ava MCP server
xyz.getava/avagetava.xyzstreamable-httpv0.5.1Scanned
Coding agents run multi-leg cross-chain DeFi. Legs re-derived from your sentence before signing.
15 tools: 10 change things and 5 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 4 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
10 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the ava MCP server can do
The ava MCP server is published by getava.xyz, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 15 tools. It can create or change data (10 tools: ava_copilot_turn, ava_approve_execute, ava_lend_execute, ava_portfolio and 6 more), but cannot delete data. 5 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 4 findings (credentials-mention and tool-shadowing). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 0.5.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
15 tools
Changes things 10Claude Code: ask
ava_approve_executeHuman-in-the-loop approve: the one call that actually settles a plan from ava_copilot_turn.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "ava_approve_execute" says "approve": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Human-in-the-loop approve: the one call that actually settles a plan from ava_copilot_turn. It is gated by the bound mandate's status and constraints and by server-side policy limits, and it CAN REFUSE (e.g. mandate paused/cancelled, a policy violation, a stale preview hash); a refusal means no funds moved and no success receipt was written, only a refusal record. Testnet mode settles against simulated balances and returns a receipt + before/after balances, never a real chain. Mainnet mode signs with the caller's own Turnkey wallet and submits for real where a venue is live, and fails closed everywhere else, so it never claims a fill it cannot show. Call ava_list_venues for which routes are live rather than assuming; that tool reads the same registry this one enforces, so it cannot drift from what will actually execute. NEVER call without explicit user confirmation of the previewed quote.
ava_copilot_turnNatural-language copilot turn: message → intent → plan → testnet quote.2 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.agentId.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.agentId.description: "...t id; uses a default testnet-scoped KYA credential when full agentCredential is omitted."
- Info
The input schema at properties.agentCredential.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.agentCredential.description: "Optional ava.kya.agent-credential.v1 object for KYA evaluation."
Description, as the server wrote it Natural-language copilot turn: message → intent → plan → testnet quote. Example: Swap 10 USDC to SUI on sui with 50 bps slip. Returns actions with approve_execute + executionId. Optional agentId/agentCredential for KYA gate (fail closed on reject). Does NOT fill until ava_approve_execute.
ava_create_agentRegister an agent instance under userId, before it has a wallet or a mandate.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "ava_create_agent" says "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Register an agent instance under userId, before it has a wallet or a mandate. Mode A (multi-agent): agentId=byo-external + label (e.g. claude-workspace, cursor-arb) for a coding agent that already exists elsewhere. Mode B (hosted): agentId=defi-lend|defi-swap|defi-perp|portfolio hires an Ava-run agent. One userId may own many agent instances; this call alone never touches funds.
ava_create_mandateCreate a capital mandate: the objective, capital and constraints an agent is allowed to act under, optionally scoped to an agentInstanceId.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "ava_create_mandate" says "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a capital mandate: the objective, capital and constraints an agent is allowed to act under, optionally scoped to an agentInstanceId. Example: "Earn on 500 USDC on Base, max 5% drawdown". Or pass structured capital {asset,amount,chain}. Creating a mandate moves no money by itself and is not yet signed by an external wallet: it is Ava's own record of what was asked for, not a user-authorised instruction a stranger can rely on. Every later ava_approve_execute run under this mandate is gated on its status (active/paused/cancelled) and constraints, and can refuse.
ava_lend_executeExecute a REAL lend against one of your mandates.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "ava_lend_execute" says "execute": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Execute a REAL lend against one of your mandates. Routes Ava has already settled a mainnet transaction on: Morpho Blue on Base, and Aave v3 on Monad, BNB Chain and Avalanche. Aave v3 on Arbitrum One is wired through the identical pipeline and address-verified, but nothing has ever settled there, so do not describe it as proven. Aave v3 on Optimism and Base, and Compound v3 on Base and Arbitrum, are wired and address-verified but operator-disabled until each settles a real transaction, so calls on those routes refuse at the capability gate. This is the only MCP tool that moves live capital. Two-phase by design: call it once WITHOUT previewHash to receive the exact artifact a human must approve plus its hash, show that to the human, then call again WITH that previewHash. Your call is never treated as the human's confirmation, because you are not the person whose money moves. Only a settlement verified against the venue's own on-chain event returns a txHash; anything else has no txHash field at all, so a draft can never be narrated as a fill.
