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agent-gateway MCP server

works.relux/agent-gatewayrelux.worksstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Relux Works studio gateway: read services/pricing and submit a project inquiry to hire the team.

2 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things and 1 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the agent-gateway MCP server can do

The agent-gateway MCP server is published by relux.works, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: request_project_quote). 1 tool only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (request_project_quote).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • request_project_quoteCreates and immediately sends an external project inquiry to a private Relux Works Telegram chat for human review.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "request_project_quote" says "request": a word for a change.
    • The input addresses people (input.reply_contact.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Creates and immediately sends an external project inquiry to a private Relux Works Telegram chat for human review. Do not call it to test the connector or demonstrate MCP. Build the summary from known conversation context, ask only for missing details, obtain a real user-provided or user-confirmed reply route to the decision maker or an accountable relay agent, and show the complete draft including that route. Before calling, provide https://relux.works/en/privacy-policy/ and obtain explicit user consent. Never invent or infer contact details. The current MCP chat is not a reply route. A human replies within one business day with a recommended package and a fixed-price quote.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Request a project quote
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_services_pricingReturns Relux Works services, fixed-price packages, company facts, selected work, supported languages, and market-specific planning prices.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_services_pricing" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns Relux Works services, fixed-price packages, company facts, selected work, supported languages, and market-specific planning prices. Tool and service identifiers remain in English.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get services and pricing
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:21 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://api.relux.works/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
https://api.relux.works
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 destructive). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.relux.works/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including request_project_quote (destructive)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agent-gateway https://api.relux.works/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agent-gateway https://api.relux.works/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agent-gateway__get_services_pricing"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__agent-gateway__request_project_quote"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-gateway. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__agent-gateway__request_project_quote untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/works.relux/agent-gateway/verify?hash=ee1ac3baa2b433fefb272eb7629db809f9cf1956ee662ed1080b72c914964e63" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash ee1ac3baa2b4, from Nov 19, 2026, 12:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/works.relux/agent-gateway/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for works.relux/agent-gateway
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/works.relux/agent-gateway.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/works.relux/agent-gateway)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:55 UTC.

agent-gateway MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the agent-gateway MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the agent-gateway MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: request_project_quote.

Can the agent-gateway MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the agent-gateway MCP server have?

2 tools: 1 destructive, 1 read. request_project_quote and get_services_pricing.

Does the agent-gateway MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the agent-gateway MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the agent-gateway MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.