prerequisite checks of a real router are left out. Only the path is read; it is neither stored nor logged.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
check_lookalikeCheck whether one domain or Web3 name is a visual look-alike (homograph): letters from different scripts mixed in one label, or every non-ASCII letter having a Latin twin, so раура…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check whether one domain or Web3 name is a visual look-alike (homograph): letters from different scripts mixed in one label, or every non-ASCII letter having a Latin twin, so раураl.com reads as paypal.com. Returns the scripts used and the Latin name it imitates. Use it to screen candidate or incoming names quickly (phishing triage, brand monitoring). lookup_target already includes this warning for the name it looks up, so there is no need to call both for one name. Behavior: offline and instant; no DNS, registry or network call. It catches script tricks only, not typos or digit swaps such as paypa1.com, so a clean result does not mean the domain is safe.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
check_mail_securityGrade one domain's email authentication and list every check: SPF (single record, the 10 DNS-lookup limit across includes, the all qualifier), DMARC (policy, inheritance from the o…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Grade one domain's email authentication and list every check: SPF (single record, the 10 DNS-lookup limit across includes, the all qualifier), DMARC (policy, inheritance from the organizational domain, pct, report addresses), MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE and null MX. The level is strong, fair, weak, no_mail (domain declares it sends no mail) or none (no MX, SPF or DMARC at all). Use it for questions about spoofing, deliverability or a DMARC rollout. lookup_target gives only the overall grade; this tool gives the status and a one-line finding for each check. Behavior: reads public DNS only and never connects to the domain's mail servers, so it cannot test SMTP TLS, certificates or whether a mailbox exists. Usually under 2 s.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
check_routeCheck one (prefix, origin AS) pair against the public records: RPKI route origin validation (RFC 6811), the routing registries (IRR route objects) and how many RIPE RIS peers see t…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check one (prefix, origin AS) pair against the public records: RPKI route origin validation (RFC 6811), the routing registries (IRR route objects) and how many RIPE RIS peers see that origin for the prefix. Use it to answer whether an AS is authorised to originate a prefix, why a route may be dropped by networks that filter on RPKI, or whether a registry object matches an announcement. For everything about one prefix or AS use lookup_target instead. Behavior: offline, answered from local snapshots; the result lists only the datasets this instance has loaded. RPKI "invalid" can be a stale ROA and an IRR object is a claim, so neither is proof of a hijack or of authorisation. A prefix RIS does not see may still be announced to peers it does not have.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
get_tld_infoFacts about one top-level domain from local datasets: whether it is delegated in the root zone, its type (country-code or infrastructure when derivable), the registry's RDAP server…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_tld_info" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Facts about one top-level domain from local datasets: whether it is delegated in the root zone, its type (country-code or infrastructure when derivable), the registry's RDAP server, root-zone name servers, whether the root zone publishes a DS record (DNSSEC) and which DS algorithms, and any Web3 namespace that claims the same label (for example .eth, .crypto, .bnb, or a collision such as .xyz). Use it to answer where to send an RDAP query for a TLD, whether a TLD is signed, or whether a name under it could mean something else on a blockchain. For one domain use lookup_target instead. Behavior: offline and instant, answered from synced IANA and root-zone data; makes no network call. A field without data is omitted, never guessed. Registry operator and delegation date are not included.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
list_data_sourcesList the local datasets and feeds behind lookup_target (RIR delegations, IANA, Public Suffix List, cloud / CDN ranges, Tor and Private Relay, reputation lists, GeoLite2) with state…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_data_sources" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the local datasets and feeds behind lookup_target (RIR delegations, IANA, Public Suffix List, cloud / CDN ranges, Tor and Private Relay, reputation lists, GeoLite2) with state, record count, generation date and a stale flag. Use it to judge how current a reputation, RIR, cloud or geolocation answer is, or to explain why such a section is missing from a lookup (dataset not loaded or stale). Registry, DNS and Web3 data are fetched live and are not listed here. Behavior: takes no arguments and makes no external calls.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