ava_plan_standingTurn a request for REPEATED autonomous action into an envelope of bounds the user signs once.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Turn a request for REPEATED autonomous action into an envelope of bounds the user signs once. Use this instead of ava_plan_workflow when the request describes a cadence: "every hour, rotate my USDC into the best yield on Base using Aave and Morpho, never move more than 200 per rotation, never exceed 1000 total, stop after 30 days". Asking a human to approve each rotation would defeat the point, so the user authorizes LIMITS rather than a plan: allowed operations, venues, chains, per-move and cumulative caps, a minimum gain that stops the agent churning capital for fees, an expiry, and revocation. Every bound must come from the user: anything missing is returned in `missing` and the envelope is NOT signable until supplied. minGainBps is required from you because users say "the best yield" rather than a basis-point floor, and Ava must not choose how much of their money goes to gas. Returns the envelope unsigned; nothing is authorized until the user signs it.
ava_plan_workflowTurn ONE natural-language DeFi request into the dependent actions it actually contains, across one chain or several.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Turn ONE natural-language DeFi request into the dependent actions it actually contains, across one chain or several. Example: "Supply 300 USDC to Morpho on Base, bridge no more than 200 to Avalanche, then supply what arrives to Aave" returns three legs with the third depending on the second and taking its amount from what the bridge actually delivered, not a plan-time guess. Same-chain works identically: "swap 100 USDC to WETH on Base then supply the WETH to Aave" records the swap OUTPUT token so the second leg is denominated in WETH. Plans nothing it cannot execute: a clause naming an unsupported operation, an unnamed venue, a zero or negative amount, or one amount split across venues comes back in `unsupported` with a reason rather than being guessed at. Signs nothing and moves nothing. Every leg reports `executable` so you can see what Ava could actually run today.
ava_portfolioSimulated testnet portfolio for a userId (same data as GET /v1/portfolio): seeded balances, fills, optional portal.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Simulated testnet portfolio for a userId (same data as GET /v1/portfolio): seeded balances, fills, optional portal. Requires userId. Does not invent live chain balances.
ava_provision_walletProvision a Turnkey-custodied wallet address for this userId, scoped to one chain family (evm | solana | sui).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Provision a Turnkey-custodied wallet address for this userId, scoped to one chain family (evm | solana | sui). Requires ava_session first. Returns the address for funding and later signing; it does not fund the wallet and does not move any money. If Turnkey is not configured server-side, the wallet comes back with status pending_provision rather than a fabricated active address, and cannot sign or hold funds until it is active.
ava_sessionCreate or resume a human/org identity (userId), the first call in the loop.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
Findings
- Warn
The description contains "every other tool", wording about other tools or servers.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...l once and reuse the returned userId on every other tool."
Description, as the server wrote it Create or resume a human/org identity (userId), the first call in the loop. One human can own many agent instances (Claude + Cursor + OpenClaw + Ava-hosted). Moves no money and provisions no wallet by itself; call once and reuse the returned userId on every other tool.
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
ava_agent_recordRead an agent's track record before delegating capital to it.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Read an agent's track record before delegating capital to it. Returns mandates held, executions attempted, refusals by typed code, and receipts with their proof standing. Distinguishes CLAIMED from PROVEN: receiptsProven counts only chain-confirmed receipts; unconfirmed receipts prove nothing. AP2-aligned (each receipt's ap2.reference is the hash of the closed mandate) so an AP2-aware verifier can check it. Owner-readable always; a stranger reads only if the owner opted the record public. Zero is zero, never a placeholder.
ava_eval_mandateRead-only: check a mandate's exit conditions against a market snapshot and record the result.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Read-only: check a mandate's exit conditions against a market snapshot and record the result. Omit snapshot to pull a live CoinGecko price for the condition asset. Never executes and never moves money; ava_approve_execute is the only tool that does.
ava_get_receiptRetrieve the receipt for a prior ava_approve_execute by executionId, the loop's final step.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "ava_get_receipt" says "get": a word for reading.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...verify URL a stranger can check with no credential."
