Pitch Protocol MCP server
vc.pitchprotocol/founderpitchprotocol.vcstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
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7 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 2 do something that can't be undone, 2 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 5
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things and 2 do something that can't be undone. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Pitch Protocol MCP server can do
The Pitch Protocol MCP server is published by pitchprotocol.vc, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: submit_answers), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (verify_email and resend_verification) and create or change data (2 tools: create_application and update_application). 2 tools only read.
5 tools bring in text other people can write (verify_email, create_application, submit_answers and 2 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (resend_verification).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
7 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
submit_answersSave the founder's answers to the intake questions.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_answers" says "submit": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Save the founder's answers to the intake questions. Upsert semantics with an explicit commit flag. **When:** `status == "intake"`, after research generates the questions. Read them from `get_status` → `intake.questions`. **Before you call:** - READ the questions to the founder verbatim. Ask only the question `text` — do not volunteer or invent any internal rationale for why we ask. - Collect answers conversationally; don't make them answer all five at once if they'd rather talk through them. - If `finalize: true`: show every answer back to the founder for confirmation first. This is one-way — after finalize they can't edit. - If `finalize: false` (autosave): no confirmation needed. **Answers shape:** array of `{questionId, answer}` objects. Only include question ids that were in the `get_status` response — other ids are rejected. **Upsert rules:** - Answers with matching `questionId` overwrite. - Prior answers for ids NOT in this batch are KEPT. - So you can save Q1 + Q2 in one call, Q3-Q5 in another, then commit with `finalize: true` + empty `answers: []` at the end. **On error:** - `unknown questionIds` — check spelling / the id list from `get_status`. - `missing required` — on `finalize: true`, every `priority=required` must have an answer. Error lists which are missing. - `alreadyAnswered` — you called finalize twice. Status is `submitted`; no more edits. - Wrong status — not in `intake` yet (still researching) or already past it.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Submit answers
Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
resend_verificationIssue a fresh 6-digit verification code.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "resend_verification" says "resend": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe name "resend_verification" says "resend": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Issue a fresh 6-digit verification code. Supersedes any prior unconsumed code. **When:** founder didn't receive the first code, the code expired, or too many wrong attempts invalidated it. **Before you call:** nothing. Safe to call multiple times (rate-limited). **Returns:** confirmation the new code was emailed (in dev: the code itself). **On error:** - Rate-limited — the error tells you how many seconds to wait. Don't spam. - Already verified — status already past `draft`. Nothing to resend. Call `get_status` to confirm the current state.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Resend verification code
verify_emailConsume the 6-digit code the founder received and start the research pipeline.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description says "irreversible".
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Consume the 6-digit code the founder received and start the research pipeline. **When:** after `create_application`, and ideally after the deck has been uploaded over plain HTTP (see the `curl` printed by `create_application`). Founder has read the code from their inbox. **Before you call:** - CONFIRM you have the right code from the founder (not guessing, not stale). Once this succeeds, research starts and is irreversible. - If deck parsing is still pending, that's fine — research auto-defers and dispatches when the deck resolves. Don't wait, don't re-verify. **Returns:** `status: researching` + whether research was dispatched now or deferred on the deck. **On error:** - `wrong code` — response includes attempts-remaining. Ask the founder to check their inbox again. If the error says the code is invalidated, call `resend_verification` for a new one. - `no active code` — they never received one, or it expired. Call `resend_verification`. - Already verified — idempotent success; returns current status. Don't retry in a loop.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Verify email
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
create_applicationCreate a new pitch application draft and send a 6-digit verification code to `contactEmail`.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "create_application" says "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a new pitch application draft and send a 6-digit verification code to `contactEmail`. **When:** once you have a complete payload (research + deck + founder confirmed). One per conversation with a given founder. **Before you call:** 1. `get_application_schema` — know the fields, limits, enums. 2. Get the founder's source material — deck, memo, one-pager, website, or even a few sentences — and READ/parse it yourself (plus web search) to fill the payload. The deck is an input you read, not a file to upload. 3. Ask the founder for anything you can't find or confirm. Don't fabricate — leave gaps and ask. 4. Show the assembled payload to the founder for review before submitting. **Returns:** `applicationId` — required for every subsequent tool call — plus `codeSent` and (in dev) `devCode`. **Next:** ask the founder for the 6-digit code and call `verify_email`.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Create application
