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GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server

tech.noahsarch/sanctions-screenernoahsarch.techstreamable-httpv0.1.1Scanned

Screen names vs OFAC, UN, EU, UK and UAE terrorist lists with Arabic-aware matching.

5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server can do

The GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server is published by noahsarch.tech, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: screen_name, screen_batch and audit_report), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (list_status); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (list_status).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 0.1.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • audit_reportScreens 1–50 subjects and returns a self-contained HTML report (result.html): timestamp, each list with its version / fetched-at / SHA-256, the inputs, every hit with its explanati…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screens 1–50 subjects and returns a self-contained HTML report (result.html): timestamp, each list with its version / fetched-at / SHA-256, the inputs, every hit with its explanation, and an explicit no-match statement for clear subjects — suitable for the client's AML file (open in a browser, print to PDF). One charge per report. Example: subjects [{name:'Qusay Saddam Hussein', dob:'1966'}], case_reference 'KYC-2026-0412', prepared_by 'MLRO'. Response: result plus data_confidence, estimated_items[], sources[] (official list pages), data_version (snapshot id), warnings[] (e.g. a list snapshot older than 7 days) and a disclaimer. Lists: ofac_sdn, ofac_cons, un, eu, uk, uae. Names are never logged; matching is deterministic (no AI) and runs offline against the bundled snapshot.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • screen_batchEach subject may carry dob, nationality, entity_type, id_number and your reference.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Each subject may carry dob, nationality, entity_type, id_number and your reference. Identical rows are screened once (charged once). Returns per-subject decision_hint, hit_count, top_score and the top 5 hits, plus summary counts (clear / review / likely_match). Charged per unique name. Example: subjects [{name:'Ali Kony', reference:'C-17'}, {name:'شركة الأمل للتجارة', entity_type:'entity'}], default_nationality 'AE'. Response: result plus data_confidence, estimated_items[], sources[] (official list pages), data_version (snapshot id), warnings[] (e.g. a list snapshot older than 7 days) and a disclaimer. Lists: ofac_sdn, ofac_cons, un, eu, uk, uae. Names are never logged; matching is deterministic (no AI) and runs offline against the bundled snapshot.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • screen_nameScreen a person, company, vessel or aircraft name against OFAC SDN + Consolidated, UN, EU, UK and the UAE Local Terrorist List.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen a person, company, vessel or aircraft name against OFAC SDN + Consolidated, UN, EU, UK and the UAE Local Terrorist List. Returns up to 20 hits sorted by score with list, listed_name, aliases_matched, score, match_strength (exact / strong / possible / weak), matched_on (which alias, which normalisation, DOB / nationality / type agreement), programs, listed_on, DOBs, nationalities, id_numbers, reference and source_url, plus decision_hint. Example: name 'Mohamed Hussein Al-Tikriti', dob '1966', nationality 'IQ', entity_type 'individual'. Response: result plus data_confidence, estimated_items[], sources[] (official list pages), data_version (snapshot id), warnings[] (e.g. a list snapshot older than 7 days) and a disclaimer. Lists: ofac_sdn, ofac_cons, un, eu, uk, uae. Names are never logged; matching is deterministic (no AI) and runs offline against the bundled snapshot.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • explain_matchNormalises both names step by step (Unicode, Arabic letter folding, honorifics/particles dropped, merged 'Abdul…' forms split, romanisation variants folded) and returns every score…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "explain_match" says "explain": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Normalises both names step by step (Unicode, Arabic letter folding, honorifics/particles dropped, merged 'Abdul…' forms split, romanisation variants folded) and returns every score component (token_sort, token_set, Jaro-Winkler, subset, or the cross-script skeleton) and the resulting score / strength. Free. Example: name_a 'Abd al-Rahman Al Shaikh', name_b 'عبدالرحمن الشيخ'. Response: result plus data_confidence, estimated_items[], sources[] (official list pages), data_version (snapshot id), warnings[] (e.g. a list snapshot older than 7 days) and a disclaimer. Lists: ofac_sdn, ofac_cons, un, eu, uk, uae. Names are never logged; matching is deterministic (no AI) and runs offline against the bundled snapshot.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • list_statusPer list: entries (individuals / entities / vessels / aircraft), aliases, fetched_at, days_since_fetch (stale flag when older than 7 days), official source URL and page, SHA-256 of…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_status" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "file": it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Per list: entries (individuals / entities / vessels / aircraft), aliases, fetched_at, days_since_fetch (stale flag when older than 7 days), official source URL and page, SHA-256 of the downloaded file, licence/terms, and any failures of the last refresh. Free. Call it before relying on a 'clear' result in a regulated process. Response: result plus data_confidence, estimated_items[], sources[] (official list pages), data_version (snapshot id), warnings[] (e.g. a list snapshot older than 7 days) and a disclaimer. Lists: ofac_sdn, ofac_cons, un, eu, uk, uae. Names are never logged; matching is deterministic (no AI) and runs offline against the bundled snapshot.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 31, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://screen.noahsarch.tech/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including screen_name (write), screen_batch (write), audit_report (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http sanctions-screener https://screen.noahsarch.tech/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http sanctions-screener https://screen.noahsarch.tech/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__sanctions-screener__list_status",
      "mcp__sanctions-screener__explain_match"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__sanctions-screener__screen_name",
      "mcp__sanctions-screener__screen_batch",
      "mcp__sanctions-screener__audit_report"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as sanctions-screener. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__sanctions-screener__list_status private-data, untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/tech.noahsarch/sanctions-screener/verify?hash=f8b1f8d7cb508c41ebf55a0337ec03b2f204d856d0f9ced81765cd2b25a41cee" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash f8b1f8d7cb50, from Nov 13, 2026, 22:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/tech.noahsarch/sanctions-screener/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for tech.noahsarch/sanctions-screener
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/tech.noahsarch/sanctions-screener.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/tech.noahsarch/sanctions-screener)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 31, 2026, 23:17 UTC.

GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server have?

5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. screen_name, screen_batch, audit_report, list_status and explain_match.

Does the GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.