Skip to content

Backfill Fetch MCP server

top.backfill/backfill-fetchbackfill.topstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Pay-per-fetch web extraction for agents: POST a URL, get clean markdown. x402 USDC on Base.

2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 2
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Backfill Fetch MCP server can do

The Backfill Fetch MCP server is published by backfill.top, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: extract_data), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (fetch_page); 2 tools can send data out of your system (fetch_page and extract_data).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • extract_dataExtract structured data from a web page, returned as JSON matching a JSON Schema you supply, via Backfill Extract.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract structured data from a web page, returned as JSON matching a JSON Schema you supply, via Backfill Extract. The service fetches the URL (a plain fetch first, with escalation when the plain fetch returns a bot wall or a JavaScript shell) and extracts the data described by the schema. Extraction is always a paid call (x402, USDC on Base: $0.15 fresh, $0.05 for a cached result), so a call over MCP returns an error directing you to the paid HTTP API at POST https://backfill.top/v1/extract; payment is never attempted over MCP.
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • fetch_pageFetch a web page and return its readable content as clean markdown, via Backfill Fetch.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fetch_page" says "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch a web page and return its readable content as clean markdown, via Backfill Fetch. The service fetches the URL (a plain fetch first, with escalation when the plain fetch returns a bot wall or a JavaScript shell) and extracts the content. Calls are answered free when the fetch is free — a plain fetch inside the daily allowance, or a cache hit inside the free cache allowance. When serving the page would require payment (x402, USDC on Base), the call returns an error directing you to the paid HTTP API at POST https://backfill.top/v1/fetch; payment is never attempted over MCP.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:23 UTC, unchanged since Nov 3, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-03-26
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://backfill.top/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including extract_data (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http backfill-fetch https://backfill.top/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http backfill-fetch https://backfill.top/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__backfill-fetch__fetch_page",
      "mcp__backfill-fetch__extract_data"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as backfill-fetch. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__backfill-fetch__fetch_page untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__backfill-fetch__extract_data outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/top.backfill/backfill-fetch/verify?hash=3b89d31a321f518b00bf475ce5e77d919022c0cad388d01f600e51c6805f845d" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 3b89d31a321f, from Nov 15, 2026, 13:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/top.backfill/backfill-fetch/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for top.backfill/backfill-fetch
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/top.backfill/backfill-fetch.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/top.backfill/backfill-fetch)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 2, 2026, 09:18 UTC.

Backfill Fetch MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Backfill Fetch MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Backfill Fetch MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Backfill Fetch MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Backfill Fetch MCP server have?

2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. extract_data and fetch_page.

Does the Backfill Fetch MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Backfill Fetch MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): fetch_page and extract_data.

Has the Backfill Fetch MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.