SoFinance MCP server
xyz.sofinancelab/sofinancesofinancelab.xyzstreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned
List same-stock LP pools on Raydium and Meteora, with 7-day fee APR estimates. Fees not guaranteed.
16 tools: 4 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 5 change things and 6 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 15
- Can send data out · 0
- 4 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here can delete or cancel things and 1 does something that can't be undone. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the SoFinance MCP server can do
The SoFinance MCP server is published by sofinancelab.xyz, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 16 tools. It can delete or cancel things (4 tools: submit_withdraw, submit_signed_transaction, submit_compound_transaction and submit_open_position), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (prepare_withdraw) and create or change data (5 tools: quote_add_liquidity, prepare_transaction, prepare_compound_transaction, quote_open_position and 1 more). 6 tools only read.
15 tools bring in text other people can write (prepare_withdraw, submit_withdraw, get_position_performance and 12 more).
The fixed checks matched 4 findings (annotation-conflict and base64-blob). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 0.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
16 tools
Deletes or cancels 4Claude Code: deny
submit_compound_transactionSubmit a signed compound transaction.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_compound_transaction" says "submit": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Submit a signed compound transaction. Re-verifies permit and summary, then broadcasts. Returns signature on success. Same safety as submit_signed_transaction.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
submit_open_positionSubmit a signed open-position transaction.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_open_position" says "submit": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Submit a signed open-position transaction. Re-verifies HMAC permit, re-reads pool/balances, re-simulates (sigVerify true, including the NFT-mint partial signature), then broadcasts. Pass signedTransaction plus permit, wallet, and the complete summary from prepare_open_position, unchanged. If the wallet rewrote the message (Phantom Lighthouse / ComputeBudget), also pass unsignedTransaction from prepare. Returns signature and the new positionMint.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
submit_signed_transactionSubmit a signed add-liquidity transaction.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_signed_transaction" says "submit": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Submit a signed add-liquidity transaction. Re-verifies HMAC permit, re-reads on-chain state, re-simulates, then broadcasts. Pass signedTransaction plus every field of submitArgs from the prepare_transaction response, unchanged. Failure modes: permit mismatch, state changed (liquidity, balance, NFT), expired (time or blockhash), simulation failure. Returns transaction signature on success.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
submit_withdrawSubmit a wallet signed withdrawal.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_withdraw" says "submit": a word for a change.
- The name "submit_withdraw" also says "withdraw": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Submit a wallet signed withdrawal. Verifies its HMAC permit and signature, checks expiry, and re-simulates before broadcast. Supply the unchanged summary and permit from prepare_withdraw. If the wallet appended extra instructions (e.g. Phantom Lighthouse), also pass unsignedTransaction from prepare_withdraw. High impact requires confirmHighImpact=true.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
prepare_withdrawPrepare a fully simulated position withdrawal with a sign link.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "prepare_withdraw" says "withdraw": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Prepare a fully simulated position withdrawal with a sign link. Default receive USDC; original keeps position tokens. Supply percent (1–100) OR targetUSDC. Impact above 5% requires confirmHighImpact. For two transactions, finalize the first then call again with stage=swap, tx1Signature and previous (the complete first result).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
prepare_compound_transactionPrepare an unsigned compound transaction.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Prepare an unsigned compound transaction. Returns base64 transaction, permit, and summary. Same safety as prepare_transaction: full simulation, HMAC permit, no private keys. After signing, use submit_compound_transaction.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
prepare_open_positionPrepare an unsigned, fully-simulated transaction that opens a new CLMM position.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "prepare_open_position" says "open": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Prepare an unsigned, fully-simulated transaction that opens a new CLMM position. Prefer passing nftMint from an agent-held Keypair so the server never signs: wallet signs first, then add the mint signature on the wallet-returned tx and call submit_open_position. Without nftMint, open signUrl: the sign page generates the mint in the browser, re-prepares, wallet signs first, then the mint (the returned tx is a preview only). HMAC permit, summary, signUrl. 1232-byte limit, fresh blockhash, full simulation. Not submit_signed_transaction — this tx has two required signers.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
prepare_transactionPrepare an unsigned, fully-simulated transaction for adding liquidity.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Prepare an unsigned, fully-simulated transaction for adding liquidity. Returns base64-encoded transaction for signing, HMAC permit, and summary. The server NEVER holds private keys. Transaction must be signed by the user/agent wallet. Includes: full simulation, 1232-byte limit check, Jupiter swap + Raydium increase_liquidity_v2, short-lived permit. Failure modes: same as quote_add_liquidity, plus simulation failure, size limit, blockhash expiry. After signing, use submit_signed_transaction.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
quote_add_liquidityGet a quote for adding liquidity to a position.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "quote_add_liquidity" says "add": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "quote_add_liquidity" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "quote_add_liquidity" says "add": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Get a quote for adding liquidity to a position. Estimates swap routes (Jupiter), price impact, output amounts, and immediate resale gap. Verifies NFT ownership, pool state, and balance. Read-only. Quotes expire quickly (configured TTL). Failure modes: insufficient balance, high price impact (>5%), resale floor breach, quote expiration, pool state changes.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
quote_open_positionQuote opening a NEW Raydium CLMM position in a pool (no existing NFT).Reads text others write3 findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "quote_open_position" says "open": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The input schema at properties.inputMint.description contains a 43-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.inputMint.description: "..."USDC" (resolved to So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112 / EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM..."
