FLOCORE Governed MCP server
tech.flocore/flocoreflocore.techstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Governed MCP front door to FLOCORE; write calls need human approval and signed receipts.
4 tools: 4 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the FLOCORE Governed MCP server can do
The FLOCORE Governed MCP server is published by flocore.tech, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: aegis_inspect, flocore_onboard_request, flocore_support_ask and flocore_verify_counterparty), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (flocore_support_ask).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
aegis_inspectScreen a prompt or text for injection, jailbreak and exfil intent.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "aegis_inspect" says "inspect": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "aegis_inspect" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "aegis_inspect" says "inspect": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Screen a prompt or text for injection, jailbreak and exfil intent. Free, public, defensive-only: returns a risk score (0..1), the detected intents, and whether it is suspicious. No token needed, no tenant data. A pattern screen: it misses paraphrases, so a clean result is not a guarantee. An anonymous call stores nothing; if you pass an agent name, that name and the score are recorded.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- title: Screen for prompt injection
flocore_onboard_requestRegisters an onboarding request for human review (human-gated approval, Ed25519 signed receipts, EU AI Act Article 12 audit evidence).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "flocore_onboard_request" says "request": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Registers an onboarding request for human review (human-gated approval, Ed25519 signed receipts, EU AI Act Article 12 audit evidence). Public: no token needed. Returns a request id and a sandbox token (fc_test_...) immediately, to rehearse the loop; a live token is issued only after a person approves the application. Set rehearsal_only to true to get a sandbox token without applying.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- title: Request governance onboarding
flocore_support_askAsk a plain-English support/product question about FLOCORE itself, agent to agent, instead of a helpdesk.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Ask a plain-English support/product question about FLOCORE itself, agent to agent, instead of a helpdesk. Public, no token needed. Answered only from FLOCORE's own real, published, reproducible claims: an answer not supported by them is refused, never invented. Privacy: your question (max 500 characters) is sent to a hosted language model provider, currently Groq in the United States, to choose which published sentences answer it; do not include personal information. See https://humanseal.world/privacy.html.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- title: Ask FLOCORE support, agent to agent
flocore_verify_counterpartyBefore transacting with another agent, check whether it is FLOCORE-governed (a human-approval gate on its world-affecting actions, Ed25519 signed receipts) and, if it handed you a …No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Before transacting with another agent, check whether it is FLOCORE-governed (a human-approval gate on its world-affecting actions, Ed25519 signed receipts) and, if it handed you a receipt, verify that receipt independently. Public, no token needed. A sandbox receipt is reported as a rehearsal and never as valid proof.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- title: Verify a counterparty agent
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:19 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-11-25
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://fo.flocore.tech/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including aegis_inspect (write), flocore_onboard_request (write), flocore_support_ask (write), flocore_verify_counterparty (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnaegis_inspect
The server marks "aegis_inspect" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "aegis_inspect" says "inspect": a word for reading.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http flocore https://fo.flocore.tech/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http flocore https://fo.flocore.tech/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__flocore__aegis_inspect",
"mcp__flocore__flocore_onboard_request",
"mcp__flocore__flocore_support_ask",
"mcp__flocore__flocore_verify_counterparty"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as flocore. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__flocore__flocore_support_ask untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/tech.flocore/flocore/verify?hash=b51af217618969e7ecc51317ed316f6c1ce114e85efa467c1c5c2cdd4d8e5369" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash b51af2176189, from Nov 19, 2026, 06:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/tech.flocore/flocore/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/tech.flocore/flocore)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:55 UTC.
FLOCORE Governed MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the FLOCORE Governed MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the FLOCORE Governed MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the FLOCORE Governed MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the FLOCORE Governed MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 4 write. aegis_inspect, flocore_onboard_request, flocore_support_ask and flocore_verify_counterparty.
Does the FLOCORE Governed MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the FLOCORE Governed MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the FLOCORE Governed MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.