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Scienter MCP server

xyz.scienter/scienterscienter.xyzstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Crypto forensics with sources: deployer records, OFAC matches, exchange and bridge attribution.

8 tools: 7 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 7 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 8
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

7 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Scienter MCP server can do

The Scienter MCP server is published by scienter.xyz, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 8 tools. It can create or change data (7 tools: solana_token, solana_deployer, solana_operator, wallet_score and 3 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

8 tools bring in text other people can write (solana_token, solana_deployer, solana_operator and 5 more).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

8 tools

Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
  • bridge_traceTrace an address's cross-chain bridge transfers: which transfers touched which bridge contracts, toward which chains, for how much, with the transaction hash of each.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Trace an address's cross-chain bridge transfers: which transfers touched which bridge contracts, toward which chains, for how much, with the transaction hash of each. Scienter matches the address's transfer history (its own warehouse first, a live provider inside a budget after that) against a registry of bridge contracts across seven protocols. The registry is partial by construction, so an empty result means none of the tracked contracts were touched -- never that the funds did not bridge. The coverage and the caveat come back in the same payload and must be repeated whenever the result is restated. Three outcomes: transfers found (listed with amounts and hashes); none of the registry's contracts touched (a bounded negative); not traced (the engine did not answer, and nothing may be inferred). `truncated: true` means the provider's row cap was hit and every count is a lower bound. EVM addresses only; a Solana address is out of scope, which is a different fact from clear. Args: - address (string): an EVM 0x address (a base58 Solana address answers out of scope).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • cex_attributionLook up whether an address is a labelled centralised-exchange wallet in Scienter's published exchange-wallet table, whether any address clustered with it is, and what the address's…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up whether an address is a labelled centralised-exchange wallet in Scienter's published exchange-wallet table, whether any address clustered with it is, and what the address's own exchange activity looks like: its deposits to labelled exchange wallets and any per-user deposit addresses inferred from its behaviour, read from real transfer history (activity.checked says whether that read ran). The table is small (tens of addresses, from public block-explorer labels, activity-checked on chain) and a miss means no label is held -- not that the address is unaffiliated with an exchange. Critical limit on what a hit means: an exchange hot or cold wallet is paid by millions of unrelated people. Two addresses that both funded the same exchange wallet are two customers of that exchange and nothing more. Each row carries a clusterable flag saying whether it can be used to link addresses at all; this must be repeated whenever the result is restated. Args: - address (string): an EVM 0x address or a base58 Solana address.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • ofac_checkScreen one blockchain address against the U.S.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen one blockchain address against the U.S. Treasury OFAC SDN (Specially Designated Nationals) list: a direct match on the address itself, plus the engine's two-hop proximity walk over the address's real transfer history. Two separate claims, reported separately. Three direct-match outcomes, and they must not be collapsed: - a match: the address is published on the SDN list. The designated entity, its type, its sanctions programs and the chain OFAC filed it under are returned. - no match: the whole published list was searched and the address is not on it. That is a real finding about one list on one date. - not screened: the list could not be read, so nothing was checked. Never report this as clear; point the user at https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/ instead. Proximity: when proximity_checked is true the engine walked up to two hops of transfer history (its warehouse or a live read) looking for a listed address, and reports found or not, the hop count, the path and how far it went. Being N hops from a listed address is a fact about the graph, never a designation. When proximity_checked is false nothing was walked and the result says so. A walk that could not read every address it needed is reported as WALK INCOMPLETE with how many hops are known in full, and a walk the API did not confirm as complete is reported as WALK NOT CONFIRMED COMPLETE; neither is a negative result and neither may be restated as one. Limits to repeat whenever the result is restated: SDN list only (not the EU, UN or UK/OFSI lists, and not OFAC's non-SDN lists such as SSI, NS-MBS and CAPTA); as published on a stated date; a walk bounded by hops and a node budget. A miss is not a sanctions clearance. Call this when a user asks about sanctions exposure, designation, or OFAC status for an address, so the answer is grounded in what was actually searched. Args: - address (string): an EVM 0x address or a base58 Solana address.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • solana_deployerWhat the wallet that deployed a Solana token has done before: how many of its launches settled, how many died, and whether every one of them did.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    What the wallet that deployed a Solana token has done before: how many of its launches settled, how many died, and whether every one of them did. Built from a census that has watched Solana launches prospectively since 2026-09-08, which is why it can answer a question about the deployer rather than about the token. Three outcomes, and they must not be collapsed: - flagged: every settled launch by this wallet has died. - not flagged: a settled record exists and at least one launch survived. This is NOT a positive finding; it means the screen does not fire. - no record: no settled launch by this wallet was ever recorded. This is the answer for most of the chain and it is NOT a clean record — it is a statement about coverage, never about conduct. Never report it as clear. What the flag is worth, scored once on a later window: flagged launches were still listed a day later about 0.8% of the time against about 4.3% for the rest, non-overlapping 95% intervals. It is a NEGATIVE screen. It does not identify anything worth buying, and over this same data every return bucket loses money after costs. Never restate it as a recommendation, a risk score, or a safety verdict. Case is significant: Solana addresses are base58, and a mis-cased address is a different address that will answer no record. Call this when a user asks who made a Solana token, whether a deployer has a history, or whether a launch's creator has ever had one survive. Args: - address (string): a base58 Solana wallet address, exact case.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • solana_operatorWhat the wallet that created Solana tokens has done, as one record: the settled launches and whether every one died (the same screen as solana_deployer, with the same measured wort…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    What the wallet that created Solana tokens has done, as one record: the settled launches and whether every one died (the same screen as solana_deployer, with the same measured worth), every indexed launch newest first with the name the deployer typed, the outcome and when it was checked, how often the wallet launches (last 24 hours, 7 days, active days) and whether the census marks it as launching repeatedly in the last day with no surviving launch on record, and the wallet that paid for its first transaction with how many other recorded wallets that funder paid for and how their launches ended. What it will not say: no record is not a clean record. Shared funding is an association and never identity or control. Launch names prove nothing. It is a negative screen and never a recommendation, a score or a safety verdict. Survival is a low bar. The funder rule's own verdict is quoted verbatim with the date it was scored, whichever way it went. A record of one or two settled launches is too thin to read either way and is reported as such. Case is significant: Solana addresses are base58, and a mis-cased address is a different address that will answer no record. Call this when a user asks what a Solana token's creator wallet has launched, how active that wallet is, whether it is launching in volume right now, or which wallet paid for a deployer wallet's first transaction. Args: - address (string): a base58 Solana wallet address, exact case.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • solana_tokenWho created a Solana token, and what that wallet's OTHER launches did.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Who created a Solana token, and what that wallet's OTHER launches did. Takes a mint — the identifier a user actually has — and resolves the wallet that created it, which requires a census that watched Solana launches prospectively since 2026-09-08. EVERY NUMBER IT RETURNS COUNTS LAUNCHES BY THAT WALLET, NOT EVENTS IN THIS TOKEN. Never write that the token had launches or has a death rate; the true statement is about its maker, and it is a reason to look harder at the token rather than a measurement of it. Three outcomes, and they must not be collapsed: - flagged: every settled launch by the creating wallet has died. - not flagged: that wallet has a settled record and at least one launch survived. This is NOT a positive finding; it means the screen does not fire. - no record: either the mint is not one the census publishes evidence for, or its wallet has no settled launch on record. This is the answer for most of the chain and it is NOT a clean result — it is a statement about coverage. Never report it as clear. What the flag is worth, scored once on a later window: flagged launches were still listed a day later about 0.8% of the time against about 4.3% for the rest, non-overlapping 95% intervals. It is a NEGATIVE screen. It does not identify anything worth buying, and over this same data every return bucket loses money after costs. Never restate it as a recommendation, a risk score, or a safety verdict. Case is significant: a mis-cased mint is a different mint and will answer no record. Call this when a user asks about a specific Solana token, who made it, or whether its creator has a history. Use solana_deployer instead when a deployer wallet is already known. Args: - mint (string): a base58 Solana mint address, exact case.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • wallet_scoreScienter's forensic read on one blockchain address: public block-explorer facts (age, activity, balance, bounded-window flows), the published exchange-wallet label when the address…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Scienter's forensic read on one blockchain address: public block-explorer facts (age, activity, balance, bounded-window flows), the published exchange-wallet label when the address is one, the clustering engine's entity when it answers, and itemised findings with citations. This does NOT return a risk score. Scienter publishes no calibrated wallet-risk model and this tool will never emit a number to grade an address by. It returns evidence, and it reports explicitly when a check did not run -- an empty findings list with findings_checked=false means the engine did not answer and must not be read as a clean result. Args: - address (string): an EVM 0x address or a base58 Solana address.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • receipts_lookupSearch Scienter's published forensic receipts -- written reconstructions of specific on-chain incidents -- by address or free text, and get back titles, dates, subjects and public …Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "receipts_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search Scienter's published forensic receipts -- written reconstructions of specific on-chain incidents -- by address or free text, and get back titles, dates, subjects and public URLs a human can open. There are only tens of receipts in total, each written for one investigation, so most addresses have none. No match is the normal case and is NOT evidence that nothing happened to or around the address. Unverified drafts are withheld from results and counted separately. Args: - address (string, optional): match receipts whose subject or deployer contains this. - q (string, optional): free-text match over title, description and tags. - limit (integer, optional): maximum receipts to return, 1-50 (default 20). Passing neither address nor q lists the most recent published receipts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write8
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
7
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://scienter.xyz/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including solana_token (write), solana_deployer (write), solana_operator (write), wallet_score (write), ofac_check (write) and 2 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 6, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 7

