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person.work — Agent-maintained CV MCP server

work.person/career-recordperson.workstreamable-httpv0.7.0Scanned

Maintain your CV with your agent. Review changes, then share one record as web, PDF and open data.

4 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the person.work — Agent-maintained CV MCP server can do

The person.work — Agent-maintained CV MCP server is published by person.work, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: sync_my_profile) and create or change data (1 tool: propose_my_career_change). 2 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 0.7.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • sync_my_profileExplicit initial-import operation for structured facts already interpreted by the calling agent.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "sync_my_profile" says "sync": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Explicit initial-import operation for structured facts already interpreted by the calling agent. It does not accept or store a raw CV, PDF, or source text, and person.work does not run a second AI interpretation. The operation deterministically validates the payload and atomically creates a private profile when needed or replaces the owner's profile facts and complete experience list. Experiences may include a public HTTPS company_logo_url; person.work imports a protected copy. Use null to remove a logo and omit the field to preserve it. Identity is required only for first creation. Never use this for routine updates.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • propose_my_career_changeAdds a structured, human-readable diff to the owner's review inbox.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "add": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Adds a structured, human-readable diff to the owner's review inbox. Experience upserts may include a public HTTPS company_logo_url; person.work imports its own protected copy only after owner approval. Use this for normal maintenance after the initial import; the agent cannot apply or publish it.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_my_career_recordReturns the OAuth-authenticated owner's canonical record.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_my_career_record" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the OAuth-authenticated owner's canonical record. Read this before proposing an ongoing CV update so stable experience identifiers and confirmed facts are preserved.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_profileReturns one public Career Record whose owner explicitly enabled MCP visibility.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_profile" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns one public Career Record whose owner explicitly enabled MCP visibility. Contact values are excluded.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:20 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://person.work/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp
Authorization servers
https://ekgcdubapswckxdgxgei.supabase.co/auth/v1
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://person.work/api/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including sync_my_profile (destructive), propose_my_career_change (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.7.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http career-record https://person.work/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http career-record https://person.work/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__career-record__get_profile",
      "mcp__career-record__get_my_career_record"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__career-record__propose_my_career_change"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__career-record__sync_my_profile"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as career-record. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/work.person/career-record/verify?hash=e02a21d7c97dbe89d5a5be0f6c0bf8acd5687ad5c5477fc5c10ce5a9b11877f4" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e02a21d7c97d, from Nov 19, 2026, 12:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/work.person/career-record/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for work.person/career-record
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/work.person/career-record.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/work.person/career-record)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:55 UTC.

person.work — Agent-maintained CV MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the person.work — Agent-maintained CV MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the person.work — Agent-maintained CV MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: sync_my_profile.

Can the person.work — Agent-maintained CV MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the person.work — Agent-maintained CV MCP server have?

4 tools: 1 destructive, 1 write, 2 read. sync_my_profile, propose_my_career_change, get_profile and get_my_career_record.

Does the person.work — Agent-maintained CV MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the person.work — Agent-maintained CV MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the person.work — Agent-maintained CV MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.