BlazePhoenix on-chain DEX aggregator MCP server
xyz.blazephoenix/mcpblazephoenix.xyzstreamable-httpv2.0.1Scanned
On-chain DEX aggregator: quotes and verified swap calldata computed on your own RPC. No API key.
4 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 1
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the BlazePhoenix on-chain DEX aggregator MCP server can do
The BlazePhoenix on-chain DEX aggregator MCP server is published by blazephoenix.xyz, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (prepare_quote) and create or change data (1 tool: decode_quote), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
1 tool can send data out of your system (prepare_quote).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 2.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
prepare_quotePrepare an on-chain BlazePhoenix quote to run on YOUR OWN RPC.Can send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.recipient): what the tool writes goes there.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "prepare_quote" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input addresses people (input.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Prepare an on-chain BlazePhoenix quote to run on YOUR OWN RPC. Returns the exact eth_call (Quoter address + calldata, as a ready JSON-RPC request and a curl line) plus a `request` object. Run the call on your node, then pass `request` and the result hex to decode_quote. This server performs no RPC.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Prepare an on-chain quote
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
decode_quoteDecode the eth_call result YOUR node returned for a prepare_quote call: net output after the 0.28% fee, price impact, the Phoenix Check verdict (ok / caution / danger / blocked — f…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Decode the eth_call result YOUR node returned for a prepare_quote call: net output after the 0.28% fee, price impact, the Phoenix Check verdict (ok / caution / danger / blocked — fails closed) and, in preview mode, the on-chain floor the Quoter reports for the route (ironFloor, effectiveMinOut). With a recipient and a userMinOut, it also returns unsigned calldata verified against the request, whose minimum output is the higher of your userMinOut and the quoted net output less slippageBps, never under the on-chain floor (exact mode: exactly your userMinOut; a recipient without a usable userMinOut returns a txError instead). The calldata clears the swap math, not the token transfer: before sending, simulate it as an eth_call to the Router from the paying address. Pure computation: it cannot authenticate your node's answer.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Decode a quote result
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_abiThe JSON ABI of one BlazePhoenix contract, generated from the Solidity sources, with the source revision it was built from.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_abi" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The JSON ABI of one BlazePhoenix contract, generated from the Solidity sources, with the source revision it was built from. Use it to encode your own calls to the addresses get_deployments returns, or pass `errors` to decode a revert reason from a failed swap or quote. Returns { contract, revision, abi }; an unknown name returns ok:false with the accepted list. Pure lookup, no RPC.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Contract ABI
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_deploymentsThe versioned BlazePhoenix deployment registry: Core, Hub, Solver, Quoter and Router addresses per chain and protocol version, each version with its status, and the version each ch…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_deployments" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The versioned BlazePhoenix deployment registry: Core, Hub, Solver, Quoter and Router addresses per chain and protocol version, each version with its status, and the version each chain resolves to as latest (`active`: the newest non-deprecated version deployed on that chain).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Deployment registry
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:21 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://blazephoenix.xyz/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including prepare_quote (irreversible), decode_quote (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnprepare_quote
The server marks "prepare_quote" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The input addresses people (input.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:decode_quoteChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:get_deploymentsOnly readsdescription
- Changed:prepare_quoteCan't be undoneinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 2.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http blazephoenix https://blazephoenix.xyz/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http blazephoenix https://blazephoenix.xyz/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__blazephoenix__get_deployments",
"mcp__blazephoenix__get_abi"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__blazephoenix__prepare_quote",
"mcp__blazephoenix__decode_quote"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as blazephoenix. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__blazephoenix__prepare_quote outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/xyz.blazephoenix/mcp/verify?hash=74f039a9641130336e889f9f6bcb09c90c56166af9909debd16bdebe2c8f6e6f" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 74f039a96411, from Nov 19, 2026, 12:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/xyz.blazephoenix/mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/xyz.blazephoenix/mcp)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:55 UTC.
BlazePhoenix on-chain DEX aggregator MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the BlazePhoenix on-chain DEX aggregator MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the BlazePhoenix on-chain DEX aggregator MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the BlazePhoenix on-chain DEX aggregator MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: prepare_quote.
What tools does the BlazePhoenix on-chain DEX aggregator MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 1 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read. prepare_quote, decode_quote, get_deployments and get_abi.
Does the BlazePhoenix on-chain DEX aggregator MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the BlazePhoenix on-chain DEX aggregator MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): prepare_quote.
Has the BlazePhoenix on-chain DEX aggregator MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 19, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.