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monitor MCP server

work.agentexchange.tooldrift/monitortooldrift.agentexchange.workstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Check if an MCP server tool changed or hides injection patterns before you trust it.

3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

1 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the monitor MCP server can do

The monitor MCP server is published by tooldrift.agentexchange.work, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: check_mcp_server), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool can send data out of your system (check_mcp_server).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Last scanned Oct 21, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • check_mcp_serverCheck whether an MCP server's tools have changed since they were first recorded, and whether any tool description contains prompt-injection or data-exfiltration patterns.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether an MCP server's tools have changed since they were first recorded, and whether any tool description contains prompt-injection or data-exfiltration patterns. Call this BEFORE trusting a newly added or recently updated MCP server. Returns a verdict of clean or REVIEW_BEFORE_USE.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_drift_feedList MCP tools across the public ecosystem whose definitions recently changed, newest first.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_drift_feed" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List MCP tools across the public ecosystem whose definitions recently changed, newest first. Use to see whether a dependency mutated.
  • get_findingsList tools whose descriptions contain detected injection, concealment, or exfiltration patterns.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_findings" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List tools whose descriptions contain detected injection, concealment, or exfiltration patterns. Filter by severity: critical, high, medium, low.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:31 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
410
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 410.

Posture changes

  1. Nov 20, 2026
    • Reachable: no to yes
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 410
  2. Oct 29, 2026
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: no -> yes; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none -> 410.View diff
    • Reachable: no to yes
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 410
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 2 more).View diff
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http monitor https://tooldrift.agentexchange.work/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http monitor https://tooldrift.agentexchange.work/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__monitor__get_drift_feed",
      "mcp__monitor__get_findings"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__monitor__check_mcp_server"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as monitor. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__monitor__check_mcp_server outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/work.agentexchange.tooldrift/monitor/verify?hash=31fd80b625b926422d31f263dfca6a9d0fcc5cef026ae511f795a61177887459" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 31fd80b625b9, from Oct 21, 2026, 19:32 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/work.agentexchange.tooldrift/monitor/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for work.agentexchange.tooldrift/monitor
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/work.agentexchange.tooldrift/monitor.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/work.agentexchange.tooldrift/monitor)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 05:18 UTC.

monitor MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the monitor MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the monitor MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the monitor MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the monitor MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. check_mcp_server, get_drift_feed and get_findings.

Does the monitor MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the monitor MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_mcp_server.

Has the monitor MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Oct 21, 2026.