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FLOCORE Governed MCP server

tech.flocore/flocoreflocore.techstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Governed MCP front door to FLOCORE; write calls need human approval and signed receipts.

4 tools: 4 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the FLOCORE Governed MCP server can do

The FLOCORE Governed MCP server is published by flocore.tech, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: aegis_inspect, flocore_onboard_request, flocore_support_ask and flocore_verify_counterparty), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (flocore_support_ask).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • aegis_inspectScreen a prompt or text for injection, jailbreak and exfil intent.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "aegis_inspect" says "inspect": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "aegis_inspect" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "aegis_inspect" says "inspect": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen a prompt or text for injection, jailbreak and exfil intent. Free, public, defensive-only: returns a risk score (0..1), the detected intents, and whether it is suspicious. No token needed, no tenant data. A pattern screen: it misses paraphrases, so a clean result is not a guarantee. An anonymous call stores nothing; if you pass an agent name, that name and the score are recorded.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: Screen for prompt injection
  • flocore_onboard_requestRegisters an onboarding request for human review (human-gated approval, Ed25519 signed receipts, EU AI Act Article 12 audit evidence).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "flocore_onboard_request" says "request": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Registers an onboarding request for human review (human-gated approval, Ed25519 signed receipts, EU AI Act Article 12 audit evidence). Public: no token needed. Returns a request id and a sandbox token (fc_test_...) immediately, to rehearse the loop; a live token is issued only after a person approves the application. Set rehearsal_only to true to get a sandbox token without applying.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: Request governance onboarding
  • flocore_support_askAsk a plain-English support/product question about FLOCORE itself, agent to agent, instead of a helpdesk.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Ask a plain-English support/product question about FLOCORE itself, agent to agent, instead of a helpdesk. Public, no token needed. Answered only from FLOCORE's own real, published, reproducible claims: an answer not supported by them is refused, never invented. Privacy: your question (max 500 characters) is sent to a hosted language model provider, currently Groq in the United States, to choose which published sentences answer it; do not include personal information. See https://humanseal.world/privacy.html.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • title: Ask FLOCORE support, agent to agent
  • flocore_verify_counterpartyBefore transacting with another agent, check whether it is FLOCORE-governed (a human-approval gate on its world-affecting actions, Ed25519 signed receipts) and, if it handed you a …No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Before transacting with another agent, check whether it is FLOCORE-governed (a human-approval gate on its world-affecting actions, Ed25519 signed receipts) and, if it handed you a receipt, verify that receipt independently. Public, no token needed. A sandbox receipt is reported as a rehearsal and never as valid proof.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • title: Verify a counterparty agent

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:19 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-11-25
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://fo.flocore.tech/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including aegis_inspect (write), flocore_onboard_request (write), flocore_support_ask (write), flocore_verify_counterparty (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "aegis_inspect" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "aegis_inspect" says "inspect": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http flocore https://fo.flocore.tech/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http flocore https://fo.flocore.tech/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__flocore__aegis_inspect",
      "mcp__flocore__flocore_onboard_request",
      "mcp__flocore__flocore_support_ask",
      "mcp__flocore__flocore_verify_counterparty"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as flocore. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__flocore__flocore_support_ask untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/tech.flocore/flocore/verify?hash=b51af217618969e7ecc51317ed316f6c1ce114e85efa467c1c5c2cdd4d8e5369" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash b51af2176189, from Nov 19, 2026, 06:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/tech.flocore/flocore/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for tech.flocore/flocore
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/tech.flocore/flocore.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/tech.flocore/flocore)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:55 UTC.

FLOCORE Governed MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the FLOCORE Governed MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the FLOCORE Governed MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the FLOCORE Governed MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the FLOCORE Governed MCP server have?

4 tools: 4 write. aegis_inspect, flocore_onboard_request, flocore_support_ask and flocore_verify_counterparty.

Does the FLOCORE Governed MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the FLOCORE Governed MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the FLOCORE Governed MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.