update_applicationUpdate an application's payload and/or contact email while it's still in `draft`.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "update_application" says "update": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Update an application's payload and/or contact email while it's still in `draft`. **When:** founder caught something wrong after `create_application` but before `verify_email`. Also when changing the email address. **Before you call:** - Full-replace on payload: send the WHOLE `PitchApplication` object, not a patch. Read current values from `get_status` if you don't have them. - Email change resets verification: `emailVerified` goes back to false and a fresh code is sent to the NEW address. Let the founder know. **Returns:** the fresh `StatusView` — markdown by default, JSON if `responseFormat: "json"`. Same shape as `get_status`. **On error:** - `notEditable` — status is past `draft`. Nothing to update; state is locked. Read `get_status` to understand where you are. - Validation failed — payload doesn't satisfy the schema. Fix per the error message and retry.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Update application
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_application_schemaThe authoritative field reference for the `PitchApplication` payload.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_application_schema" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The authoritative field reference for the `PitchApplication` payload. **When:** call this FIRST in every session. Cache the response. **Before you call:** nothing — no inputs. **Returns:** markdown listing every field, type, limit, enum, plus a complete valid example. With this in context, you can assemble a payload that validates on the first `create_application`.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
- title: Application schema
get_statusThe primary status endpoint.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_status" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The primary status endpoint. Returns the full current state of an application: status, email verification, deck state, intake questions (when ready), and a `nextAction` string. **While research runs (`status == "researching"`) — read this:** This call WAITS server-side. It holds for up to ~45 seconds and returns the instant research finishes (or after ~45s if nothing has changed yet). You do NOT sleep or set timers yourself — you just call it again. Research usually completes within a handful of these blocking calls (~5–10 min total). Between calls, give the founder a short "still researching…" note so they're not left wondering — but do NOT ask permission to keep checking, and do NOT hand control back as if it failed. Keep calling until `status` leaves `researching`. In all other states (`draft`, `intake`, `submitted`, `failed`, `withdrawn`) this returns immediately and `nextAction` is the founder-facing instruction — read it to them verbatim and act on their reply. **When to call:** - After `verify_email` — call again and again until status leaves `researching`. - When the founder asks for an update. - To read intake questions when `status == "intake"`. **Before you call:** nothing. **Returns:** markdown by default. Use `responseFormat: "json"` when you need to branch programmatically on `status` / `deck.state`. **On error:** `notFound` if the applicationId is wrong. Otherwise safe to call repeatedly.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
- title: Application status
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write5
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 18, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (1 destructive, 2 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.pitchprotocol.vc/mcp/founder?ppr=ppc_mcpregistry: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including submit_answers (destructive), resend_verification (irreversible), verify_email (irreversible), create_application (write), update_application (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http founder https://api.pitchprotocol.vc/mcp/founder?ppr=ppc_mcpregistryclaude mcp add --transport http founder https://api.pitchprotocol.vc/mcp/founder?ppr=ppc_mcpregistryRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__founder__get_status",
"mcp__founder__get_application_schema"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__founder__verify_email",
"mcp__founder__create_application",
"mcp__founder__update_application",
"mcp__founder__resend_verification"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__founder__submit_answers"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as founder. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__founder__verify_email untrusted-input
- mcp__founder__create_application untrusted-input
- mcp__founder__submit_answers untrusted-input
- mcp__founder__update_application untrusted-input
- mcp__founder__resend_verification untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/vc.pitchprotocol/founder/verify?hash=83cc005db0032fc5850ad7805b1b4bda69fa1291ed982dae2fce7bec2ff866e1" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 83cc005db003, from Nov 17, 2026, 17:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/vc.pitchprotocol/founder/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/vc.pitchprotocol/founder)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 17, 2026, 17:18 UTC.
Pitch Protocol MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Pitch Protocol MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Pitch Protocol MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: submit_answers.
Can the Pitch Protocol MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: verify_email and resend_verification.
What tools does the Pitch Protocol MCP server have?
- 7 tools: 1 destructive, 2 irreversible, 2 write, 2 read. submit_answers, verify_email, resend_verification, create_application, update_application, get_status and get_application_schema.
Does the Pitch Protocol MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Pitch Protocol MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): resend_verification.
Has the Pitch Protocol MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.