MONARK MCP server
tech.monarkgate/monarkmonarkgate.techstreamable-httpv0.4.0Scanned
Commit / defer / abstain over a conformal coverage region - not a probability of being right.
4 tools: 4 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the MONARK MCP server can do
The MONARK MCP server is published by monarkgate.tech, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: gate, cascade, attest and calibrate), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (long-description). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 0.4.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
attestprojection of a committed Shōgen-verified witness (Binance BTCUSDT, self-notarized); the verifier is NOT executed at call time.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it projection of a committed Shōgen-verified witness (Binance BTCUSDT, self-notarized); the verifier is NOT executed at call time.
calibratesplit-conformal quantile at miscoverage α over caller-supplied nonconformity scores.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it split-conformal quantile at miscoverage α over caller-supplied nonconformity scores. MONARK does not see, store, or verify the caller's data or model, and does not validate that the supplied numbers are nonconformity scores of any model. Marginal 1−α coverage holds ONLY for future points exchangeable with the supplied scores; non-exchangeable data (e.g. distribution-shifted or time-ordered) voids it. Never a probability of being right.
cascadeEstimated liquidable amount from the real UKEMI cascade primitives (imported, never re-implemented): an Eisenberg-Noe clearing of the interbank system (L, e) with alpha=beta=1 yiel…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Estimated liquidable amount from the real UKEMI cascade primitives (imported, never re-implemented): an Eisenberg-Noe clearing of the interbank system (L, e) with alpha=beta=1 yields the largest clearing vector L*; each node is then read as a leveraged position — collateral is its cleared balance-sheet value (external assets plus interbank receipts under L*), debt is its nominal obligations, liquidation threshold K=1 — and liquidableAmount sums the debts of the nodes whose cleared value, once shocked by the caller-carried 24h fraction, no longer covers their obligations. Shocking the whole cleared value is a v0 simplification; no source supports shocking interbank receivables. yhat is that liquidable amount: a monetary quantity in the reference asset, a single point that HIKAE conformalizes downstream — no guarantee, no score. Downstream, no cascade calibration is committed; the gate abstains (under_calib) on this class. This cascade tool is v0, replaced at U-5.
gateCoverage-gated decision from the real HIKAE L3 policy (commit/defer/abstain) over a caller-carried authorization budget B_t.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Findings
- Info
The description is 3,952 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...ested` is refused. The gate only emits a decision; it never calls the named tool."
Description, as the server wrote it Coverage-gated decision from the real HIKAE L3 policy (commit/defer/abstain) over a caller-carried authorization budget B_t. Dispatches on task_class. The class 'btc-dir-15m' is retired and answers a named refusal. For 'cascade-liquidable-24h' no cascade calibration is committed; the gate abstains (under_calib) on this class. For 'stable-run-velocity-24h' (Narabi: a redemption-flow velocity forecast) the gate holds a committed stable-run velocity calibration for the USDe synthetic-dollar-whitelisted-redeem population (key narabi:persistence-v2@eip155:1/erc20:0x4c9edd5852cd905f086c759e8383e09bff1e68b3) over calm-window redemption flow; coverage is stated under the split-conformal bound of Barber, Candes, Ramdas and Tibshirani 2023 (Thm 2, unit weights): at least 1 − α minus the average total-variation gap between calibration windows and the next one; that gap is not estimated here and the calibration is measured non-stationary across half-years, so 1 − α is the coverage only if that gap is zero (exchangeability), which is not assumed here; no coverage is measured; on that key it requires alpha = 0.1, nMin = 50; for any other population, no stable-run velocity calibration is committed for this population; the gate abstains (under_calib). For 'liquidation-eligible-coverage' (Ukemi: a per-account liquidable-amount class, class A only) the served region is a conformal upper bound on the liquidable amount for the calibrated class; the lower edge is 0 by construction, not a calibrated bound; abstains (under_calib) outside it; this class requires alpha = 0.01, nMin = 100; calibrated on one recorded episode; no coverage is claimed on any other event; the H-3 exchangeability check is a report, a YES licenses nothing more; the bound holds only if yhat was produced by the frozen close-factor rule on a mono-collateral WETH account at the first crossing, which the gate does not check. The 32 kata classes `{btc,eth,bnb,sol}-{dir,range,mae-down,mae-up}-{1h,4h}` are served from their policy tables, which hold no committed calibration row: every well-formed kata call abstains with no region (under_calib, or non_evaluable on a dir lean of exactly 0), and no kata class has an attestation subject. A kata call carries a `predictor_id` of the form `kata:<kataId>@<venue>/<SYMBOL>/<h>` (no bucket, <h> the class horizon), a `features_digest`, alpha = 0.45, nMin = 6 on dir classes and alpha = 0.01, nMin = 299 on the others, tau at most 1 on dir classes, and a `produced_at` on the class horizon grid, received at most 300 s after it; the full request rules are in section 9 of the contract 1.1.0 specification. When the caller instead supplies a `calibration` (its own nonconformity scores plus a `mode`: `interval` ⇒ region [yhat - q̂, yhat + q̂], or `set` ⇒ a conformal set over caller `candidates`), the gate conformalizes against THOSE caller-supplied scores (BYO): split-conformal quantile at miscoverage α over caller-supplied nonconformity scores. MONARK does not see, store, or verify the caller's data or model, and does not validate that the supplied numbers are nonconformity scores of any model. Marginal 1−α coverage holds ONLY for future points exchangeable with the supplied scores; non-exchangeable data (e.g. distribution-shifted or time-ordered) voids it. Never a probability of being right. A caller-carried `attested` price must declare a subject consistent with the committed task class (exact committed-URL membership; BYO classes do not accept `attested` in P1); the attestation is carried by the caller and is not re-verified at call time (the verifier is not executed here); `attest` only projects the committed witness — verify a caller-carried attestation offline with the Shōgen verifier; no temporal binding in P1. No served class has a committed attestation subject (the retired 'btc-dir-15m' held the only one), so any `attested` is refused. The gate only emits a decision; it never calls the named tool.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:19 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.monarkgate.tech/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including gate (write), cascade (write), attest (write), calibrate (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Infogate
The description is 3,952 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...ested` is refused. The gate only emits a decision; it never calls the named tool."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.4.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http monark https://mcp.monarkgate.tech/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http monark https://mcp.monarkgate.tech/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__monark__gate",
"mcp__monark__cascade",
"mcp__monark__attest",
"mcp__monark__calibrate"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as monark. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/tech.monarkgate/monark/verify?hash=1598633a73e5ec90cdad36b82eb4fe6bf14d838a652c2c8dd604c4e62bff59c6" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 1598633a73e5, from Nov 18, 2026, 09:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/tech.monarkgate/monark/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/tech.monarkgate/monark)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:55 UTC.
MONARK MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the MONARK MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the MONARK MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the MONARK MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the MONARK MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 4 write. gate, cascade, attest and calibrate.
Does the MONARK MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the MONARK MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the MONARK MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.