lookup_manyLook up up to 10 domains, IPs, CIDRs, ASNs or Web3 names in one call and get one short line per target (type, registrar and expiry, nameservers, network owner, origin AS, cloud, re…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lookup_many" says "lookup": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Look up up to 10 domains, IPs, CIDRs, ASNs or Web3 names in one call and get one short line per target (type, registrar and expiry, nameservers, network owner, origin AS, cloud, reputation, Web3 status) plus the same facts as structured fields and a details_url for each. Use it to triage a list, for example the domains in a phishing report or the IPs in a log excerpt. For the full fact sheet of one target use lookup_target. Behavior: each target is a live lookup like lookup_target and counts against the same rate limit, so a long list can hit it; targets that were refused say so and can be retried later. Up to 3 run at once, the whole call is cut off after about 22 s and targets that did not finish say so. One failing target does not fail the others.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
lookup_targetLook up one domain, IP address, CIDR block, ASN (AS15169), EVM address (0x…) or Web3 name (ENS .eth, Unstoppable, SPACE ID .bnb, Handshake hns:) and get a compact fact sheet.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lookup_target" says "lookup": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Look up one domain, IP address, CIDR block, ASN (AS15169), EVM address (0x…) or Web3 name (ENS .eth, Unstoppable, SPACE ID .bnb, Handshake hns:) and get a compact fact sheet. Domains: registrar, dates, status, nameservers, DNS records, overall mail-security grade, third-party services seen in DNS, possibly dangling records. IPs, CIDRs and ASNs: network owner, origin AS, RIR, cloud / CDN provider, Tor or iCloud Private Relay tag, geolocation, abuse contact, local reputation. Web3 names: registration status, addresses, records, ENS expiry. A 0x EVM address: its ENS primary name on Ethereum, Base, Optimism, Arbitrum, Linea and Scroll (reverse lookup). A look-alike warning is added when the name uses deceptive letters. Use it first for any question about who owns, runs, hosts or registered something. Prefer check_mail_security when you need each email check rather than the grade, and check_lookalike to screen many names without network calls. Behavior: queries registries, DNS and (for Web3) blockchain RPC live, usually in 1-5 s, at most about 12 s. If one source fails, the rest is still returned and the failure is listed under errors. Reputation covers local blocklists only: no match is not a clean bill of health. Queries are not logged or stored. The result ends with details_url, the full page with every record and its provenance.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:19 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://whois.dc5.tech/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including check_aspa_path (write), check_lookalike (write), check_mail_security (write), check_route (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 6, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 4
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 4.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 4
Tools4 added, 1 changed.+4 added~1 changedView diff
- Added:check_aspa_pathChanges things
- Added:check_routeChanges things
- Added:get_tld_infoOnly reads
- Added:lookup_manyOnly reads
- Changed:lookup_targetOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 2026.11.13. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http dc5-whois https://whois.dc5.tech/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http dc5-whois https://whois.dc5.tech/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__dc5-whois__get_tld_info",
"mcp__dc5-whois__list_data_sources",
"mcp__dc5-whois__lookup_many",
"mcp__dc5-whois__lookup_target"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__dc5-whois__check_aspa_path",
"mcp__dc5-whois__check_lookalike",
"mcp__dc5-whois__check_mail_security",
"mcp__dc5-whois__check_route"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as dc5-whois. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__dc5-whois__check_mail_security untrusted-input
- mcp__dc5-whois__lookup_many untrusted-input
- mcp__dc5-whois__lookup_target untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/tech.dc5.whois/dc5-whois/verify?hash=6bab39262eed9114fc791299b1f381ec348dcdb7b06fd107977d89722f22a5d3" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 6bab39262eed, from Nov 13, 2026, 17:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/tech.dc5.whois/dc5-whois/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/tech.dc5.whois/dc5-whois)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 13, 2026, 17:18 UTC.
DC5 WHOIS MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the DC5 WHOIS MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the DC5 WHOIS MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the DC5 WHOIS MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the DC5 WHOIS MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 4 write, 4 read. check_aspa_path, check_lookalike, check_mail_security, check_route, get_tld_info, list_data_sources, lookup_many and lookup_target.
Does the DC5 WHOIS MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the DC5 WHOIS MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the DC5 WHOIS MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Oct 30, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.