dutiful MCP server
work.dutiful/dutifuldutiful.workstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Cited company background reports for agents from official registries. $3 per report via x402.
3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the dutiful MCP server can do
The dutiful MCP server is published by dutiful.work, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: check_coverage and create_order), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (check_coverage and create_order).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
check_coverageFree.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Searches the official company register of the given country for the company name and returns the matching entities (idx, registry reference, name, address), an order id, and what a report covers. Nothing is charged. Supported country codes: GB, FR, NO, FI, CZ, EE, SK, LV, IL, CA, CY, US (CA: federal corporations only; US: SEC reporting companies only).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
create_orderSelects one entity from the check_coverage results (idx, starting at 0) and returns the x402 payment requirements for a report (USDC on Base, exact amount in the requirements).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "create_order" says "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Selects one entity from the check_coverage results (idx, starting at 0) and returns the x402 payment requirements for a report (USDC on Base, exact amount in the requirements). This tool does not pay. To pay, send the signed payment in a PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header to the returned pay_url, then read the report with get_report.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
get_reportReturns the status of an order and, once delivered, the report (structured JSON and plain text).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_report" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns the status of an order and, once delivered, the report (structured JSON and plain text). Status values: pending_entity, pending_payment, paid, delivered. An unpaid order returns its payment requirements.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 26, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://dutiful.work/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including check_coverage (write), create_order (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http dutiful https://dutiful.work/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http dutiful https://dutiful.work/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__dutiful__get_report"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__dutiful__check_coverage",
"mcp__dutiful__create_order"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as dutiful. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__dutiful__check_coverage untrusted-input
- mcp__dutiful__create_order untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/work.dutiful/dutiful/verify?hash=4c311eb5d1bae64b151db1f874844a1b9683ed58470b4f42225d475a38c3302c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 4c311eb5d1ba, from Nov 9, 2026, 10:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/work.dutiful/dutiful/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/work.dutiful/dutiful)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 26, 2026, 12:18 UTC.
dutiful MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the dutiful MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the dutiful MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the dutiful MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the dutiful MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. check_coverage, create_order and get_report.
Does the dutiful MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the dutiful MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the dutiful MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.