- Warn
The input schema at properties.inputMint.description contains a 44-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.inputMint.description: "...11111111111111112 / EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v), or a mint address..."
- Warn
The server marks "quote_open_position" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "quote_open_position" says "open": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Quote opening a NEW Raydium CLMM position in a pool (no existing NFT). Input SOL/USDC/pool token, amount, and a price range (presets tight ±0.05% / standard ±0.3% / wide ±1%, or custom minPrice/maxPrice in B per 1 A). Returns expected A/B after Jupiter swap-to-ratio, tick-aligned range, in/out-of-range, price impact, refundable vs non-refundable SOL rent (NFT + tick arrays), and Token-2022/freeze flags. Fails clearly on insufficient balance, >5% impact, transfer-fee/freeze, or unfunded tick arrays the wallet cannot pay. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 6Show 6 read-only tools
get_pool_range_aprEstimated 7-day fee APR of one listed pool (poolAddress from list_rwa_pairs, Raydium or Meteora) for each of the 4 range presets the site prices: Micro (±2 price steps), Tight (±0.…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_pool_range_apr" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Estimated 7-day fee APR of one listed pool (poolAddress from list_rwa_pairs, Raydium or Meteora) for each of the 4 range presets the site prices: Micro (±2 price steps), Tight (±0.05%), Standard (±0.3%), Wide (±1%). Per preset: price bounds (B per 1 A), APR %, share of the last 7 days' volume that traded inside the range, and fees per day at the site's $1,000 card basis. Also the highest-APR preset, the 7-day window, data freshness and confidence. Same saved snapshot as the pool cards on https://sofinancelab.xyz/app/rwa-pairs. New pools (too few days of data) and missing snapshots return a status with a reason and no APR. Estimates from past trading, not a promise of future fees. Fees not guaranteed. No wallet or token needed.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_position_performanceCompute holding-period return and realized fee APR for a Raydium CLMM position NFT from finalized history and current on-chain state (not Raydium pool 24h feeApr).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_position_performance" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Compute holding-period return and realized fee APR for a Raydium CLMM position NFT from finalized history and current on-chain state (not Raydium pool 24h feeApr). Prefer token-native metrics: for same-asset RWA wrap pairs (e.g. SPCXx/SPCX) report TE in the plain/base ticker using current tick mid (1.0001^tick×10^(decA−decB)), plus raw A/B inventory, holdingDays, feeOnlyAprPct and annualizedReturnPct (HPR×365/days; feesEarned/deposited×365/days). USD is optional/secondary (Jupiter Price v3 / Raydium stable-leg, labeled current — not historical). Discovers open/increase/decrease txs via personal-position signatures + Anchor events + current equity. After submitting a position transaction, use refreshHistory=true and historyAfterSignatures to require its finalized history. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_position_range_statusCompute live in-range / out-of-range status for a Raydium CLMM position from the current on-chain pool price versus tickLower/tickUpper (B per 1 A).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_position_range_status" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Compute live in-range / out-of-range status for a Raydium CLMM position from the current on-chain pool price versus tickLower/tickUpper (B per 1 A). Flags when price approaches a range edge. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
list_positionsList all Raydium CLMM positions and wallet assets.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_positions" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it List all Raydium CLMM positions and wallet assets. Returns position NFTs (with pool, ticks, liquidity) and eligible input assets (SOL, tokens) with balances. Read-only, no private keys required. Use this first to discover available positions and assets.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
list_rwa_pairsList the same-stock Solana pools on the SoFinance pools page (https://sofinancelab.xyz/app/rwa-pairs): Raydium CLMM and Meteora DLMM pools where both sides are the same stock from …Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_rwa_pairs" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "list" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it List the same-stock Solana pools on the SoFinance pools page (https://sofinancelab.xyz/app/rwa-pairs): Raydium CLMM and Meteora DLMM pools where both sides are the same stock from two issuers (e.g. TSLA/TSLAx, SPCX/SPCXx), plus the USDC/USDT pool. Served from the site's saved pools snapshot, the same list the page shows. Each pool has protocol, symbols, fee tier, TVL, 24h volume, apr7d (the highest 7-day range fee APR estimate and which of the 4 range presets it comes from: Micro, Tight, Standard, Wide), and an openPositionUrl. Filter with symbol (e.g. "TSLA"). Default order: 7-day APR, high to low. estimatedFeeAprPct / estimatedFeeAprLabel are the older pool-level 24-hour figure (last 24h fees / TVL, annualized), not a 7-day estimate; small pools can show very large values, and a pool without a 7-day estimate carries a warning. Estimates from past trading, not a promise of future fees. Fees not guaranteed. For the 4 presets of one pool call get_pool_range_apr. No wallet or token needed. Opening a position through MCP (quote_open_position / prepare_open_position) is Raydium CLMM only and needs a wallet token; Meteora pools open on the website.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
