gardenpatch MCP server
xyz.gardenpatch/gardenpatchgardenpatch.xyzstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Paid per call over x402: growth coaches, small utilities and real-world actions. USDC on Base.
9 tools: 4 change things and 5 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the gardenpatch MCP server can do
The gardenpatch MCP server is published by gardenpatch.xyz, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 9 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: sandbox_call, call_coach, call_action and call_tool), but cannot delete data. 5 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
9 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
call_actionPaid.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "call_action" says "call": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid. HAS A REAL-WORLD SIDE EFFECT: it puts a message in front of an actual person. Requires a consent block stating how and when that person agreed to be contacted. There is no sandbox for this — a simulated send cannot be told apart from a real one. Retries are safe with the same idempotency key; a new key means a genuine second send.
call_coachPaid, from $0.18 per call, settled in USDC on Base over x402.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "call_coach" says "call": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid, from $0.18 per call, settled in USDC on Base over x402. Returns a growth diagnosis, the arithmetic behind it, concrete actions, and a typed deliverable. Without payment this returns the payment requirements as a structured error you can settle and retry. Try sandbox_call first if you only need to see the shape.
call_toolPaid, from $0.01 per call, settled in USDC on Base over x402.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "call_tool" says "call": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid, from $0.01 per call, settled in USDC on Base over x402. Runs one utility and returns its result. Tools contact no one and store nothing; website signals and image resize read only the one public URL you name. A request refused for its input is never charged.
sandbox_callFree, and no wallet needed.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "sandbox_call" says "call": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Free, and no wallet needed. Returns a schema-valid sample response for a mode: same envelope, same field names, same deliverable shape as a paid call. It is a fixed sample for the mode, not an answer to your input — that is what makes it free. Build your integration against this first.
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
get_receiptFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_receipt" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. Returns a call you already paid for: amount, mode, usage, and the deliverable again. Only the wallet that paid can read it, and only while the receipt has not expired.
get_schemaFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_schema" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. The published request or response JSON Schema for one mode or one action. Use it to build a request you know will validate before you pay for it.
list_actionsFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_actions" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. The catalog of paid real-world side effects, such as sending a review request. An action does something rather than returning advice, so it carries consent rules a coach call does not.
list_coachesFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_coaches" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. The catalog of 7 growth coaches, the 16 modes they sell, and the current price of each. Call this first — it is generated from the same registry the paid endpoint validates against, so it is never stale.
list_toolsFree.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_tools" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Free. The catalog of 6 small paid utilities (QR codes, time zone conversion, Markdown to HTML, calendar .ics files, website growth signals, image resize) with each one's price, request schema and a worked example. One endpoint, one job, one payment.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 23, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://gardenpatch.xyz/mcp: tools/list returned 9 tools to an anonymous client, including sandbox_call (write), call_coach (write), call_action (write), call_tool (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:call_toolChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:list_toolsOnly readsdescription
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http gardenpatch https://gardenpatch.xyz/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http gardenpatch https://gardenpatch.xyz/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__gardenpatch__list_coaches",
"mcp__gardenpatch__list_actions",
"mcp__gardenpatch__list_tools",
"mcp__gardenpatch__get_schema",
"mcp__gardenpatch__get_receipt"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__gardenpatch__sandbox_call",
"mcp__gardenpatch__call_coach",
"mcp__gardenpatch__call_action",
"mcp__gardenpatch__call_tool"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as gardenpatch. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/xyz.gardenpatch/gardenpatch/verify?hash=46994453378be52fa6247b71bf87d00a0da476e6e972bce77f0aa66fde7d4dd6" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 46994453378b, from Nov 8, 2026, 16:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/xyz.gardenpatch/gardenpatch/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/xyz.gardenpatch/gardenpatch)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 22, 2026, 16:18 UTC.
gardenpatch MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the gardenpatch MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 9 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the gardenpatch MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the gardenpatch MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the gardenpatch MCP server have?
- 9 tools: 4 write, 5 read. sandbox_call, call_coach, call_action, call_tool, list_coaches, list_actions, list_tools, get_schema and 1 more.
Does the gardenpatch MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the gardenpatch MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the gardenpatch MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 8, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.