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 -> 7.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 7
  3. Tools1 added, 1 removed, 7 changed.+1 added−1 removed~7 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http scienter https://scienter.xyz/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'
claude mcp add --transport http scienter https://scienter.xyz/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__scienter__receipts_lookup"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__scienter__solana_token",
      "mcp__scienter__solana_deployer",
      "mcp__scienter__solana_operator",
      "mcp__scienter__wallet_score",
      "mcp__scienter__ofac_check",
      "mcp__scienter__cex_attribution",
      "mcp__scienter__bridge_trace"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as scienter. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 8 rules
  • mcp__scienter__solana_token untrusted-input
  • mcp__scienter__solana_deployer untrusted-input
  • mcp__scienter__solana_operator untrusted-input
  • mcp__scienter__wallet_score untrusted-input
  • mcp__scienter__ofac_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__scienter__cex_attribution untrusted-input
  • mcp__scienter__bridge_trace untrusted-input
  • mcp__scienter__receipts_lookup untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/xyz.scienter/scienter/verify?hash=eafaa341a3c1a6a3697adb5451a39935e2e42a5f23763984b13f3702f227f83a" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash eafaa341a3c1, from Nov 19, 2026, 13:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/xyz.scienter/scienter/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for xyz.scienter/scienter
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/xyz.scienter/scienter.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/xyz.scienter/scienter)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:55 UTC.

Scienter MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Scienter MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Scienter MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Scienter MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Scienter MCP server have?

8 tools: 7 write, 1 read. solana_token, solana_deployer, solana_operator, wallet_score, ofac_check, cex_attribution, bridge_trace and receipts_lookup.

Does the Scienter MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Scienter MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Scienter MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 19, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.