Onyx AML MCP server
trade.onyxprotocol/onyx-amlonyxprotocol.tradestreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Crypto address risk checks for agents: USDT/USDC blacklists, sanctions, scam lists, poisoning
8 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 5 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Onyx AML MCP server can do
The Onyx AML MCP server is published by onyxprotocol.trade, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (onyx_payment_info) and create or change data (5 tools: onyx_screen_batch, onyx_preflight, onyx_trace, onyx_watch and 1 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (onyx_screen); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (onyx_decide); 1 tool can send data out of your system (onyx_watch). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
onyx_payment_infoMachine-readable payment terms: which asset and network to send, the address, prices per operation, and how to claim an API key from the address you paid from.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "onyx_payment_info" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Machine-readable payment terms: which asset and network to send, the address, prices per operation, and how to claim an API key from the address you paid from. No account or signup is involved. Free, and works without a key.
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
onyx_balanceHow much credit your API key has left, and the current prices.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it How much credit your API key has left, and the current prices. Free.
onyx_preflightOperational safety check for a payment, separate from risk screening.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Operational safety check for a payment, separate from risk screening. Detects address poisoning (a lookalike planted in your history so it gets copied instead of the real address), burn addresses, token contracts and other contract recipients that would swallow the tokens (a Safe multisig or an EIP-7702 delegated wallet is reported as a wallet, not a trap), and addresses that behave differently on different chains. Pass known_addresses (the counterparties you already use) to enable poisoning detection. Verdicts: stop, caution, clear, or unknown: on EVM chains the recipient check could not run (retry, not charged); on TRON and Solana only the lookalike check exists (partial: true) and known_addresses is required. In our live-traffic sample this class of loss came up far more often than sanctioned counterparties. Dedicated transaction-security services cover part of it; no AML screening does. Run this together with onyx_decide before every payment.
onyx_screen_batchScreen up to 50 addresses in a single call, for example before a mass payout.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Screen up to 50 addresses in a single call, for example before a mass payout. Priced per address, and only addresses actually screened are charged. Each result carries facts_complete so you can tell whether the behavioural facts finished loading.
onyx_traceMulti-hop trace of outgoing flows from an address, with attribution where a node is known (exchange labels, deposit addresses).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Multi-hop trace of outgoing flows from an address, with attribution where a node is known (exchange labels, deposit addresses). Use it to establish provenance after receiving funds. Costs more than a screening call.
onyx_watchSubscribe to an address.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "subscribe": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.callback_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Subscribe to an address. When it enters an issuer blacklist, a sanctions list or a scam database, we POST a signed event to your callback URL. A one-off check cannot warn you about a freeze that has not happened yet. Billed per address per day. The callback must be public https.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
onyx_decideReturn allow / review / deny for a counterparty address against your own risk policy, with the reasons named.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Return allow / review / deny for a counterparty address against your own risk policy, with the reasons named. Use this before every outbound transfer. Checks issuer blacklists (USDT, USDC), sanctions across six EVM chains plus the OFAC list, open scam databases, community reports and behavioural patterns. Costs credit.
onyx_screenReturn the raw risk markers for one address: risk zone, issuer blacklists, sanctions coverage, scam databases, community reports, address age, balance and exchange attribution wher…Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "database": it reads databases.
Description, as the server wrote it Return the raw risk markers for one address: risk zone, issuer blacklists, sanctions coverage, scam databases, community reports, address age, balance and exchange attribution where known. Use this when you want the facts rather than a decision. Costs credit.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
1 path in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__onyx-aml__onyx_watch"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:19 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 6
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://onyxprotocol.trade/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including onyx_payment_info (irreversible), onyx_screen_batch (write), onyx_preflight (write), onyx_trace (write), onyx_watch (write) and 1 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:onyx_preflightChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:onyx_preflightChanges thingsdescription
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http onyx-aml https://onyxprotocol.trade/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http onyx-aml https://onyxprotocol.trade/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__onyx-aml__onyx_decide",
"mcp__onyx-aml__onyx_screen"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__onyx-aml__onyx_screen_batch",
"mcp__onyx-aml__onyx_preflight",
"mcp__onyx-aml__onyx_trace",
"mcp__onyx-aml__onyx_watch",
"mcp__onyx-aml__onyx_balance",
"mcp__onyx-aml__onyx_payment_info"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as onyx-aml. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__onyx-aml__onyx_decide untrusted-input
- mcp__onyx-aml__onyx_screen private-data
- mcp__onyx-aml__onyx_watch outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/trade.onyxprotocol/onyx-aml/verify?hash=663c48f04061333546a4a31224bb226022a7bef8d67708f6122e1acd2cec547c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 663c48f04061, from Nov 19, 2026, 08:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/trade.onyxprotocol/onyx-aml/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/trade.onyxprotocol/onyx-aml)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:55 UTC.
Onyx AML MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Onyx AML MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Onyx AML MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Onyx AML MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: onyx_payment_info.
What tools does the Onyx AML MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 1 irreversible, 5 write, 2 read. onyx_payment_info, onyx_screen_batch, onyx_preflight, onyx_trace, onyx_watch, onyx_balance, onyx_decide and onyx_screen.
Does the Onyx AML MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Onyx AML MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): onyx_watch.
Has the Onyx AML MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 19, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.