GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server
tech.noahsarch/sanctions-screenernoahsarch.techstreamable-httpv0.1.1Scanned
Screen names vs OFAC, UN, EU, UK and UAE terrorist lists with Arabic-aware matching.
5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server can do
The GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server is published by noahsarch.tech, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: screen_name, screen_batch and audit_report), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (list_status); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (list_status).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 0.1.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
audit_reportScreens 1–50 subjects and returns a self-contained HTML report (result.html): timestamp, each list with its version / fetched-at / SHA-256, the inputs, every hit with its explanati…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Screens 1–50 subjects and returns a self-contained HTML report (result.html): timestamp, each list with its version / fetched-at / SHA-256, the inputs, every hit with its explanation, and an explicit no-match statement for clear subjects — suitable for the client's AML file (open in a browser, print to PDF). One charge per report. Example: subjects [{name:'Qusay Saddam Hussein', dob:'1966'}], case_reference 'KYC-2026-0412', prepared_by 'MLRO'. Response: result plus data_confidence, estimated_items[], sources[] (official list pages), data_version (snapshot id), warnings[] (e.g. a list snapshot older than 7 days) and a disclaimer. Lists: ofac_sdn, ofac_cons, un, eu, uk, uae. Names are never logged; matching is deterministic (no AI) and runs offline against the bundled snapshot.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
screen_batchEach subject may carry dob, nationality, entity_type, id_number and your reference.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Each subject may carry dob, nationality, entity_type, id_number and your reference. Identical rows are screened once (charged once). Returns per-subject decision_hint, hit_count, top_score and the top 5 hits, plus summary counts (clear / review / likely_match). Charged per unique name. Example: subjects [{name:'Ali Kony', reference:'C-17'}, {name:'شركة الأمل للتجارة', entity_type:'entity'}], default_nationality 'AE'. Response: result plus data_confidence, estimated_items[], sources[] (official list pages), data_version (snapshot id), warnings[] (e.g. a list snapshot older than 7 days) and a disclaimer. Lists: ofac_sdn, ofac_cons, un, eu, uk, uae. Names are never logged; matching is deterministic (no AI) and runs offline against the bundled snapshot.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
screen_nameScreen a person, company, vessel or aircraft name against OFAC SDN + Consolidated, UN, EU, UK and the UAE Local Terrorist List.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Screen a person, company, vessel or aircraft name against OFAC SDN + Consolidated, UN, EU, UK and the UAE Local Terrorist List. Returns up to 20 hits sorted by score with list, listed_name, aliases_matched, score, match_strength (exact / strong / possible / weak), matched_on (which alias, which normalisation, DOB / nationality / type agreement), programs, listed_on, DOBs, nationalities, id_numbers, reference and source_url, plus decision_hint. Example: name 'Mohamed Hussein Al-Tikriti', dob '1966', nationality 'IQ', entity_type 'individual'. Response: result plus data_confidence, estimated_items[], sources[] (official list pages), data_version (snapshot id), warnings[] (e.g. a list snapshot older than 7 days) and a disclaimer. Lists: ofac_sdn, ofac_cons, un, eu, uk, uae. Names are never logged; matching is deterministic (no AI) and runs offline against the bundled snapshot.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
explain_matchNormalises both names step by step (Unicode, Arabic letter folding, honorifics/particles dropped, merged 'Abdul…' forms split, romanisation variants folded) and returns every score…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "explain_match" says "explain": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Normalises both names step by step (Unicode, Arabic letter folding, honorifics/particles dropped, merged 'Abdul…' forms split, romanisation variants folded) and returns every score component (token_sort, token_set, Jaro-Winkler, subset, or the cross-script skeleton) and the resulting score / strength. Free. Example: name_a 'Abd al-Rahman Al Shaikh', name_b 'عبدالرحمن الشيخ'. Response: result plus data_confidence, estimated_items[], sources[] (official list pages), data_version (snapshot id), warnings[] (e.g. a list snapshot older than 7 days) and a disclaimer. Lists: ofac_sdn, ofac_cons, un, eu, uk, uae. Names are never logged; matching is deterministic (no AI) and runs offline against the bundled snapshot.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
list_statusPer list: entries (individuals / entities / vessels / aircraft), aliases, fetched_at, days_since_fetch (stale flag when older than 7 days), official source URL and page, SHA-256 of…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_status" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "file": it reads files.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Per list: entries (individuals / entities / vessels / aircraft), aliases, fetched_at, days_since_fetch (stale flag when older than 7 days), official source URL and page, SHA-256 of the downloaded file, licence/terms, and any failures of the last refresh. Free. Call it before relying on a 'clear' result in a regulated process. Response: result plus data_confidence, estimated_items[], sources[] (official list pages), data_version (snapshot id), warnings[] (e.g. a list snapshot older than 7 days) and a disclaimer. Lists: ofac_sdn, ofac_cons, un, eu, uk, uae. Names are never logged; matching is deterministic (no AI) and runs offline against the bundled snapshot.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 31, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://screen.noahsarch.tech/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including screen_name (write), screen_batch (write), audit_report (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http sanctions-screener https://screen.noahsarch.tech/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http sanctions-screener https://screen.noahsarch.tech/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__sanctions-screener__list_status",
"mcp__sanctions-screener__explain_match"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__sanctions-screener__screen_name",
"mcp__sanctions-screener__screen_batch",
"mcp__sanctions-screener__audit_report"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as sanctions-screener. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__sanctions-screener__list_status private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/tech.noahsarch/sanctions-screener/verify?hash=f8b1f8d7cb508c41ebf55a0337ec03b2f204d856d0f9ced81765cd2b25a41cee" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash f8b1f8d7cb50, from Nov 13, 2026, 22:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/tech.noahsarch/sanctions-screener/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/tech.noahsarch/sanctions-screener)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 31, 2026, 23:17 UTC.
GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. screen_name, screen_batch, audit_report, list_status and explain_match.
Does the GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the GCC Sanctions & Terror-List Screener MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.