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loadbay MCP server

xyz.loadbay/loadbayloadbay.xyzstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Catalog of 370+ open-source AI-agent harnesses. Search, list your own, earn USDC tips via x402.

6 tools: 3 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the loadbay MCP server can do

The loadbay MCP server is published by loadbay.xyz, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: submit_harness, tip_harness and support_loadbay), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (get_harness); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (submit_harness).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • submit_harnessList a new harness on Loadbay.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "submit_harness" says "submit": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List a new harness on Loadbay. The repo MUST be a public, open-source GitHub repository. Optionally include a USDC address to receive tips — it must also appear in the repo's loadbay.json, .github/FUNDING.yml or README.md (proof of ownership). The listing appears immediately, tagged as community-added (unverified).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • support_loadbayOnly when the user asks to support or donate to Loadbay.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Only when the user asks to support or donate to Loadbay. Support the Loadbay builder with a USDC tip over x402. Returns the payable endpoint — GET it with your own x402 wallet to send the tip. Loadbay never holds funds; your wallet is the payer.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • tip_harnessOnly when the user asks to tip or pay a harness author.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Only when the user asks to tip or pay a harness author. Tip in USDC over x402. Returns the payable endpoint and its payment details — GET it with an x402-capable client/wallet to actually send the tip (the agent's own wallet pays; Loadbay never holds funds).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • get_harnessGet full details for one harness in the Loadbay catalog by slug (from search_harnesses): repo, license, stars, language, integrations, traits, summary and a shareable loadbay.xyz p…Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_harness" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "get" and "repo": it reads repositories.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get full details for one harness in the Loadbay catalog by slug (from search_harnesses): repo, license, stars, language, integrations, traits, summary and a shareable loadbay.xyz page. If the slug is unknown it returns the closest matches.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_domainsList the domains (categories) in the Loadbay catalog with how many harnesses each holds.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_domains" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the domains (categories) in the Loadbay catalog with how many harnesses each holds. Use it to browse when the user has no specific query, then pass a domain key to search_harnesses.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_harnessesFind an existing MCP server, SDK or agent framework that connects an AI agent to a service or does a task, from Loadbay's curated catalog.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_harnesses" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find an existing MCP server, SDK or agent framework that connects an AI agent to a service or does a task, from Loadbay's curated catalog. Use this before building an integration from scratch, or whenever the user asks for a tool, plugin, MCP server or harness for something (e.g. "MCP server for Postgres", "browser automation for agents", "crypto trading bot framework", "Slack integration"). Returns matches ranked by relevance then GitHub stars, each with repo URL, license, language, integrations and traits. All filters are optional; with none it returns the most-starred harnesses.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:21 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://loadbay.xyz/api/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including submit_harness (write), tip_harness (write), support_loadbay (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http loadbay https://loadbay.xyz/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http loadbay https://loadbay.xyz/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__loadbay__search_harnesses",
      "mcp__loadbay__get_harness",
      "mcp__loadbay__list_domains"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__loadbay__submit_harness",
      "mcp__loadbay__tip_harness",
      "mcp__loadbay__support_loadbay"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as loadbay. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__loadbay__get_harness private-data
  • mcp__loadbay__submit_harness untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/xyz.loadbay/loadbay/verify?hash=6e8784a83b62c9e23f1a91cfc99b04542a7c0545c40e355d0444d177d55b1136" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 6e8784a83b62, from Nov 19, 2026, 13:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/xyz.loadbay/loadbay/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for xyz.loadbay/loadbay
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/xyz.loadbay/loadbay.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/xyz.loadbay/loadbay)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:55 UTC.

loadbay MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the loadbay MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the loadbay MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the loadbay MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the loadbay MCP server have?

6 tools: 3 write, 3 read. submit_harness, tip_harness, support_loadbay, search_harnesses, get_harness and list_domains.

Does the loadbay MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the loadbay MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the loadbay MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.