Teppi MCP server
xyz.teppi/teppiteppi.xyzstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Check what a paid x402 endpoint or MCP server delivered, from probes anyone can repeat.
5 tools: 2 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 5
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Teppi MCP server can do
The Teppi MCP server is published by teppi.xyz, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: plan_route and check_exposure), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
5 tools bring in text other people can write (search_capabilities, get_capability, plan_route and 2 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
check_exposureLook up every paid endpoint your agents call in one go, added up by the address each one pays: which are unknown to the record, which took money and returned nothing, which list wh…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Look up every paid endpoint your agents call in one go, added up by the address each one pays: which are unknown to the record, which took money and returned nothing, which list what they do not serve, and how much monthly spend sits on each. Unknown is reported as unknown, never as bad.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
plan_routeTurn a goal and a budget into an ordered list of paid endpoints that could reach it, with a cost estimate and what has been verified about each step.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Turn a goal and a budget into an ordered list of paid endpoints that could reach it, with a cost estimate and what has been verified about each step. Moves no money and buys nothing: it returns the plan for you to run yourself.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
check_gradeReturn what has been verified about an x402 endpoint or its url: whether it answers, what it charges, and whether that price has moved.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Return what has been verified about an x402 endpoint or its url: whether it answers, what it charges, and whether that price has moved. Answers unrated rather than guessing when the evidence is thin. Works for endpoints Teppi does not operate, and a url never seen is put in line for a free handshake, so ask again in an hour.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
get_capabilityFull detail for one capability: schemas, pricing, networks, the seller behind it, and every observation recorded against it.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_capability" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Full detail for one capability: schemas, pricing, networks, the seller behind it, and every observation recorded against it.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
search_capabilitiesSearch paid agent capabilities by task description.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_capabilities" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Search paid agent capabilities by task description. Returns the price, the input and output schemas, the networks each one settles on, and what has been verified about it. Sort by verified to put the ones with the most evidence behind them first. Use before paying an x402 endpoint you have not used.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write5
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:21 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.teppi.xyz/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including plan_route (write), check_exposure (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http teppi https://api.teppi.xyz/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http teppi https://api.teppi.xyz/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__teppi__search_capabilities",
"mcp__teppi__get_capability",
"mcp__teppi__check_grade"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__teppi__plan_route",
"mcp__teppi__check_exposure"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as teppi. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__teppi__search_capabilities untrusted-input
- mcp__teppi__get_capability untrusted-input
- mcp__teppi__plan_route untrusted-input
- mcp__teppi__check_grade untrusted-input
- mcp__teppi__check_exposure untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/xyz.teppi/teppi/verify?hash=8c61438311be8a0a4b48fb72ce541187488f1c0581b5c1d3c7d845433008dd3e" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 8c61438311be, from Nov 19, 2026, 13:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/xyz.teppi/teppi/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/xyz.teppi/teppi)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:55 UTC.
Teppi MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Teppi MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Teppi MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Teppi MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Teppi MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 2 write, 3 read. plan_route, check_exposure, search_capabilities, get_capability and check_grade.
Does the Teppi MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Teppi MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Teppi MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.