quote_compoundGet a quote for compounding a position (harvest fees/rewards, swap to ratio, reinvest).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Get a quote for compounding a position (harvest fees/rewards, swap to ratio, reinvest). Returns expected liquidity increase, swap plan, simulation results. Verifies position eligibility. Read-only. Phase one: rejects third reward tokens (no verifiable swap path). Failure modes: ineligible position, third reward token, insufficient harvested fees for minimum liquidity unit, swap plan failure.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write15
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 15, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 10
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 10 tools that change things (4 destructive, 1 irreversible, 5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://sofinancelab.xyz/api/mcp: tools/list returned 16 tools to an anonymous client, including submit_withdraw (destructive), submit_signed_transaction (destructive), submit_compound_transaction (destructive), submit_open_position (destructive), prepare_withdraw (irreversible) and 5 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "quote_add_liquidity" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "quote_add_liquidity" says "add": a word for a change.
The input schema at properties.inputMint.description contains a 43-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.inputMint.description: "..."USDC" (resolved to So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112 / EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM..."
The input schema at properties.inputMint.description contains a 44-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.inputMint.description: "...11111111111111112 / EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v), or a mint address..."
The server marks "quote_open_position" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "quote_open_position" says "open": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http sofinance https://sofinancelab.xyz/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http sofinance https://sofinancelab.xyz/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__sofinance__get_position_performance",
"mcp__sofinance__get_position_range_status",
"mcp__sofinance__list_rwa_pairs",
"mcp__sofinance__get_pool_range_apr",
"mcp__sofinance__list_positions",
"mcp__sofinance__quote_compound"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__sofinance__prepare_withdraw",
"mcp__sofinance__quote_add_liquidity",
"mcp__sofinance__prepare_transaction",
"mcp__sofinance__prepare_compound_transaction",
"mcp__sofinance__quote_open_position",
"mcp__sofinance__prepare_open_position"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__sofinance__submit_withdraw",
"mcp__sofinance__submit_signed_transaction",
"mcp__sofinance__submit_compound_transaction",
"mcp__sofinance__submit_open_position"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as sofinance. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 15 rules
- mcp__sofinance__prepare_withdraw untrusted-input
- mcp__sofinance__submit_withdraw untrusted-input
- mcp__sofinance__get_position_performance untrusted-input
- mcp__sofinance__get_position_range_status untrusted-input
- mcp__sofinance__list_rwa_pairs untrusted-input
- mcp__sofinance__list_positions untrusted-input
- mcp__sofinance__quote_add_liquidity untrusted-input
- mcp__sofinance__prepare_transaction untrusted-input
- mcp__sofinance__quote_compound untrusted-input
- mcp__sofinance__prepare_compound_transaction untrusted-input
- mcp__sofinance__submit_signed_transaction untrusted-input
- mcp__sofinance__submit_compound_transaction untrusted-input
- mcp__sofinance__quote_open_position untrusted-input
- mcp__sofinance__prepare_open_position untrusted-input
- mcp__sofinance__submit_open_position untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/xyz.sofinancelab/sofinance/verify?hash=bdcd97b3b20d00e94b342c3a00136acba6a0661bb7f64d00544de6ee465635ce" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash bdcd97b3b20d, from Nov 15, 2026, 11:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/xyz.sofinancelab/sofinance/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/xyz.sofinancelab/sofinance)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 15, 2026, 11:17 UTC.
SoFinance MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the SoFinance MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 16 tools, 10 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the SoFinance MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 4 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: submit_withdraw, submit_signed_transaction, submit_compound_transaction and submit_open_position.
Can the SoFinance MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: prepare_withdraw.
What tools does the SoFinance MCP server have?
- 16 tools: 4 destructive, 1 irreversible, 5 write, 6 read. submit_withdraw, submit_signed_transaction, submit_compound_transaction, submit_open_position, prepare_withdraw, quote_add_liquidity, prepare_transaction, prepare_compound_transaction and 8 more.
Does the SoFinance MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the SoFinance MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the SoFinance MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 15, 2026.