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve the receipt for a prior ava_approve_execute by executionId, the loop's final step. Returns the stored receipt plus its honest proof.standing: none (nothing submitted), unconfirmed (an identifier exists but nothing independent confirmed it), chain-confirmed (the declared chain returned the transaction and it matches what the receipt claims), or chain-contradicted (the chain disagrees with the receipt). A verified receiptHash does not by itself mean chain-confirmed; read proof.standing, not just verified. Owner-scoped: only the userId the receipt was produced for can read it by executionId; also returns a receiptHash-addressed verify URL a stranger can check with no credential.
ava_list_mandatesList capital mandates for a userId (optional filter by agentInstanceId).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "ava_list_mandates" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List capital mandates for a userId (optional filter by agentInstanceId).
ava_preview_txPre-sign preview: build the exact venue artifact (CoW EIP-712 order or unsigned Solana transaction) for a pending plan against the provisioned Turnkey wallet, simulate it where sup…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "ava_preview_tx" says "preview": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Pre-sign preview: build the exact venue artifact (CoW EIP-712 order or unsigned Solana transaction) for a pending plan against the provisioned Turnkey wallet, simulate it where supported, and return it UNSIGNED. Nothing is signed or submitted. Show the artifact to the human, then pass the returned previewHash to ava_approve_execute so the signature covers exactly what was reviewed.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:21 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 10
- Protocol version
- 2024-11-05
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 10 tools that change things (10 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.getava.xyz/mcp: tools/list returned 15 tools to an anonymous client, including ava_copilot_turn (write), ava_approve_execute (write), ava_lend_execute (write), ava_portfolio (write), ava_session (write) and 5 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnava_session
The description contains "every other tool", wording about other tools or servers.
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...l once and reuse the returned userId on every other tool."
- Infoava_copilot_turn
The input schema at properties.agentId.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.agentId.description: "...t id; uses a default testnet-scoped KYA credential when full agentCredential is omitted."
- Infoava_copilot_turn
The input schema at properties.agentCredential.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.agentCredential.description: "Optional ava.kya.agent-credential.v1 object for KYA evaluation."
- Infoava_get_receipt
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...verify URL a stranger can check with no credential."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.5.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http ava https://api.getava.xyz/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http ava https://api.getava.xyz/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__ava__ava_preview_tx",
"mcp__ava__ava_list_mandates",
"mcp__ava__ava_eval_mandate",
"mcp__ava__ava_agent_record",
"mcp__ava__ava_get_receipt"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__ava__ava_copilot_turn",
"mcp__ava__ava_approve_execute",
"mcp__ava__ava_lend_execute",
"mcp__ava__ava_portfolio",
"mcp__ava__ava_session",
"mcp__ava__ava_create_agent",
"mcp__ava__ava_provision_wallet",
"mcp__ava__ava_plan_workflow",
"mcp__ava__ava_plan_standing",
"mcp__ava__ava_create_mandate"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ava. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/xyz.getava/ava/verify?hash=c78f9d26bc46f91b5347c79d12d9879032c289e76c0af07e609656a7d874c329" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash c78f9d26bc46, from Nov 18, 2026, 11:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/xyz.getava/ava/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/xyz.getava/ava)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:55 UTC.
ava MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the ava MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 15 tools, 10 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the ava MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the ava MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the ava MCP server have?
- 15 tools: 10 write, 5 read. ava_copilot_turn, ava_approve_execute, ava_lend_execute, ava_portfolio, ava_session, ava_create_agent, ava_provision_wallet, ava_plan_workflow and 7 more.
Does the ava MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the ava MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the ava MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.